Overconfidence, ability and gender effects in an

experimental financial market by Zhao, Xinran
   
  
  
Overconfidence, Ability and Gender effects in an  
Experimental Financial Market  
  
  
  
  
By  
  
  
Xinran Zhao  
  
  
  
  
  
A Thesis Submitted in Fulfilment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of  
Philosophy of Cardiff University  
  
  
  
Economic Section of Cardiff Business School, Cardiff University  
  
  
  
May,2018  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
ii  
  
DECLARATION  
  
This work has not been submitted in substance for any other degree or award at this or any other 
university or place of learning, nor is being submitted concurrently in candidature for any degree or 
other award.  
  
Signed …………………… ………………………… …………………… (candidate)      
Date …………30/04/2018……….…………….………  
  
  
STATEMENT 1  
  
This thesis is being submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of ………(insert 
MCh, MD, MPhil, PhD etc, as appropriate)  
  
Signed………………  ……………………….……………  (candidate)      
Date …………30/04/2018………………….……………  
  
  
STATEMENT 2  
  
This thesis is the result of my own independent work/investigation, except where otherwise stated, and 
the thesis has not been edited by a third party beyond what is permitted by Cardiff University’s Policy on 
the Use of Third Party Editors by Research Degree Students. Other sources are acknowledged by explicit 
references.  The views expressed are my own.  
  
Signed……………………  ………………………………….……….…… (candidate)        
Date …………30/04/2018………….…………………  
  
  
STATEMENT 3  
  
I hereby give consent for my thesis, if accepted, to be available online in the University’s Open Access 
repository and for inter-library loan, and for the title and summary to be made available to outside 
organisations.  
  
Signed…………………  …………………………………………..…..….. (candidate)        
Date ………30/04/2018…………………………………  
  
  
STATEMENT 4: PREVIOUSLY APPROVED BAR ON ACCESS  
  
I hereby give consent for my thesis, if accepted, to be available online in the University’s Open Access 
repository and for inter-library loans after expiry of a bar on access previously approved by the 
Academic Standards & Quality Committee.   
  
Signed………………  ………………………………………..………  (candidate)        
Date …………30/04/2018……………………….………  
iii  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
Acknowledgement   
  
A PhD is a long and ambitious journey, which of course cannot be completed without 
support and encouragement. Words are never enough to express my feelings and 
appreciation towards following people who have played important roles in the 
development of this thesis.  
First and foremost, my grateful thanks are due to my primary supervisor, Dr Woon 
Wong, for his unfailing support and understanding, and the considerable time he spent 
reading and discussing my work. I also thank Qingwei Wang, for his constant support, 
dialogue and suggestions.   
My colleagues at Cardiff Business School have also been a constant source of support 
– there are too many to mention by name, but all my thanks go to each one who has 
encouraged me, attended my workshop, expressed interest in my topic and progress, or 
in any way validated my confidence that my work is interesting and worthwhile. Special 
thanks go to my officemates; it has been good to be able to share the highs and lows of 
our progress.  
Many other people have contributed to make this research project possible. My grateful 
thanks go to all postgraduates from Cardiff Business School who participated the 
underling experiments or completed questionnaires, and to IT support team for their 
cooperation.   
iv  
  
And lastly, but most importantly, my deepest gratitude and appreciation is extended to 
my family, from that of my fantastic mum and parents in law to that of my husband Fei 
and son Max, for cheerfully tolerating any disruption this caused to the household, but 
most importantly for their active encouragement and pride in my work.   
  
  
  
Abstract  
  
This thesis investigates individual’s overconfidence bias within the context of an 
experimental asset market. I relate overconfidence, gender differences and ability 
in judgement to individual’s trading performance and trading activities. The most 
robust finding that was found in the psychology of judgment issue, with people 
found to be generally overconfident and evidence of this overconfidence seen in 
several disciplines. In the financial market, the theoretical models predict that 
overconfident investors trade excessively. Consequently, trading too much is 
hazardous to investors’ wealth and performances. To contribute to the emerging 
literature on this topic, overall, 376 participants were involved in an experimental 
study, through which their degree of overconfidence in judgement have been 
measured using subjective confidence interval estimation (miscalibration test). In 
addition to misclaribration score, other psychological bias measures and control 
variables are also included. During the financial experiments, those individuals 
were allowed to trade with the virtual agents or against other participants given 
certain endowments of both cash and shares, depending on the trading rules of 
each experimental market. By varying the market structure, trading data was 
collected which that enables us to obtain a much better picture in relation to the 
actual individuals’ behaviour in this experimental environment.  
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Chapter 1. Introduction  
  
  
Rationality was widely assumed by financial economists, who believed that markets to 
be efficient and reflecting all the available information on stock prices (Fama 1970). 
However, growing evidence shows that the rational expectation model can not reconcile 
with witnessed financial market anomalies. For example, there is considerable evidence 
that when the trading volume is generally high, the consequent returns will be low 
(Barber and Odean 2000). In many empirical studies, trading volume in financial 
markets enormously exceeds what full rationality models can plausibly explain (Odean 
1999, Barber and Odean 2000).  Therefore, psychological bias affecting investor’s 
behaviour has been hypothesized and tested by an accumulation of research, all of which 
contributes to providing explanations for financial market puzzles.   
The most robust finding from previous research into the psychology of judgment is that 
most people are overconfident (Daniel et al 1998).  Various definitions and 
manifestations of overconfidence bias are mentioned in previous literature (Daniel et al 
1998, Scheikam and Xiong 2003). The Overconfidence effect has been defined as 
people tending to overestimate their ability and the accuracy of their knowledge in 
different contexts (Lichtenstein et al. 1982; Oskamp 1965; Alpert and Raiffa 1982; 
Brown 1988; Braumeister 1998). For instance, financial market theoretical models 
predict that an overconfident investor trades excessively compared to others in the 
financial market (Odean 1998).  Financial economists therefore note that 
overconfidence can finally harm an investor's wealth due to irrationally aggressive 
trading. Men and women have also been found to behave differently when trading in the 
financial market. (Barber and Odean 2001).   
The next chapter reviewing previous literature summarises a wealth of important 
research on this broad topic of overconfidence effect in the financial market. Both 
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empirical and theoretical psychologial studies have predominantly found people are 
prone to overconfidence in terms of miscalibration. While miscalibration test has been 
discussed and modelled exclusively in different studies, limited research has been 
conducted to discover the impact of other manifestations of overconfidence bias on 
financial market performance. A further limitation of much of the research in this field 
has been the lack of emphasis on the mechanism how psychological bias affect financial 
market trading outcomes. Therefore, to uncover the channel by which overconfidence 
bias affects financial market behaviours needs to be investigated. To some extent, too 
few of studies have appropriately found the causality between miscalibration and trading 
volume either empirically or experimentally.   
Lastly, a fundamental limitation of much of the research relating to this prominent topic 
has been overemphasis on overconfidence bias itself and neglect of the ability effect. 
Thus, it is important to identify the relationship between different psychological bias 
measures and trading performance to the extent that it contributes to the emerging 
literature on this topic to help explain behaviour bias in the financial market.  To this 
end, this thesis attempt to characterize the nature of association between overconfidence 
bias, proxy of ability and financial market behaviours, and that many other factors are 
at play.   
For this purpose, experimental research has been undertaken to simulate a naturally 
occurring market to investigate these relationships and associated channels.  The 
analysed and designed experiments emphasise in the causality between financial market 
performance and key overconfidence measurements by controlling extraneous variables. 
Another advantage of the experimental study is that measures of overconfidence bias 
and trading data can be collected through surveys and electronic trading games directly, 
with participants having the incentive to report genuinely and trade seriously.    
3  
  
When analysing the experimental and survey data, we initially test the hypothesis of 
‘overconfidence generally reduces trading wealth, which is robust by using different 
overconfidence measures’. This finding contributes to existing literature on the linkage 
between overconfidence measures and trading losses. In addition to the overconfidence 
measures widely suggested by psychologists and financial economists, this study 
defines a new pair of possible measures as proxy variables of ability and overconfidence. 
To the best of my knowledge, this is the first study that contemporaneously considers 
that overconfidence rank and quantitative ability rank effect on trading performance. In 
particular, we found that overconfidence reduce wealth in terms of miscalibration score. 
Furthermore, overconfidence rank and ability rank affect trading wealth simultaneously 
in two different directions, extending the scope of previous literature by discussing 
overconfidence effect with the presence of ability effect.   
Secondly, this thesis aims to make contribute to current knowledge by investigating the 
direct relationship between trading volume and psychological bias. However, no direct 
and significant association has been found in this experimental study. In contrast, we 
found that the male participants significantly traded more than their female counterparts 
under the different experimental set ups, highlighting that a significant gender effect is 
robust across different analytical models.   
Finally, the key advantage of this study is that this experimental research utilizes limit 
order book data provided by the trading game software, to help shed light on a new 
perspective to investigate the mechanism how overconfidence bias affects trading 
performance. We found that subjects who is more aggressive in placing limit orders, 
have higher ability rank and end up with higher relative wealth.   
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In summary, this thesis sets out to establish associations between psychological bias and 
financial market behaviours, and the extent that the mechanism reveals complex 
causality.  
This thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 presents previous literatures and sets out 
a theoretical background which motivate my experimental study. Chapter 3 discusses 
the experiments and variables.  Chapter 4 summarizes empirical methods and 
descriptive analysis of the data, while Chapter 5, 6 and 7 report and discuss regression 
results. Chapter 7 concludes.   
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
5  
  
  
  
Chapter 2. Literature review  
  
  
2.1 Overconfidence in judgement Background  
  
The most robust finding found in the previous psychology of judgment research is that 
people are overconfident (DeBonbt and Thaler 1985; Lichtenstein, Fishhoff & Phillips 
1982). Overconfidence is not just an artefact of psychological research but seems present 
in many real-life contexts. This argument is sufficiently evidenced in several contexts 
and supported by both theoretical and empirical findings. For example, studies show 
that overconfidence significantly affects investment performance (Hanauer 2014; 
Daniel et al. 1998).   
Moreover, as Sakalaki et al. (2005) point out, overconfidence has essential implications 
to investment decisions. Furthermore, researchers found that overconfidence has impact 
on investment or saving for retirement (Parker et al. 2012), financial market activities 
(Glaser and Weber 2007; Statman et al. 2006; Odean 1998) and stock market  
participation (Xia et al. 2014). These works of literature on overconfidence have greatly 
enhanced our understanding of investor and decision-making behaviour in financial and 
economic markets.   
  
In particular, studies on stock markets have brought the attention of many researchers 
(Odean 1999, Daniel et al., 1998). Indeed, overconfidence is perhaps the most widely 
investigated topic about behavioural bias involved in recent academic research in the 
spheres of finance and economics.  
6  
  
  
  
Although different definitions and various classifications of overconfidence are 
mentioned in the early literature (Daniel et al. 1998; Scheinkman and Xiong 203), 
overconfident behaviour has been widely defined as people tend to overestimate their 
ability and accuracy of their knowledge in the decision-making process (Lichtenstein et 
al. 1982; Oskamp 1965; Alpert and Raiffa 1982; Braumeister 1998). Recent studies in 
psychology have argued that there is strong evidence of different aspects of 
overconfidence effect. For instance, Odean (1998) found that people who are prone to 
overconfidence will overestimate the precision of the private information they receive.   
In line with the conventional literatures of psychology, this definition is called the 
miscalibration effect, which is widely known as a psychological foundation of 
overconfidence (Alpert and Raiffa 1982; Lichtensten et al. 1982). After the term  
“overconfidence” has been widely used in psychological studies, more extensions of 
overconfidence effect have been discussed in finance and economics.   
For example, as Daniel et al. (1998) put it, people who are prone to overconfidence tend 
to overestimate their private signals and lead to suboptimal trading decisions. Odean 
(1998) states that overconfident investors overestimate their ability and trade irrationally 
in the future. This irrationality may decrease trading profits and the expected utility of 
those overconfident investors (Barber and Odean 2000, 20001; Gervais and Odean  
2001; Hilary and Menzly 2006).  
  
According to Moore and Healy (2008), overestimation, overplacement and 
overprecision are precisely the most common concepts about overconfidence mentioned 
in prior studies. Firstly, as defined above, people tend to overestimate their ability and 
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power of control (Grieco and Hogarth 2009). Secondly, Moore and Healy 2008 define 
overplacement as when people believe themselves to be better than others, which is also 
known as the “better-than-average” effect (BTA). BTA is commonly referred to the fact 
that investors classify themselves of "above average level" comparing to their 
counterparts. (Moore and Healy 2008; Scott et al. 1999; Menkhoff et al. 2006). T  
he third definition is overprecision. It is also well known as “miscalibration", which 
refers to the fact that people are confident about the accuracy of their estimation (Moore 
and Healy 2008; Menkhoff et al. 2006). In addition, people may over-narrow confidence 
intervals around their answers of knowledge questions due to the excessive certainty of 
the accuracy of their estimations (Biais et al. 2005; Daniel et al. 1998; Cesarini et al.  
2006).  
  
Anecdotal evidence suggests that, in many markets, trading volumes are excessive (Dow 
and Gorton 1997). Various studies have argued that overconfidence can explain the 
active trading puzzle. As Odean (1998) points out, investors trade aggressively even 
when there is a transaction cost or expected negative payoffs. One possible explanation 
is that people are overconfident.   
They argue that overconfident investors overestimate their ability and underestimate the 
risk, which results in increasing the differences of opinions between traders and higher 
trading volume in the market. Excessive trading volume is an inevitable consequence of 
overconfidence, which has also been tested empirically in many studies (Barber and 
Odean 2000; Barber Odean and Zhu 2009; Statman et al. 2007; Griffin et al. 2007;  
Chuang et al. 2014). These studies argue that high market returns in the past have led to 
investor overconfidence, while market turnovers can be used as a measurement of 
trading activity.  
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Moreover, evidence shows that people who are adopting online trading tended to trade 
more aggressively based on unusual past personal success. They attribute their past good 
performance to ability instead of chance (Barber and Odean 2002; Choi, Laibson and 
Metrick 2002). This connection helps to explain why stock market trading volume 
increases after high returns, as has been documented in a significant number of countries 
(Griffin, Nardari and Stulz 2007).  
Statman et al. (2006) found that market turnover increases in the periods following 
higher returns. Regarding market performance, overconfidence may increase market 
depth and volatility (Odean 1998), while increasing trading activities (Griffin et al.  
2007; Odean 1998, Statman et al. 2006). Another study conducted by Griffin et al. (2007) 
investigated this dynamic relationship in 46 different markets worldwide. They 
documented that market turnover is positively and strongly related to past returns, while 
that relationship is much stronger in markets of developing countries.  
Chuang et al. (2014) extend these studies to cross-border investment. They find that 
trading activity has increased significantly in 10 Asian countries and that the 
overconfidence effect of excessive trading is more pronounced in markets with shortsale 
constraint. According to Scheinkman and Xiong (2003), overconfidence can lead to 
disagreements on asset fundamentals, while creating speculative bubbles caused by high 
trading volume and volatility.  
  
In terms of theoretical studies, trading volume increases when price takers, insiders or 
market makers are overconfident. These are the most robust findings regarding 
overconfidence (Odean 1998). Odean (1998) also found that overconfidence increases 
trading volume and market depth, while decreasing the expected utility of the investor 
under different microstructure models. Evidence from recent theoretical studies shows 
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that overconfidence plays a vital role in explaining trading anomalies in the financial 
market (Daniel et al. 1997; Odean 1998; Gervais and Odean  2001). Graham et al. (2009) 
argue that investors who over-relies on their knowledge and ability to lean toward 
undertaking high risks and so trading more. The argument suggests that competence 
may be another explanation for excessive trading in the financial market.   
Daniel et al. (1997) argue that the asset price implications of overconfidence do not 
directly address investor’s welfare. Daniel et al. (2001) then examined the pricing of 
securities regarding their risks and misevaluation. They found that the overconfidence 
bias implies stock market overreaction and correction, which is consistent with the 
empirical findings.  
The significant effect of active trading by overconfident investors is the most popular 
conclusion among early studies of decision-making (Odean 1998). Most studies 
exploring the link between confidence or competence and trading activity define trading 
activity in terms of the size of trades, either relative to the initial size of the individual’s 
portfolio (turnover) or in absolute value (Statman et al. 2006; Barber and Odean 2001; 
Glaser and Weber 2007).   
In fact, various studies have shown that trading activity measured by either trading 
volume or volatility will decrease individuals’ earning and performance (Gervais and 
Odean 2001). For example, theoretical models predict that overconfident investor trades 
excessively compared to others in the financial market (Daniel et al. 1997; Odean 1998), 
while psychological research has demonstrated that overconfidence would finally harm 
investor's wealth due to irrational trading behaviour (Barber and Odean 2000).  
Overconfidence could thus be the decisive cause of frequent trading and below average 
performance (Barber Odeanm and Zhu 2009; Barber and Odean 2002; Choi Laibson 
and Metrick 2002).   
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Barber and Odean (2000) used the accounting data of 66465 households represented by 
a large discount broker during 1991-1996. They found high trading levels alongside the 
resulting poor performance of individual investors. Although evidence shows that 
trading frequency and returns are negatively related, investors regularly engage in active 
speculation when markets turn into boom phase (Magron, 2014; Odean 1999). Odean 
(1999) suggests that overconfident traders suffer from trading losses due to their 
tendency to overvalue their private information and ability as men and women behave 
differently in the financial market.   
Odean (1998) was among the first to discover that the participation of overconfident 
investors in the market leads to high trading volume. In other words, overconfident 
traders overestimate their ability and underestimate the risk of investments, then trade 
more frequently in the subsequent period (Hishleifer and Luo 2001).  
Benos (1998) found that investors overestimated the accuracy of the information which 
then led to an increased trading volume in an auction market study. Daniel et al. (1998) 
concluded that the average behaviour of overconfidence in financial markets might 
cause harmful effects. Investor overconfidence can even explain the forward premium 
puzzle in the manner that investors tend to overreact to their evaluation about future 
inflation (Burnside et al. 2011). Daniel and Hirshleifer (2015) state that the active 
investing puzzle is defined as the excessive trading behaviour of individual investors, 
which leads to a loss during active trades.  
  
2.2. Measuring Overconfidence (Miscalibration and Other Measurements)  
  
According to conventional psychological definitions, confidence is the subjective 
probability or belief related to what we “think” will happen. (Kahneman and Tversky 
1982). Before the term “calibration” came into use, Adams and Adams (1961) proposed 
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that “realism of confidence” is important for one to discriminate realistically between 
what he knows and what he does not know. It has also been called realism (Brown and  
Shuford 1973), external validity (Brown and Shuford 1973), the realism of confidence 
(Adams and Admas 1961), the appropriateness of confidence (Oskamp, 1962), 
secondary validity (Murphy and Winker 1971) and reliability (Murphy 1973).   
The overconfidence effect has then been defined as “when confidence judgements are 
larger than the relative frequencies of the correct answers” (Gigerenzer, Hoffrage, 
Kleinbolting, 1991). In other words, when people are overconfident, they over-believe 
the accuracy of their judgement, thinking that they know more than they do know.   
In some studies, overconfidence can be referred to as a “cognitive conceit” (Block and 
Harper 1991). More precisely, in terms of probability estimate of perceived likelihood, 
Koriat, Lichtenstein and Fischhoff (1980) propose that “an individual is well calibrated 
if, over the long run, for all answers assigned a given probability, the proportion correct 
equals the probability assigned.” The robust and consistent finding among psychological 
literature is that people are not well calibrated. (Lichtenstein, Fischhoff & Phillips  
1982).  
  
The measurement of overconfidence has been a fundamental topic for behavioural 
economics after overconfidence was introduced. Overconfidence in one’s judgement, 
which is measured by miscalibration, can explain loss-making (Biais et al. 2005).  
Miscalibrated people tend to overestimate their ability and the precision of their 
information. This bias can be measured by using a confidence-interval task. The 
experiment of confidence -interval task has been widely adopted to measure  
“miscalibration” (Cesari et al. 2006; Glaser and Weber 2007; Sonsno and Regeve 2013).   
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Investors are asked to give confidence intervals estimates to questions concerning 
general knowledge with different domains. Overconfidence can then be measured by 
calculating the percentage of the accurate answer falling outside of the confidence 
interval. This percentage should equal significant level in the absence of overconfidence.   
Kirchler and Maciejovsky (2002) used a confidence-interval technique and found 
evidence of overconfident in predictions of price variation. Deaves et al. (2009) found 
that calibration-based overconfidence does engender additional trade. Moreover, there 
is little evidence that gender influences trading activities. Indeed, Biais et al. (2005) 
found that overconfidence measured by calibration test reduces trading performance.  
Psychological researchers have shown that people were particularly overconfident in 
their general knowledge judgement through a miscalibration test (Fischhoff et al. 1977; 
Lichetenstein et al. 1980). This type of miscalibration of subjective probability indicates 
that people tend to overestimate the accuracy of their knowledge (Alpert and Raiffa  
1982; Lichetensteina and Fischhoff 1980; Fischhoff, Slovic and Lichtenstein 1977). 
Evidence from the previous studies shows that the overconfidence measured by 
miscalibration is high in difficulty (Koriat et al. 1980; Lichetenstein and Fischhoff 1980; 
Ronis and Yates 1987).   
The mean percentage of miscalibration is 75 percent in Glaser and Weber's (2007) 
sample, which is much higher than the expected proportion (10% significant level in 
their study). This percentage range was between 40% and 70% in the most empirical 
studies. People may be overconfident in answering more difficult questions (Fischhoff 
et al. 1997; Lichtenstein et al. 1982; Yates 1990; Griffin and Tversky 1992).  
In other words, over-confidence is generally found to be much more prevalent when the 
questions being asked for judgment are difficult. The measurement of difficulty was 
defined by the number of subjects who answer the question correctly (Sniezek et al. 
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1990; Arkes et al. 1987). The hard-easy effect of overconfidence in subjective 
probability judgement occurs when the degree of overconfidence of calibration test 
increases with the increase in the task’s difficulty and where the difficulty level is 
measured by the percentage of correct answers (intervals) (Suantak et al. 1996; 
Gigerenzer et al. 1991). Klayman et al. (1999) also found that there are systematic 
differences between domains of questions were asked in over- or under-confidence, as 
well as systematic individual differences.  
The point-estimates of overconfidence are another popular measurement in the literature. 
Both objective and subjective information is commonly used to derive the point 
measurement of overconfidence (She et al. 2013 ; Malmendier et al. 2011). Malmendier 
and Tate (2005, 2008) use the acquisition of company's stock and option exercise time 
to quantify the level of overconfidence. Such information is readily available in the 
market data (i.e. objective information) that can enhance the reliability and replicability 
of the findings.  
  
According to the definitions of the overconfidence effect, miscalibration is only one 
manifestation of overconfidence (Moore and Healy 2008). Other aspects of investor 
trading behaviour are also consistent with overconfidence and the psychological 
processes that accompany it. For example, people sometimes expect good things to 
happen to them more often than to the peers. (Weinstein 1980; Kunda 1987). People are 
even unrealistically optimistic about pure chance events (Langer and Roth 1975; Irwin 
1953) and people have unrealistically positive self-evaluations (Greenwald 1980). In 
addition, more than 50% of investors consider their stock selections skills to be better 
than the others (Statman et al. 2006; Daniel et al. 1998), which is statistically untrue.   
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Most individuals see themselves as better than average people and most individuals see 
themselves better than others see them (Taylor and Brown1988). In particular, the 
better- than-average effect (BTA), which is the tendency of people to rate their skills 
and virtues favourably relative to a comparison group, yields direct predictions for 
economic decision-making.   
According to Moore and Healy 2008, there are three manifestations of the 
overconfidence effect: overestimate the “chance of good luck”(the illusion of control), 
overplacement (BTA) and miscalibration. The relationship between these different 
forms of overconfidence is discussed for instance, in various works of literature.  
(Larrick, Burson and Soll 2007; Glaser, Langer and Weber 2009; Healy and Moore 
2007).  
Overestimation is diagnosed if people’s absolute evaluation of their own performance 
(e.g. correct answers in a knowledge test) exceeds their actual performance (Lichtenstein, 
Fischhoff & Phillips 1982, Moore & Healy 2008). Miscalibration then indicates overly 
narrow confidence intervals that are supposed to contain true values for a set of general 
knowledge questions under a certain probability (Russo and Schoemaker 1992; Alpert 
& Raiffa 1982).   
Overplacement is typically called better-than-average effect when people rate 
themselves above average, which often occurs when people try to evaluate their 
competence in a certain domain relative to others (Alicke & Govorun 2005). Apart from 
the afore-mentioned over-optimism (Weinstein, 1980) and the illusion of control  
(Langer 1975) are associated with overconfidence in a broad interpretation of the term.  
It is well known that rationality assumption is long prevalent in financial and economic 
theory. Some researchers have modelled economies in which traders hold mistaken 
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distributional beliefs about the payoff of a risky asset. (Harris and Raviv 1993; Kandel 
and Pearson 1995; Roll 1986; Hirshleifer, Subrahmanyam and Titman 1994; Figlewski  
1978; Jaffe and Winkler 1976).   
  
In recent literature, various approaches have been pursued to reconcile overconfidence 
with rational behaviour (Healy and Moore 2007; Benabou and Tirole 2002; Brocas and  
Carrillo 2002; Compte and Postlewaite, 2004; Koszegi 2006; Santos-Pinto and Sobel 
2005). In the early overconfidence literature, overconfidence is modelled as the 
overestimation of the precision of private knowledge (Odean 1998; Glaser and Weber 
2007; Daniel et al. 1998; Scheinkman and Xiong 2003). Microstructure models with 
private signals were then comprehensively developed by Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) 
and Kyle (1985).   
Based on those conventional microstructure models, overconfidence can be introduced 
by modifying conditional variance and is defined as miscalibration effect (Odean 1998). 
This definition enables researchers to derive a new equilibrium under overconfidence 
and test hypotheses.   
The causal relationship in the next stage of the research expresses how the level of 
overconfidence influences the magnitude of the prediction error. The prediction error 
reflects how much the predicted value of a security has deviated from its fundamental 
value in the preopening periods.  
Odean 1998 forms a modelling perspective, in which overconfidence can promote 
orderly trade even in the absence of noise trading activities. He studies the markets with 
various types of investors respectively by assuming that trader, insiders and 
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marketmakers may overestimate the precision of their signal. The overconfidence 
behaviour causes lower expected utility and higher trading volume.   
De Long et al. (1990) have also shown in an overlapping generation model that 
overconfident traders who mis-perceive the expected price of a risky asset may have 
higher expected returns, though lower expected utilities than rational traders in the same 
economy. They demonstrate that the premium received by overconfidence traders is the 
compensation of the higher risk level that they create. Benos (1998) has looked at 
overconfidence in models based on Kyle (1985). In his model, investors are 
overconfident in their knowledge of the private signals of others, while they can also 
display extreme overconfidence in their own noisy signal, believing it to be perfect.  
Benos (1998) has derived similar results with Odean (1998) in an auction market. Kyle 
and Wang (1997) have also investigated overconfidence in models based on Kyle’s 
(1985) model, where overconfidence is defined as an overestimation of the precision of 
people’s own information. They demonstrate that overconfident traders may generate 
tighter distribution intervals of private signals which enable them to make more profit 
at the beginning compared to their rational opponents.  
Gervais and Odean (2001) develop a multiperiod model in which trader’s level of 
overconfidence is endogenously changing over the time. This dynamic of 
overconfidence level is due to trader’s tendency to attribute his success  
disproportionately to his own ability.   
The model describes both the process by which traders learn about their ability and how 
a bias in this learning can create overconfidence. They find that an overconfident 
investor has a higher trading volume and volatility which decreases his trading 
performance.   
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In Daniel Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyam’s (1998) study, rational risk-averse traders 
trade with risk-neutral traders who overact to private signals, properly weight public 
signals and grow more overconfident with success. They state that although 
overconfident traders are loss-making, they can earn exceed the profits made by rational 
investors in some cases. Kelley and Tetlock (2013) develop a structural model with 
informed and uninformed traders. They conclude that without the overconfidence effect, 
trading volumes would be much lower.  
  
2.3 Gender and Other Characteristic Effects  
  
Other characteristic variables can also affect overconfidence under some circumstances.  
Studies of the age indicator effect on overconfidence have been highlighted here 
(Grinbatt and Keloharju 2009; Menkhoff et al. 2013). Chuang and Sumel (2011) argue 
that financial market- related trading experience affect overconfidence. They found that 
professional traders with more past investment experience are less overconfident 
compared to their counterpart investors, while Lamber et al. (2012) find no 
overconfidence difference among students and professionals of investment decisions. 
Ekholm (2006) and Ekholm and Pasternack (2007) assume that overconfidence  
decreases with investor size.  
Finally, motivated by psychological evidence that men are more overconfident than 
women in decision domains traditionally perceived as masculine, such as finance, 
investors’ characteristics, such as gender, are another widely investigated area after 
excessive trading in the financial market. This line of research uses gender, past returns 
or experience as proxy variables of overconfidence effect to study market performance 
and investor behaviour.   
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Some empirical literatures studying household’s trading data suggests that men and 
women trade differently (Barber and Odean 2000; Barber and Odean 2001). As Barber 
and Odean (2001) found, individual traders’ turnover and profits are negatively related. 
Hence, they tested their conjecture that this is due to overconfidence by assuming that 
men are more overconfident than women. They find that men traded more than women 
such that the portfolio turnover of male participants was, on average, 45% higher by 
using brokerage data.   
They tested the prediction of 'overconfident investors will trade too much' by 
partitioning investors on the basis of gender characteristics, which provides a natural 
proxy for overconfidence. They found that men trade more than women and thereby 
reduce their returns more than women do. However, Deaves et al. (2009) found little 
evidence of a gender effect in an experimental market.  
  
  
2.4 Theoretical Background  
  
To guide and motivate the subsequent empirical and experimental analysis, this chapter 
presents the related theoretical models and discusses how these models and the main 
assumptions relate to the my research questions build on my understanding of this broad 
topic. Much of the recent studies on asymmetric information and imperfect competition 
in an asset pricing model has relied upon extensive forms introduced by Kyle (1985) 
originally.   
  
Kyle (1985) developed a single period Gaussian model. In his model setup, a risky asset 
has a random (ex post) liquidation value 𝑣̃ , and normally distributed with mean of 𝑣̃ and 
variance Σ0, 𝑣̃ ~𝑁(𝑣̃ , 𝛴0), . Suppose there are three types of risk neutral traders in the 
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market and two dates, 𝑡 = 0, 1,  for simplicity. The insider (informed trader) can observe 
the  true liquidation value 𝑣̃ and chooses the quantity 𝑥 = 𝑋(𝑣̃ ) to maximize expected 
profits. Secondly, the noisy trader (uninformed) can not observe 𝑣̃ , and trade a net order 
flow 𝑢̃ exogenously, 𝑢̃ ~ 𝑁(0, 𝜎𝑢̃2) and independent of 𝑣̃ . Market makers observe the 
total demand 𝑥 + 𝑢̃ and set the price 𝑝̃ = 𝑃(𝑥 + 𝑢̃ ) to clear the market.   
Constant pricing rule assumption:   
Suppose that for constant 𝜇, 𝜆, 𝛼, 𝛽, linear function 𝑃 and 𝑋 are given by:  
 𝑃(𝑦) = 𝜇 + 𝜆𝑦, 𝑋(𝑣̃) = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑣̃  
Profit Maximization assumption:    
Insider’s expected profit: 𝐸{𝜋|𝑣̃ } can be written as:  
𝐸[(𝑣̃ − 𝑝̃ )𝑥 |𝑣̃ = 𝑣̃] 𝐸{[𝑣̃ − 
𝑃(𝑥 + 𝑢̃ )]𝑥 |𝑣̃ = 𝑣̃}  
Insider choose 𝑥 to maximize:  
  
𝐸{[𝑣̃ − 𝑃(𝑥 + 𝑢̃ )]𝑥 |𝑣̃ = 𝑣̃} = (𝑣̃ − 𝜇 − 𝜆𝑥)𝑥  
First order condition yields:  
𝑣̃ − 𝜇 − 2𝜆𝑥 = 0  
Which solves 𝑥:  
 𝑣̃ 𝜇 
 𝑥 = −   
 2𝜆 2𝜆 
Substituting the result into 𝑥 = 𝑋(𝑣̃) = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑣̃, yields:   
1 𝜇 𝛽 = 
 ; 𝛼 = −   
 2𝜆 2𝜆 
𝑥 = 𝛽(𝑣̃ − 𝜇);  
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Market efficient condition: Given the trading strategy and order flow (𝑥 + 𝑢̃ )  
𝑃(𝑦) = 𝐸{𝑣̃ |𝑋(𝑣̃) + 𝑢̃ = 𝑦}  
𝜇 + 𝜆𝑦 = 𝐸{𝑣̃ |𝛼 + 𝛽𝑣̃ + 𝑢̃ = 𝑦}  
Which implies:   
𝜇 + 𝜆(𝑥 + 𝑢̃ ) = 𝐸[𝑣̃ |𝑥 + 𝑢̃ ]  
Normality makes the regression linear and application of projection theorem gives:  
𝑥 + 𝑢̃ = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑣̃ + 𝑢̃  
 𝑥 + 𝑢̃ − 𝛼 𝑢̃ 
 𝑍 =  = 𝑣̃ +   
 𝛽 𝛽 
Recall the assumption that 𝑣̃ and 𝑢̃ are normally distributed with:  
𝑣̃ ~𝑁(𝑣̃ , 𝛴0)  
𝑢̃ ~ 𝑁(0, 𝜎𝑢̃2)  
𝑍 = 𝑣̃ + 𝜖̃ ,  
Where   
𝜖̃ = 𝑢̃ ~𝑁(0, 𝜎𝜖̃2)  
𝛽 
Bayesian updating of a normal distribution with a normally distributed signal gives a  
 posterior  distribution  which  is  also  normal.  The  conditional  normal  
distribution(likelihood function) is   
𝑓     
Assumed normal prior with mean 𝑣̃ and variance ℎ𝑣̃−1  
𝑓    
According to proportionality, the posterior density is :  
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𝑓(𝑣̃ |𝑍) ∝ 𝑓(𝑍|𝑣̃ )𝑓(𝑣̃ )  
 ∝     
… …  
 1 𝜎𝜖̃2𝑣̃ + 𝛴0𝑍 2 
∝  ;  
𝜎𝜖̃2 + 𝛴0 
which gives the normal distribution with mean 𝐸(𝑣̃ |𝑍) and variance 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑣̃ |𝑍) are :   
𝜎𝜖̃2𝑣̃ + 𝛴0𝑍 
 𝐸(𝑣̃ |𝑍) = 𝜎2 + 𝛴0  
𝜖̃ 
𝜎𝜖̃2𝛴0 
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑣̃ |𝑍) = 𝜎 2 + 𝛴0  
𝜖̃ 
  
Essentially, the market maker observes (𝑥 + 𝑢̃ ) which is the normally distributed signal 
about 𝑣̃ , hence the posterior mean is updated to :   
 𝜎𝛽𝑢̃22 𝑣̃ + 𝛴0𝑍 𝛽𝛴0(𝑥 + 𝑢̃ ) + 𝜎𝑢̃2𝑣̃ − 𝛼𝛽𝛴0 
 𝐸[𝑣̃ |𝑥 + 𝑢̃ ] = 𝐸[𝑣̃ |𝑍] = 𝜎𝑢̃2 =
 𝛽2𝛴0 + 𝜎𝑢̃2 
𝛽2 + 𝛴0 
 𝜎𝑢̃2𝑣̃ − 𝛼𝛽𝛴0 𝛽𝛴0 
= 𝛽2𝛴0 + 𝜎𝑢̃2 + 𝛽2𝛴0 + 𝜎𝑢̃2 (𝑥 + 𝑢̃ ) = 
𝜇 + 𝜆(𝑥 + 𝑢̃ )  
Hence,  
 𝛽𝛴0 𝛽2𝛴0𝑣̃ + 𝛼𝛽𝛴0 
exp { − 
2 𝜎 𝜖̃ 2 𝛴 0 
( 𝜇 − 
𝜎 𝜖̃ 2 + 𝛴 0 
) } 
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 𝜆 = 𝛽 2𝛴0 + 𝜎𝑢̃2 ; 𝜇 = 𝑣̃ − 𝛽2𝛴0 + 𝜎𝑢̃2 = 𝑣̃ − 𝜆(𝛼 
+ 𝛽𝑣̃ )  
The maximum likelihood estimate of 𝐸[𝑣̃ |𝑥 + 𝑢̃ ] is best in the sense that it attains 
maximum efficiency and it also the minimum variances unbiased estimate, which is 
equivalently to the least square estimator1 : Substituting in for the definitions of 𝛼 = − 
𝜇 ; 𝛽 = 1 , which are derived from insider’s  
 2𝜆 2𝜆 
profit maximization problem yields:   
𝜇 = 𝑣̃  
𝜆 ,   
2 𝜎𝑢̃ 
therefore, the equilibrium price, insider’s demand and expected profit are:  
 𝑝̃    
2 𝜎𝑢̃ 
𝜎𝑢̃ 
𝑥 =  (𝑣̃ − 𝑣̃ )  
1 𝜎𝑢̃ 
 𝐸    
2 √𝛴0 
While Kyle (1985) assumes that insider can observe the realization of  the true value 𝑣̃ ,  
Odean (1998) builds a model upon Kyle’s model with different assumption. Instead 
observing 𝑣̃ , he assumes that insider’s private signal of the terminal value is noisy and 
that the insider is overconfident. In another word, prior to trading, a risk-neutral insider 
𝑖 receives a private signal  
𝑠̃ = 𝑣̃ + 𝜖̃  
                                                 
1 See Appendix A for least square estimation steps.  
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Where the random variables are normally distributed, as   
𝜖̃ ~𝑁(0, ℎ𝜖̃−1),  
𝑣̃ ~𝑁(𝑣̃ , ℎ𝑣̃−1),  
𝑢̃ ~ 𝑁(0, 𝜎𝑢̃2).  
The insider believes the precision of 𝜖̃ 𝑡𝑜 𝑏𝑒 𝜅ℎ𝜖̃, 𝜅 ≥ 1, and the precision of 𝑣̃ to be  
𝜂ℎ𝑣̃ , where 𝜂 ≤ 1. Same as in Kyle (1985)’ model, insider demand for 𝑥 (𝑣̃), noisy trader 
demand for 𝑢̃ ~ 𝑁(0, ℎ𝑢̃−1), and market makers observe the total demand:  𝑥 + 𝑢̃ ;   
The insider conjectures that the market maker’s pricing-setting function is a linear 
function of 𝑥 + 𝑢̃ , which gives   
𝑃 = 𝜇 + 𝜆(𝑥 + 𝑢̃ ).  
Insider choose to maximize his expected profit, 𝑥(𝑣̃ − 𝑃), conditional on his signal 𝑠̃ , 
and given his beliefs about the distributions of 𝑣̃ , 𝑠̃ , 𝑢̃ , and the conjectured price function.   
Market-maker conjectures that the insider’s demand function is a linear function of 𝑠̃  
𝑥 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑠̃  
Insider’s expected profit: 𝐸{𝜋|𝑣̃ } can be written as:  
𝐸[(𝑣̃ − 𝑝̃ )𝑥|𝑠̃ ]  
𝐸{[𝑣̃ − 𝑃(𝑥 + 𝑢̃ )]𝑥|𝑠̃ }  
given that 𝐸(𝑢̃ ) = 0:  
𝐸{[𝑣̃ − 𝑃(𝑥 + 𝑢̃ )]𝑥 |𝑠̃ } = (𝐸(𝑣̃ |𝑠̃ ) − 𝜇 − 𝜆𝑥)𝑥  
First order condition gives:  
𝐸(𝑣̃ |𝑠̃ ) − 𝜇 − 2𝜆𝑥 = 0  
 𝐸(𝑣̃ |𝑠̃ ) 𝜇 
 𝑥 = −   
 2𝜆 2𝜆 
To solve 𝐸(𝑣̃ |𝑠̃ ), applies Bayesian updating rule to the demand function :   
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Recall assumptions:  
𝑠̃ = 𝑣̃ + 𝜖̃  
𝜖̃ ~𝑁(0, ℎ𝜖̃−1)  
𝑣̃ ~𝑁(𝑣̃ , ℎ𝑣̃−1)  
For simplicity, 𝑣̃ = 0  
  
The conditional normal distribution is   
 
 𝑓     
According to proportionality, the posterior density is :  
𝑓(𝑣̃ |𝑠̃ ) ∝ 𝑓(𝑠̃ |\𝑣̃ )𝑓(𝑣̃ )  
Assume normal prior with mean 𝑣̃ and variance ℎ𝑣̃−1  
𝑓    
𝑓(𝑣̃ |𝑠̃ ) ∝ 𝑓(𝑠̃ |𝑣̃ )𝑓(𝑣̃ )  
    
    
𝜖̃ 𝑣̃ + ℎ𝑣̃−1  2 
  
which is the shape of normal distribution with mean 𝐸(𝑣̃ |𝑠̃ )′ and variance 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑣̃ |𝑠̃ )′:  
ℎ𝜖̃−1𝑣̃ + ℎ𝑣̃−1𝑠̃ 
 𝐸(𝑣̃ |𝑠̃ )′ = ℎ𝜖̃−1 + ℎ𝑣̃−1  
ℎ𝜖̃−1ℎ𝑣̃−1 
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑣̃ |𝑠̃ )′ = ℎ −1+ℎ𝑣̃−1  
𝜖̃ 
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If insider is overconfidence and believe the precisions are 𝜅ℎ𝜖̃, 𝜂ℎ𝑣̃ , the updated 
distribution becomes:  
𝜅−1ℎ𝜖̃−1𝑣̃ + 𝜂−1ℎ𝑣̃−1𝑠̃ 
𝐸(𝑣̃ |𝑠̃ ) = 
𝜅−1ℎ𝜖̃−1 + 𝜂−1ℎ𝑣̃−1  
𝜅−1ℎ𝜖̃−1𝜂−1ℎ𝑣̃−1 
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑣̃ |𝑠̃ ) = 𝜅
−1ℎ𝜖̃−1+𝜂−1ℎ𝑣̃−1  
with couple of lines of calculations the above results can be written as:  
𝜅ℎ𝜖̃𝑠̃ 
𝐸(𝑣̃ |𝑠̃ ) =   
𝜂ℎ𝑣̃ + 𝜅ℎ𝜖̃ 
1 
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑣̃ |𝑠̃ ) =   
𝜅ℎ𝜖̃ + 𝜂ℎ𝑣̃ 
  
Hence:  
 1 𝜅ℎ𝜖̃𝑠̃ 𝜇 
 𝑥 = ( ) −   
 2𝜆 𝜂ℎ𝑣̃ + 𝜅ℎ𝜖̃ 2𝜆 
If the linear demand conjecture holds:  
 −𝜇 1 𝜅ℎ𝜖̃ 
 𝛼 =  ; 𝛽 = ( )  
 2𝜆 2𝜆 𝜂ℎ𝑣̃ + 𝜅ℎ𝜖̃ 
Market efficient condition states:  
𝑃(𝑥 + 𝑢̃ ) = 𝐸{𝑣̃ |𝑥 + 𝑢̃ }  
𝜇 + 𝜆(𝑥 + 𝑢̃ ) = 𝐸{𝑣̃ |𝑥 + 𝑢̃ }  
Suppose market maker observes a normally-distributed signal about 𝑣̃ ∶  
𝑥 + 𝑢̃ = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑣̃ + 𝑢̃  
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 𝑥 + 𝑢̃ − 𝛼 𝑢̃ 
  = 𝑣̃ +   
 𝛽 𝛽 
Normality makes the regression linear and application of the projection theorem yields:  
𝑥 + 𝑢̃ − 𝛼 
𝐸(𝑣̃ |𝑥 + 𝑢̃ ) = 𝐸(𝑣̃ | ) 
𝛽 
 −𝛼𝛽ℎ𝜖̃ℎ𝑢̃ 𝛽ℎ𝜖̃ℎ𝑢̃ 
= 𝛽2ℎ𝑢̃(ℎ𝜖̃ + ℎ𝑣̃) + ℎ𝜖̃ℎ𝑣̃ + 𝛽2ℎ𝑢̃(ℎ𝜖̃ + ℎ𝑣̃) + ℎ𝜖̃ℎ𝑣̃ (𝑥 + 𝑢̃ ) 
=  𝜇 + 𝜆(𝑥 + 𝑢̃ )  
  
 Substituting in for the definitions of 𝛼 = − 𝜇 ; 𝛽 = 1 
( 𝜅ℎ𝜖̃ ) from insider’s profit  
 2𝜆 2𝜆 𝜂ℎ𝑣̃+𝜅ℎ𝜖̃ 
maximization problem yields:   
𝜆   
 2(𝜂ℎ + 
𝜅ℎ𝜖̃) ℎ 
𝛽  
ℎ𝑢̃(𝜅ℎ𝜖̃ + 2𝜂ℎ𝑣̃ − 𝜅ℎ ) 
𝛼 = 0  
𝜇 = 0  
  
where 𝜅ℎ𝜖̃ + 2𝜂ℎ𝑣̃ > 𝜅ℎ𝑣̃.  
With some calculations, the trading volume can be expressed as:   
𝐸,   
 𝜋ℎ𝑢̃(𝜅ℎ𝜖̃ + 
2𝜂ℎ𝑣̃ − 𝜅ℎ𝑣̃) 𝜋ℎ 
= 
1 
𝑣̃ 
√ 
𝜅 ℎ 𝜖̃ ℎ 𝑢̃ ( 𝜅 ℎ 𝜖̃ + 2 𝜂 ℎ 𝑣̃ − 𝑘 ℎ 𝑣̃ ) 
𝑣̃ 
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which is an increasing function of 𝜅, 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝑘ℎ𝜖̃ + 2𝜂ℎ𝑣̃ > 𝜅ℎ𝑣̃ . In another word, 
overconfidence increases trading volume. Furthermore, the expected profit can be 
obtained as:  
𝐸(𝑥,  
 2(𝜅ℎ𝜖̃+𝜂ℎ𝑣̃)
 ℎ𝑣̃ℎ 
which is an decreasing function in 𝜅,  and it implies that overconfidence decreases 
insider’s expected profit.  
  
  
  
2.5 Summary and Research Objectives  
  
A review of relevant theoretical models shows that overconfidence measured as an 
overestimation (miscalibration) is related to trading performance and volume. While the 
theoretical model builds on my understanding of overconfidence and market anomalies, 
the principal aim of this experimental study has been brought to my attention.   
Though existing literature has outlined a numerous meaningful studies on the issue of 
overconfidence effect, there is a certain numbers of limitations in the research on this 
broad topic. For instance, a fundamental limitation of much of the research 
overemphasise on overconfidence bias and neglect the influence of ability effect. This 
thesis attemps to contribute to existing literature by filling the gap in the prior research 
mentioned in the first chapter. Furthermore, this study is motived by the intention to 
answer the following research questions:  
( 𝑣̃  − 𝑃 ) ) = 
1 
√ 
𝜅 ℎ 𝜖̃ ( 𝜅 ℎ 𝜖̃ + 2 𝜂 ℎ 𝑣̃ − 𝜅 ℎ 𝑣̃ ) 
𝑢̃ 
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1. Literature and theoretical models generally suggest that overconfidence bias 
leads to a worse performance in financial market. To what extent do different 
overconfidence measures affect experimental financial market performance?  
2. Observed excessive trading is one of the central questions in financial economics 
context. Does the experimental data in this study support literature of 
investigating the direct relationship between overconfidence bias and trading 
activity?  
3. Does order book information help uncover the mechanism of the overconfidence 
bias effect in the financial market?  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
 Chapter 3. Experiments   
  
  
3.1. Introduction and some literature  
  
The Last chapter reviewed a wealth of theoretical and empirical studies to investigate 
the complex relationship between psychological bias and financial market performance.  
For example, Daniel et al. (1997) consider the asset price implications of overconfidence 
but do not directly address investors’ welfare, while some other papers listed below have 
studied the relationship between individuals’ welfare and one’s overconfidence level. In 
other words, overconfidence could be the decisive cause of frequent trading and below-
average performance. Barber and Odean (2000) studied account data from 66,465 
households at a large discount broker over from 1991-1996, finding that high trading 
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levels resulted in poor performance by individual investors. Odean (1999) suggests that 
overconfident traders suffer from trading losses due to their tendency to overvalue their 
private information and ability. Barber and Odean (2001) tested the prediction that 
‘overconfident investors will trade too much’ by separating investors on the basis of 
their gender characteristics, which provides a natural proxy for overconfidence, finding 
that men trade more than women and generated reduced returns by comparison.  
Recall the model reviewed in the previous chapter that has been widely used to explain 
the effect of overconfidence on investors’ trading behaviour (Odean 1998; Daniel et al. 
1998; Daniel et al. 2001). In the simplest version of the information model, the private 
signal S has a normal distribution and is defined as:  
𝑠̃ = 𝜃 + 𝜖̃  
where ϵ is a noise which is independent of 𝜃, the true value of dividends and normally 
distributed 𝑁(0, 𝜎𝜃2 ). The precision 𝜌𝜃 = 1/𝜎𝜃2 of the distribution is the inverse of the 
variance. Overconfident people will underestimate variance (𝜎𝜃2 ) and overestimate  
precision (𝜌𝜃).   
Odean (1998) points out that overconfident investors will overestimate the value of their 
private information, causing them to trade too actively and consequently earn 
belowaverage returns. He also found that under certain conditions, the overconfidence 
level has an increasing influence on per capita expected trading volume, with the 
overconfidence having a decreasing influence on expected profits. In addition to the 
direct relation between overconfidence and trading performance, the causal relationship 
that the level of overconfidence influences the magnitude of the prediction error should 
be considered as well. The prediction error reflects how much the predicted value of a 
security deviates from its fundamental value in preopening periods. We argue that the 
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estimation of precision depends on overconfidence. The higher the overconfidence level 
is, the higher the prediction error.   
  
Given this background, the literature identifies some research methodologies that have 
been used and that are based on theoretical frameworks or empirical analysis. A proper 
financial market experiment should be undertaken to collect such trading and prediction 
data and address the question of overconfidence in financial market. In experimental 
asset markets with different experimental designs, investor’s behaviour can be studied 
to mimic real-world financial market performance.  
The experimental research approach provides an alternative way for testing the excess 
trading hypothesis. Glaser and Weber (2007) studied a direct relation between investor 
overconfidence and trading volume through questionnaire and analysed in conjunction 
with investor trading data. They found that miscalibration, defined here as overly tight 
probability distributions and underestimation of volatilities, bears no relation to trading 
volumes, while only the better-than-average effect is demonstrated to correspond with 
higher trading volumes. Miscalibration is a concept that has been principally developed 
in cognitive psychology, and the level of miscalibration measured by the subjective 
probability, which is the percentage for number of correct answers fall outside the 
confidence interval given by participants. For example, student 1 were asked to answer 
22 questions with 90% confidence level, 10 pairs of upper-lower bonds contains true 
answers, then 12 correct answers that fall outside the 90% confidence interval, therefore 
the miscalibration score  is 12/22=54.5%.In another study of investor's trading 
behaviour that measures overconfidence directly, Grinblatt and Keloharju (2009) 
associate the trading behaviour of Finnish investors with the results of a psychometric 
test given to all Finnish males at ages 19-20 years. They found that investors who are 
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overconfident and prone to sensation-seeking, trade more often. This irrational 
behaviour has sound cognitive psychological foundations and is identified in a wide 
range of experiments and surveys, although they are at odds with predictions of the 
standard economic theory and are labelled as market anomalies (see Odean 1998 for a 
review).  
The existence of overconfidence in financial markets is demonstrated experimentally in 
varying conditions. Some investors are subject to the winner's curse and suffer from 
trading loss due to overestimating the precision of their signals in an experimental 
market (Bias, Hilton, Mazurier and Pouget 2005). Kirchler and Maciejovsky (2002) 
investigate individual’s trading behaviour in an experimental financial market. They test 
four hypotheses:1) Participants are overconfidence w.r.t. their created confidence 
intervals;2) Traders are overconfident with respect to the accuracy of their price 
prediction (Reject);3) The degree of overconfidence is highest in late trading periods 
and lowest in early trading periods;4) Trading volume is negatively correlated with 
individual earning. In this experimental asset market where agents trade one risky asset,  
Maciejovsky and Kirchler (2002) found that the largest overconfidence towards the end 
of the experiment when the participants are more experienced than at the beginning and 
start to rely more heavily on their (overestimated) knowledge. Similarly, Biais et al. 
(2005) measured the overconfidence and self-monitoring of 245 participants in an 
experimental financial market. The trading behaviours observed suggest 
miscalibrationbased overconfidence reduce the trading performance, while self-
monitoring enhances trading performance. They also found that gender characterises the 
experiment where the effect of the psychological variables is strong for men. As a part 
of their experiment, the overconfidence of participants is diagnosed through a general 
knowledge question set. Miscalibrated agents perform worse and earn lower trading 
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profits than their bettercalibrated counterparts. Moreover, despite the fact that the 
miscalibration itself is approximately the same for both male and female, it decreases 
trading performance in the experimental market only for men, who turn out to be much 
more aggressive traders than women (Bias et al 2005).  
Deaves et al. (2009) measured overconfidence in three manifestations while 
investigating the relationship between overconfidence measurements and trading 
activity. They found miscalibration-based overconfidence measurement plays a vital 
role in explaining higher trading volume and there is not much of evidence shows that 
gender influences trading activity.  
  
3.2. Experimental Design  
  
The objective of this thesis is to investigate the relationship between the degree of 
overconfidence and final wealth using accessible data sources, which could provide a 
superior explanation for trading behavioural bias in real financial markets. In the 
experiment, individuals are placed in a controlled market setting and given certain 
endowments of securities and cash. By varying the market structure, we can learn a great 
deal about the actual behaviour of economic agents in a simple competitive 
environment.2  
  
Then we next go on to get psychological data. There are limited studies supporting the 
precise interpretation of the measurements of overconfidence, and the relationships 
surrounding those measurements attribute to overconfidence the intuitive appeal 
                                                 
2 The variables are defined in the next section.  
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connecting trading activity in the financial markets. Some of the studies have utilised 
measures of overconfidence directly from a survey or within an experimental framework  
(Biais et al. 2005; Kirchler and Maciejovsky 2002).  
  
Overconfidence in one’s judgement, as discussed in Chapter 2, which can be measured 
by miscalibration, can offer an explanation for loss-making (Biais et al. 2005).  Mis-
calibrated people tend to over-estimate the precision of their information. This bias can 
be measured by using a confidence-interval task. Inspired by the theoretical frameword, 
Kirchler and Maciejovsky (2002) used a confidence-interval technique and found 
evidence of overconfidence in predictions of price variation. Deaves et al. (2009) found 
that calibration-based overconfidence engenders additional trade. There is however little 
evidence that gender influences trading activities. Biais et al. (2005) found that 
overconfidence measured by the calibration test reduces trading performance. The 
survey experiments of miscalibration test, as will be shown below, follows 
psychological research that has shown that people are especially overconfident in their 
general knowledge judgements when miscalibration tests are used (Fischhoff et al. 1977; 
Lichetenstein et al. 1980 ).   
This kind of overconfidence measured by miscalibration is particularly task depends 
(Koriat et al. 1980; Lichetenstein and Fischhoff 1980; Ronis and Yates 1987). In other 
words, over-confidence is generally found to be much more prevalent when the 
questions being asked for judgment are difficult.34 Klayman et al. (1999) also found 
systematic differences between domains of questions that are asked and that are related 
to over- or under-confidence, as well as finding systematic individual differences.   
                                                 
3 Difficulty is measured by the number of subjects who answered the questions correctly (Arkes et al.  
4 ; Sniezek et al. 1990).  
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Following the studies mentioned above, we calibrated subjects’ overconfidence level 
with 22 general knowledge questions to get miscalibration score. The subjects were 
asked to provide estimated intervals, for which they are 90 per cent confident that the 
intervals contain the correct answers for each question. People being generally prone to 
overconfidence indicates that the provided intervals are too narrow on the basis of 
assumed 90 per cent confidence level. The alternative to report overconfidence measures 
from this general knowledge survey method, in which the widths of each the intervals 
were documented, provides another possible measure of overconfidence level. The 
smaller the interval, the higher the overconfidence degree. 5  
  
Our basic analysis focuses on the direct association between overconfidence level of the 
participants and their trading performance. As well-mentioned above, the subjects have 
to participate in two experiments, which are a survey experiment and a trading game 
experiment.    
  
3.2.1. Survey Experiment  
The survey experiment is designed to collect psychological measures and characteristic 
measures.  
 In order to analyse the direct consequences of miscalibration and other overconfidence 
measures in the financial market, a well-established quantifiable approach is used in this 
thesis.   
                                                 
5 The definitions of different measures are shown in the section of ‘Defining variables’.  
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We follow  Lichtenstein, FIschhoff and Phillips (1982), Klayman et al. (1999) and Bias 
et al 2005 by using a confidence interval test in which subjects are asked to specify 
interval estimations for which that they are 90 percent sure that the true answer of each 
question falls within the range provided. If subject is said to be overconfident or 
miscalibrated, it typically means that the subject has given intervals that are too narrow 
to contain the true answer more than 10 percent of the time.   
For example, Biais et al 2005 found that university students had the correct answer 
within the stated range of an average 36 percent of the time. While the mean degree of 
overconfidence in Klayman et al 1999’s study was 48 per cent, indicating that the correct 
answer fell inside the subject’s confidence intervals 52 per cent of the time. Russo and 
Schoemaker (1992) also found that the correct answer fell inside their participants’ 
confidence interval from 42% to 62% of the time. Utilizing the same miscaliration 
procedure to elicit interval estimations, this study has found that the participants to be  
generally prone to overconfidence in judgment and have an average 72%  
overconfidence level.   
  
Method  
The survey experiments presented in this study used two questionnaires to look for 
psychological bias measures and participants’ characteristics. We collected participants’ 
characteristic measures, including gender, age, trading experience and others. In 
addition, participants were asked about the questions to measure the illusion control.6 
Furthermore, after the financial market experiments, they have to fill the postexperiment 
questionnaire.   
                                                 
6 The last five questions on Questionnaire 2 shown in Appendix B. The definition is in section of 
“Defining Variables” in this chapter.    
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The experiment of survey questionnaires used the same procedure to ascertain the 
miscalibration score as Bias (2005). These experiments were conducted to investigate 
miscalibration, better-than-average effect, the illusion of control and provide other 
possible measures of psychological bias.   
  
Participants  
Two groups of students from Cardiff Business School participated in the experiments as 
part of their coursework assessments in the module “Investment and Electronic  
Trading”. 281 postgraduate students participated in an network experiment in 2017. 90 
postgraduate students participated in an stand-alone experiment as a robustness check.   
  
Design:   
Participants were asked to respond to 22 questions of questionnaire 2 and provided a 
pair of lower bound and upper bound for each question, such that they were 90 per cent 
sure the correct answer fell into the range. This technique of confidence interval 
estimation was conducted to measure miscalibration score and other associated 
measures.  In addition, participants were asked to fill the questionnaire 1 to provide some 
basic information about themselves, for example, gender and age. 7  The last five 
questions in the questionnaire 1 were also asked to generate the illusion of control 
measure as well. 7  
  
Procedure:   
                                                 
7 The corresponding questionnaires used for experiments are shown in Appendix 
B.  7 The definitions of all the variables are shown in Chapter 4 8 Required by 
University Research Committee.  9 Questionnaire is shown in appendix B.  
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Prior to the financial market experiments, participants were asked to sign a consent 
form8 to consent to the use of their information and trading data in this experimental 
research. The students were instructed to participate in completing questionnaire 1 and 
2 in the experiments. As per the requirements by Ethics Committee, the subjects can 
choose not to answer any of those questions and opt out the experiments at any time. 
After completing the financial market experiments (trading games), the participants 
were asked to fill in a post-experimental questionnaire, which asked them to compare 
their performance with the peers.9  
  
3.2.2. Financial market experiments  
  
To gain further insights into the mechanism behind the association of overconfidence 
and trading performance, the experimental trading games were designed to gather 
experimental trading data after survey experiments.   
Following the theoretical literature, we consider 2 experimental financial markets  in 
which assets are bought and sold by participants. These experiments are in-module 
experiments whereby all of the students from this module were randomly assigned to 
trading game groups. All students had previously taken a lecture and tutorials about 
financial market activities and therefore had basic information and knowledge of the 
experimental financial market.   
The main difference between two experiments concerns the rule of each trading game. 
The first experiments conducted with students in 2015 was a stand-alone trading game, 
while the second experiment in 2017 was a network game. The network game allows 
students to trade against each other in the same group. Each trading experiment lasts for 
approximately 60 minutes, including instruction and practice. There was a sequence of 
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six trading sessions in an experimental financial market, each of which lasted five 
minutes. At the end of each period, the asset will be paid out as dividends.   
  
Software and trading rules  
  
Teaching and Research Electronic Simulator (TRETS) was used to simulate a 
singleasset financial market, in which participants can place limit orders and market 
orders8.  A distinguishing feature of the limit order markets is that investors can provide 
liquidity by submitting limit orders or consume liquidity by submitting market orders. 
Limit orders specify a price and the number of shares available for sale or purchase. The 
price is pre-specified, so they can not always be matched with orders on the other side 
upon arrival. They are then stored in a limit order book while waiting to be executed. 
Market orders are executed with certainty at the best available quoted prices on the 
market.  The trading statistics and limit order book information are stored for empirical 
analysis automatically after each trade. All of the participants were postgraduate 
students with no previous experience in any similar experiment and had been involved 
in Survey Experiments illustrated in this chapter. At the beginning of each trading 
session, before any trading took place, participants were given private information 
regarding the value of the true dividend per share, with this information shown on a 
ticket or computer screen. After receiving the privately distributed dividend signal, 
participants were required to write down their own prediction about the realization of 
the true dividend value. Hence, the prediction error could be calculated based on the 
                                                 
8 The brief introduction about the software is shown in Appendix B.   
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absolute value of the difference between the true dividend and each participant’s 
prediction.9   
Before any trade occurred, each participant had the same amount of cash (300 
experimental currency) and share endowments (50 shares of a single risky asset). Figure 
2 shows the sequence of the events in the experiment. For each session, subjects could 
buy and sell any number of shares subject to having sufficient funds and shares.10 At the 
end of the experiment, the participants’ performances were privately marked, with this 
mark accounting for 10 per cent of their final grade of this module’s assessment, which 
was the incentive and was documented in the instructions.   
Another advantage of this analaytical designed financial market experimental market is 
that it can report the details of each order submitted by participants and this wealth of 
limit order book information is able to shed light on the study of aggressiveness 
behaviors and overconfidence bias.   
  
3.3. Defining variables  
  
A survey experiment is an important resource for different research disciplines because 
it helps to collect characteristic variables. Together with the panel data set obtained from 
trading experiments, the unique nature of the data sets allows this study to analyse how 
behaviours and performance of individuals change over time. This thesis empirically 
analyses both survey data and trading experimental data. The average value of each 
variable is defined for cross sectional analysis. The variables with both time and 
crosssectional dimensions are collected for panel data estimation.   
  
                                                 
9 The definition of prediction error in is the next chapter.   
10 Short selling and borrowing money are restricted in our experiments.  
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Relative Final Wealth:   
The Final wealth of each student includes cash and the value of holding shares at the 
end of each session, which is defined as end of session positions multiplied by true 
dividend of the group in the session plus end of session cash. Let 𝑊𝑖𝑗 denotes relative  
final wealth which measures how far the individual i’s final wealth in session j differs 
from the group average or initial wealth.13    
Suppose individual 𝑞′ s final wealth in session 𝑗 of group 𝑘  is 𝑊𝑞𝑗𝑘 , where 𝑗 = 
1, 2, 3,4,5,6 ,  which indicates that there are 6 sequences of sessions; 𝑘 = 1,2,3. . 𝐾, 𝐾 
6, which represents that there are maximum 6 groups in each session. 𝑞 = 
1,2,3, … 𝑄, 𝑄 ; there are a maximum of 9 traders in each group.   
In a network game, then the group 𝑘′ s average of 𝑄 traders in session 𝑗  is :  
 𝑄 𝑘 
  𝑘 𝑞  𝑊𝑞𝑗  
 𝑊𝑗 𝑄 
Then the relative wealth of individual 𝑖 among all the participants is: 14  
                                                      
13 For financial market experiment 1 (stand alone game), the relative final wealth =student i’s final wealth 
/ his or her initial wealth; for experiment 2(network game), the formula is shown in the next page.   
14 In a stand alone game, relative final wealth:  
𝑊𝑞𝑗𝑘 − 𝑊 𝑖𝑗𝑘0 
 
 𝑊𝑖𝑗 = 𝑊 𝑖𝑗𝑘0   
Where 𝑊 𝑖𝑗𝑘0 is individual 𝑖′𝑠̃ initial wealth of each session 𝑗.   
𝑊𝑞𝑗𝑘 − 𝑊 𝑗𝑘 
 𝑊𝑖𝑗 = 𝑊 𝑗𝑘   
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Where 𝑖 = 1,2 … 𝑛, 𝑛 is the total number of the participants, n=281. The percentage 
difference is defined as the nature log term of relative final wealth formula shown above 
multiplied by 100. The first dependent variable from our data can be written as:  
𝑊𝑞𝑗𝑘 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝐿𝑛𝑊𝑖𝑗 ≈ 𝐿𝑛 ( 𝑊 𝑗𝑘 ) ∗ 100  
In order to show the crude association between psychological measures and trading 
performance, the cross sectional regression is needed. Therefore, the average 
performance across 6 sessions of each individual 𝑖:  
  
 𝐿𝑛𝑊𝑖𝑗  
𝑦1𝑖 =    
6 
  
Trading activity:   
The first proxy variable of trading activity in this paper is the total number of shares 
transacted in each session. Suppose individual 𝑞  bought 𝑏𝑞𝑗𝑘 shares and sold 𝑠̃𝑞𝑗𝑘 shares 
in session𝑗 group 𝑘, then the total absolute volume is calculated as follows:  
𝑦𝑖𝑗 = 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑗 = 𝑉𝑜𝑙1𝑘𝑗 = 𝑏𝑞𝑗𝑘 + 𝑠̃𝑞𝑗𝑘  
 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑗 
𝑦2𝑖 =   
6 
Where 𝑦2𝑖 is the average absolute volume across six sessions for cross sectional analysis.   
  
Overconfidence measurements:   
A number of overconfidence-related variables were ascertained from the experimental 
survey data. Generally speaking, the higher the value of the overconfidence variable, the 
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higher the overconfidence level. To measure overconfidence through survey questions, 
the first question is whether the answer is verifiable as the degree of confidence level in 
judgement.  Therefore, a well-mentioned quantifiable approach is converting the degree 
of belief into an estimation of the subjective probability that the judgment is 
correct.(Kahneman and Tversky (1982), Gigerenzer hoffrage and  
kleinbolting  1991, DeFinetti 1962). The subjective probability is one’s estimation about 
the probability of a judgement is of being correct, and which has been frequently 
expressed as confidence. ( Adams and Adams 1961). For example, saying “ I am 90 % 
sure that stock price will be £1 per share” indicates a degree of uncertainty and have a 
small margin of room for error. Suppose we are interested in the judgement of a student 
on questions about his or her general knowledge. In principle, we can measure the 
overconfidence level as how this student is miscalibrated.   
Miscalibration score(Miscal): is a concept that has been principally developed in 
cognitive psychology, and the level of miscalibration measured by the subjective 
probability, which is the percentage for number of correct answers  fall outside the  
confidence interval given by participants.    
  
𝑁𝑜. 𝑜𝑓 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑣̃𝑎𝑙𝑠̃ 𝑑𝑜 𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑛 𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑎𝑛𝑠̃𝑤𝑒𝑟𝑠̃ 
𝑥1𝑖 = 𝑎𝑣̃𝑔𝑀𝑖𝑠̃𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑖 =   
22 
  
For example, student 1 were asked to answer 22 questions with 90% confidence level, 
10 pairs of upper-lower bonds contains true answers, then 12 correct answers that fall 
outside the 90% confidence interval, therefore the miscalibration score  is 12/22=54.5%. 
Rank of disability/Ability: The confidence-range tasks of the survey capture the 
overconfidence level based on subjective probability. The subject is said to be 
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miscalibrated if the proportion of correctness is less than confidence level (90%). In 
another word, the subject is overconfidence if the intervals are too narrow to include the 
true answers for more than 10% of the time. Therefore, here we define another two 
measures relate to confidence-range questions to elicit overconfidence or psychological  
bias.    
ocRankgood(ability): Rank of ability is the measure of ability of individual 𝑖. The score 
of ability equals to the average widths of intervals of 5 easiest (most accurate ) questions 
as follows:  
|𝑊𝑖𝑑𝑡ℎ 𝑜𝑓 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑣̃𝑎𝑙| 
𝐴𝑏𝑆𝑖 = 𝑖𝑗  
5 
Where 𝑗 = 1𝑠̃𝑡, 8𝑡ℎ, 11𝑡ℎ, 15𝑡ℎ, 22𝑡ℎ questions in the survey. Then the rank of ability 
is defined as:  
𝑥2𝑖 = 𝑜𝑐𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑔𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑖 = 𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘[𝐴𝑏𝑆𝑖] The individual with 
smallest average width has highest rank of ability ocRankbad: (disability): Rank of 
disability is the measure of overconfidence of individual 𝑖 . The score of overconfidence 
equals to the average widths of intervals of 6 hardest ( least accurate) questions as 
follows:  
|𝑊𝑖𝑑𝑡ℎ 𝑜𝑓 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑣̃𝑎𝑙| 
𝑂𝑐𝑆𝑖 = 𝑖𝑗  
6 
Where 𝑗 = 9𝑡ℎ, 12𝑡ℎ, 13𝑡ℎ, 17𝑡ℎ, 18𝑡ℎ, 20𝑡ℎ question in the survey. Then the rank of 
overconfidence is defined as:  
𝑥3𝑖 = 𝑜𝑐𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑏𝑎𝑑𝑖 = 𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘[𝑂𝑐𝑆𝑖]  
The individual with smallest average width has highest rank of overconfidence As 
mentioned in previous chapter, this confidence-range test is highly depending on the 
difficulty or the domains of tasks are being asked. For answering more difficult 
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questions, the subject is more prone to overconfidence because of lower rate of accuracy, 
which is known as “hard-easy effect”. (Suantak et al 1996). The hard-easy effect of 
overconfidence in subjective probability judgement occurs when the degree of 
overconfidence of calibration test increases as task difficulty increases and where 
difficulty is measured by the percentage of correct answers (intervals) (Suantak et al. 
1996; Gigerenzer et al. 1991). In addition, we have noticed that the subjects response to 
easy or hard questions differently.  
More precisely, when the question is easy, subject’s judgement is correct with a high 
probability and when the probability is higher than confidence level, the subject is said 
to be under confidence. Comparing to two participants with same confidence –task, they 
all have 90% accuracy and they are all well calibrated, but one subject’s average width 
of intervals is smaller than the other one. Based on miscalibarition score, they are the 
same, but the width is telling you that the smaller the width the better skilled subject 
with higher knowledge.    
Thereby, the smaller the confidence intervals are, the higher the ability with easiest 
questions, while the smaller the width of confidence intervals are, the higher the 
overconfidence with hardest questions.  
Thus, our finding can also confirm that the significant hard-easy effect of 
overconfidence exists in this experimental environment.   
  
Other measurements of psychological variables:  
According to the definitions of overconfidence, people tend to overestimate their ability 
and accuracy of their knowledge. Miscalibration and ranks of overconfidence/ability 
measure overconfidence through subjective probability, while we argue that the intuitive 
prediction errors could also provide some quantifiable measures of overconfidence.   
45  
  
Prediction error of survey questions(Svpred): individual 𝑖 ’s percentage prediction error 
of the accuracy of 22 survey questions.   
𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑣̃𝑖𝑑𝑢̃𝑎𝑙 𝑖′𝑠̃ 𝑝̃𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 
𝑥4𝑖 = 𝑎𝑣̃𝑔𝑠̃𝑣̃𝑝̃𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖 = ln( )  
𝑁𝑜. 𝑜𝑓 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑣̃𝑎𝑙𝑠̃ 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑛 𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑎𝑛𝑠̃𝑤𝑒𝑟 
  
Dividend prediction error(avgpderr): is the average absolute deviation of individual 𝑖′ 
s dividend prediction from true dividend  
 |𝑇𝑢̃𝑟𝑒 𝐷𝑖𝑣̃𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑗𝑘 − 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑗𝑘 | 
𝑥5𝑖 = 𝑎𝑣̃𝑔𝑝̃𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑖 =   
6 
Prediction error of Better-than-average(𝑏𝑡𝑎𝑖)  
The better-than-average score and the illusion of control scores are designed to capture 
the overconfidence effect. Following Glaser and Weber (2007)’s study, the subjects in 
this experiment were asked to provide a percentage estimate of how many participants 
of their peers would have better performance than themselves. And the prediction error 
of this better-than-average score is expressed as:   
50% − 𝑒𝑠̃𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖 
𝑏𝑡𝑎 =   
50% 
Average score of illusion of control(𝑖𝑜𝑐𝑖)  
The illusion of control is defined as inappropriate confidence of a subject if  he attributes 
the chance of success to his ability(Langer 1975). The illusion of control score is the 
cognitive error and defined as:   
5 − 𝑎𝑛𝑠̃𝑤𝑒𝑟𝑖 
𝑖𝑜𝑐𝑖 =   
4 
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∑5𝑖=1 𝑖𝑜𝑐𝑖 
𝑖𝑜𝑐   
There are five questions about the illusion of control measure and is shown in 
questionnaire 1 in the Appendix. The illusion of control score is the average score across  
5 questions, with the highest value of 1 and lowest value of 0.   
Other control variables  
In this section, we also introduce other characteristics of the subjects. The data set is 
conducted from questionnaire 1 through survey experiment. The variables are defined 
as follows:   
Gender:                         𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑖 = 1  for female subject.  
Nationality:                     𝑛𝑖 = 1  for Chinese;   
Academic Background:  𝑏𝑐𝑖 = 1  for Frist class graduated;   
                                        𝑠̃1𝑖 = 1  for IEBF students;   
                                        𝑠̃2𝑖 = 1  for FE students;   
Experiences:                𝑒𝑚𝑝̃𝑖 = 1 for subject who was employed in financial market;                                                     
𝑠̃𝑡𝑖 = 1 for subject who has self-online trading experience.  
  
Order book information:   
In an order driven market like our trading game, participants can submit both limit orders 
and market orders.   
We conduct a number of variables from order book data in the network trading game.  
In particular, we thus constructing the elicited individual’s expectations about execution 
prices from each time period. In order to characterize such individual beliefs by order 
price they indicate, we compute the order aggressiveness as following steps.  
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Order aggressiveness:  
𝑝̃𝑖𝑗𝑛  is individual 𝑖′ s 𝑛𝑡ℎ order ‘s price, 𝑠̃𝑖𝑗𝑛 is the order size. where 𝑛 = 1,2, … . 𝑁, in 
session 𝑗 , group 𝑘. 𝑝̃𝑛 is 𝑛𝑡ℎ order’s transaction price. Then the first order 
aggressiveness measure is calculated by comparing order price and the bid/ask prices in 
the limit order book at the time of the submission. We write individual 𝑖 ′𝑠̃ rank of 
aggressiveness of order 𝑛 as follows:  
  
𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘[𝐴𝐺𝑆1]𝑛𝑖𝑗 
 6 , 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟 
  5 , 𝑝̃𝑖𝑗𝑛 > 𝐵𝑒𝑠̃𝑡 𝑎𝑠̃𝑘 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎 𝑏𝑢̃𝑦 𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟; 𝑝̃𝑖𝑗𝑛 < 𝐵𝑒𝑠̃𝑡 𝑏𝑖𝑑 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎 𝑠̃𝑒𝑙𝑙 𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟 
  4 , 𝑝̃𝑖𝑗𝑛 = 𝐵𝑒𝑠̃𝑡 𝑎𝑠̃𝑘 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎 𝑏𝑢̃𝑦 𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟; 𝑝̃𝑖𝑗𝑛 = 𝐵𝑒𝑠̃𝑡 𝑏𝑖𝑑 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎 𝑠̃𝑒𝑙𝑙 𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟 
 = 3 ,                                            𝐵𝑒𝑠̃𝑡 𝑏𝑖𝑑 < 𝑝̃𝑖𝑗𝑛 < 𝐵𝑒𝑠̃𝑡 𝑎𝑠̃𝑘                              
 
 
  2 , 𝑝̃𝑖𝑗𝑛 = 𝐵𝑒𝑠̃𝑡 𝑏𝑖𝑑 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎 𝑏𝑢̃𝑦 𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟; 𝑝̃𝑖𝑗𝑛 = 𝐵𝑒𝑠̃𝑡 𝑎𝑠̃𝑘 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎 𝑠̃𝑒𝑙𝑙 𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟 
 {1 , 𝑝̃𝑖𝑗𝑛 < 𝐵𝑒𝑠̃𝑡 𝑏𝑖𝑑 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎 𝑏𝑢̃𝑦 𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟 ; 𝑝̃𝑖𝑗𝑛 > 𝐵𝑒𝑠̃𝑡 𝑎𝑠̃𝑘 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎 𝑠̃𝑒𝑙𝑙 𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟 
  
 𝑁𝑛 𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑛𝑖𝑗 
𝑚  , 𝑛 = 1,2, … . 𝑁,   
𝑁 
Where 𝑝̃𝑖𝑗𝑛  is individual 𝑖′ s 𝑛𝑡ℎ limit order ′𝑠̃ price in session 𝑗 group 𝑘.  Therefore 𝑚1𝑖𝑗 
denotes the aggressiveness measure of student 𝑖 in session 𝑗 which is calculated by the 
ranking rule above. Consequently, a higher rank indicates higher overall aggressiveness 
of orders and associated attitude towards risk, while lower valueo 𝑚1𝑖𝑗 suggest lower 
aggressiveness and more risk averse.   
  
Trading Activity  
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Recall that each network trading game group has 8 traders. As we are interested in the 
ranked activities in each network-trading group, we calculated the total share size which 
elicits the demand for individual 𝑖  in session 𝑗 as follows:  
  
𝑁 
𝐴𝐺𝑆  𝑠̃𝑖𝑗𝑛  
𝑛  
𝑚2𝑖𝑗 = 𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘[𝐴𝐺𝑆2𝑖𝑗],  
  
where 𝑠̃𝑖𝑗𝑛 is the order size of 𝑛𝑡ℎ order in session 𝑗. We write 𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘[𝐴𝐺𝑆2𝑖𝑗] = 8 of the 
individual with highest 𝐴𝐺𝑆2𝑖𝑗 in the group.   
  
We define another trading activity variable from limit order book information which 
builds on 𝑚2𝑖𝑗 as follows:   
𝐴𝐺𝑆2𝑖𝑗 
𝐴𝐺𝑆3𝑖𝑗 =   
𝑁 
𝑚3𝑖𝑗 = 𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘[𝐴𝐺𝑆3𝑖𝑗]  
𝐴𝐺𝑆3𝑖𝑗 denotes the average trading activity per order and the 𝑚3𝑖𝑗 = 𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘[𝐴𝐺𝑆3𝑖𝑗] = 8 
of the individual with highest 𝐴𝐺𝑆3𝑖𝑗 in the group.   
  
VWAP-Price   
The last variable has been conducted from order book data is the measure of the 
deviation between (limit) order price and VWAP. The VWAP is shown in the Trading 
Statistics panel of the software when the market is opened. 11  
                                                 
11 The screenshot of the software’s user interface is shown in appendix B.   
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𝑝̃ 𝑚 
 𝐴𝐺𝑆4𝑛𝑖𝑗 = {𝑉𝑊𝐴𝑖𝑗 −𝑃𝑉𝑊𝐴𝑛 − 𝑝̃𝑃 𝑖𝑗𝑚𝑖𝑗𝑛  ,,𝑏𝑢̃𝑦𝑠̃𝑒𝑙𝑙  𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑠̃𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑠̃  
𝑖𝑗 
  
∑𝑁𝑛=1 𝐴𝐺𝑆4𝑛𝑖𝑗 
𝑚4𝑖𝑗 = ,   
𝑁 
Where 𝑝̃ 𝑖𝑗𝑚 denotes individual 𝑖′ s 𝑚𝑡ℎ order ′𝑠̃ transaction price in session 𝑗 and 
𝑉𝑊𝐴𝑃𝑖𝑗𝑛 is the 𝑉𝑊𝐴𝑃 figure shown on individual′𝑠̃ trading software screen at the time 
when the order 𝑚 is executed at price 𝑝̃ 𝑖𝑗𝑚.  
In real life trading market, VWAP is used sometime as a proxy for fair price, which can 
help investors consider if their execution prices were consistent and in line with fair 
market prices. Simply say, a negative value of 𝐴𝐺𝑆4𝑛𝑖𝑗 indicates better performance and 
a positive value indicates underperformance. In another word, the higher the value of 
4𝑛𝑖𝑗 , the lower the performance of 𝑛𝑡ℎ order. Hence the average order performance of 
individual 𝑖 can be expressed as:   
∑𝑁𝑛=1 𝐴𝐺𝑆4𝑛𝑖𝑗 
𝑚4𝑖𝑗 = ,   
𝑁 
Chapter 4. Methodology  
As we have seen previous discussions, the principle aim of this thesis is to investigate 
in an experimental financial market. To analysis experimental data, regression plays an 
exceptionally critical role. To review the fundamental properties and implications of 
regression methods, we next go on to the discussion of OLS regression method to start 
with.   
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4.1 OLS  
  
To gain the crude empirical association between different measures of overconfidence 
and financial market performance, I firstly estimate a single equation multivariate linear 
model using Ordinary Least Square method for cross sectional data set and panel data 
set as follows relation (1):  
𝑦𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑂𝑣̃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖 + Γ𝑋′ + 𝜖̃𝑖  
Where 𝑦𝑖 is individual 𝑖′𝑠̃ average performance across six sessions and refers to average 
relative final wealth or average absolute volume. 𝛼, 𝛽1, Γ, are unknown parameters and 
need to be estimated.The key variable of interest is the impact of 𝑜𝑣̃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑖 on 
𝑦𝑖 , which refers to different overconfidence bias measures collecting from survey 
experiments. The coefficient 𝛽1 of 𝑜𝑣̃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖 indicate the separate and marginal 
effects of overconfidence measures. I also include a group of control variables 𝑋′ which 
can be collected from survey and refers to gender, age, and other characteristics of the 
subjects, for example, including academic background and working experiences. 𝜖̃𝑖 is 
unobserved error term with certain properties and refers to  
the part of 𝑦𝑖 left unexplained by 𝑜𝑣̃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖.   
  
4.2 Dummy Variables in Regressions  
  
Recall the previous multivariate regression model:  
𝑦𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑂𝑣̃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖 + Γ𝑋′ + 𝜖̃𝑖,  
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Where 𝑋′ is expressed by a group of dummy variables to indicate the presence or absence 
of demographical effect. Suppose 𝑋′ = 𝐷𝑖,   𝐷𝑖 = 0  or 1. The above equation becomes 
to:  
𝑦𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑂𝑣̃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖 + γDi + 𝜖̃𝑖,  
With constant effect of 𝐷𝑖 on outcome, the conditional expectation of the above equation 
can be expressed as:  
𝑦1𝑖 = 𝐸[𝑦𝑖|𝐷𝑖 = 1] = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑂𝑣̃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖 + 𝛾 + 𝐸[𝜖̃𝑖|𝐷𝑖 = 1]  
𝑦0𝑖 = 𝐸[𝑦𝑖|𝐷𝑖 = 0] = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐸𝑂𝑣̃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖 + 𝐸[𝜖̃𝑖|𝐷𝑖 = 0]  
  
Then the observed outcome (𝑦𝑖) shifts to 𝑦1𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑂𝑣̃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖 + 𝛾 + 𝜖̃𝑖 if  
𝐷𝑖 = 1; or 𝑦0𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑂𝑣̃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖 + 𝜖̃𝑖 if 𝐷𝑖 = 0. Therefore the outcome 𝑦𝑖 can 
be expressed as:  
𝑦𝑖 = 𝑦0𝑖 + (𝑦1𝑖 − 𝑦0𝑖)𝐷𝑖 + 𝜖̃𝑖,  
Where the estimate of (𝑦1𝑖 − 𝑦0𝑖) = 𝛾 . For example,  𝐷𝑖 = 1 , if individual 𝑖  is female; 0 
otherwise. The regression of 𝑦𝑖 on 𝐷𝑖 presents the causal effect of interest, 𝛾 . Then the 
estimation result of 𝛾 suggests that the outcome of 𝑦𝑖 for a female trader is higher than 
the outcome of a male trader by about 𝛾 amount. In the following empirical chapters, 
we consistently estimate 𝛾 and test if there is significant gender effect among the 
subjects. If 𝛾 is significantly positive, which indicate a gender difference effect on the 
outcome and female individual’s performance are much higher. There are also other 
control dummy variables describe student characteristics such as age, academic 
background, financial market experiences.   
If these controls are uncorrelated with 𝑜𝑣̃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖, then they will not affect the 
estimate of 𝛽𝑖. In another word, estimate of 𝛽 1 in the long regression:  
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𝑦𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑂𝑣̃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖 + Γ𝑋′ + 𝜖̃𝑖,  
will be close to the estimate of 𝛽 1 in the short regression of no control dummies. 
Inclusion of control variables 𝑋′, although not necessary in the study of overconfidence 
effect, may generate more precise estimators of the causal effect of interest, 𝛽 1 . 
Although the control variables are uncorrelated with 𝐷𝑖 , they have substantial 
explanantory power for 𝑦𝑖.   
Therefore regression is a useful and straightforward tool for the discussion of causal 
issue, with the presence of experimental or survey data.  
  
4.3 Panel data model  
  
As discussed in Chapter3, the experimental trading game in this study was designed to 
collect trading data of the subject across six trading periods. The analysis of panel data 
estimation is applicable has been widely by economists. Before we get into the next 
important question of which panel data model is appropriate, It is conductive to review 
the nature of panel data and highlights the advantages of using panel data for regressions.  
The use of panel data has increased dramatically since the pioneering research of 
financial market experiments. Before proceeding to review the panel data estimating 
methodology, a quick review of various conceptual definitions of panel data regression 
and data properties. A data set containing observations with both time dimension and 
cross-section dimension is called panel data (Wooldrige 2002).  Panel data analyses do 
not require that the time period in which different individuals or sampling units are 
observed are exactly the same. Unbalanced panel is acceptable for regression. Baltagi 
(2008) suggests that, depending on the superior nature of panel data, panel data 
estimation reduces the volume of multicollinearity problems when comparing to 
crosssection and time series analysis.   
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The financial experiments carried out in this study provide trading data for each 
individual 𝑖 and across six periods. In order to determine the impact of survey measured 
overconfidence bias in the experimental financial market, we use panel data analysis as 
the main econometric analysis technique in addition to cross sectional OLS estimation.   
Consider the following linear panel model with unobserved effect:  
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑥𝑖𝑡 + 𝑐𝑖 + 𝑢̃𝑖𝑡,  
where 𝑐𝑖𝑡 is the unobserved effect;   𝑖 = 1,2, … 𝑛, 𝑡 = 1,2, … 𝑇. 𝑥𝑖𝑡 is a 1 × 𝐾 vector that 
contains all the regressors. The error terms can be denoted as :  
𝜖̃𝑖𝑡 = 𝑐𝑖 + 𝑢̃𝑖𝑗,   
where:  
𝐸(𝜖̃𝑖1𝜖̃𝑖2|𝑥) = 𝐸[(𝑐𝑖 + 𝑢̃𝑖1)(𝑐𝑖 + 𝑢̃𝑖2)|𝑥] = 𝐸(𝑐𝑖𝑐𝑖 + 𝑐𝑖𝑢̃𝑖2 + 𝑢̃𝑖1𝑢̃𝑖2)|𝑥] 
= 𝐸(𝑐𝑖𝑐𝑖|𝑥) + 𝐸(𝑐𝑖𝑢̃𝑖2|𝑥) + 𝐸(𝑐𝑖𝑢̃𝑖1|𝑥) + 𝐸(𝑢̃𝑖1𝑢̃𝑖2|𝑥) = 𝐸(𝑐𝑖𝑐𝑖|𝑥) 
≠ 0  
Therefore, the “No serial correlation ” assumption of OLS regression is violated.  
Viewed in this light, it is apparent that OLS regression cannot obtain “consistent” 
estimators (Wooldrige, 2002).  It is necessary, therefore, to find an alternative method 
to OLS regression. Two commonly applied alternatives are random effects methods and 
fixed effect methods. Both of these methods assumes 𝐸(𝑢̃𝑖𝑡|𝑥, 𝑐𝑖) = 0.  The random 
effect methods assumes that 𝐸(𝑐𝑖|𝑥𝑖) = 0,  while the fixed effect method dose not retain 
any such assumption.   
  
4.3.1 Fixed effect model(FE)estimators  
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝑥𝑖𝑡𝛽 + 𝑐𝑖 + 𝜖̃𝑖𝑡  
where 𝛾𝑖 is the unobserved effect and 𝑐𝑜𝑣̃(𝑥𝑖, 𝛾𝑖) ≠ 0  
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Within Estimator:  
𝑦𝑖𝑡 − 𝑦 𝑖 = (𝑐𝑖 − 𝑐𝑖) + (𝑥𝑖𝑡 − 𝑥 𝑖)′𝛽 + (𝜖̃𝑖𝑡 − 𝜖̃𝑖 )  
𝑦𝑖𝑡 − 𝑦 𝑖 = (𝑥𝑖𝑡 − 𝑥 𝑖)′𝛽 + 𝑣̃𝑡  
Where 𝑣̃𝑡 = (𝜖̃𝑖𝑡 − 𝜖̃𝑖 ).  
Within estimator is the OLS estimator of above equation, within estimator of FE model 
is consistent.   
𝐶𝑜𝑣̃(𝑣̃𝑡, 𝑣̃𝑡−1 ) = 𝐸 ((𝜖̃𝑖𝑡 − 𝜖̃𝑖 )(𝜖̃𝑖,𝑡−1 − 𝜖̃𝑖 ))  
 𝜎𝜖̃2  𝜎𝜖̃2  𝜎𝜖̃2  
 = 0 − − +   
 𝑇 𝑇 𝑇 
𝜎𝜖̃2  
= −   
𝑇 
𝑐𝑖 = 𝑦 𝑖 − 𝑥 𝑖′𝛽 𝑊,  
Problem: T must be large for consistency of 𝛼 𝑖.  
LSDV-Least square dummy variable Fixed effect estimator:  
  
   𝑦1 𝑒 0 0 𝛼1 𝑋1 𝜖̃1 
 [ ⋮ ] = [0 ⋱ 0] [ ⋮ ] + [ ⋮ ] 𝛽 + [ ⋮ ]  
 𝑦𝑁 0 0 𝑒 𝛼𝑁 𝑋𝑁 𝜖̃𝑁 
𝑒 
where 𝐷 = [0 
0 
0 
⋱ 
0 
0 
0] is the cross-sectional dummy variable.  
𝑒 
  
First difference estimator:  
  
′ 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 − 𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 = (𝑐𝑖 − 𝑐𝑖 ) + (𝑥𝑖𝑡 − 𝑥𝑖,𝑡−1) 𝛽 + (𝜖̃𝑖𝑡 − 𝜖̃𝑖,𝑡−1)  
  
First difference estimator is the OLS estimator of the above equation. It is consistent.  
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𝜔𝑡 = (𝜖̃𝑖𝑡 − 𝜖̃𝑖,𝑡−1)  
𝐶𝑜𝑣̃(𝜔𝑡, 𝜔𝑡−1) = 𝐸 ((𝜖̃𝑖𝑡 − 𝜖̃𝑖,𝑡−1)(𝜖̃𝑖,𝑡−1 − 𝜖̃𝑖,𝑡−2))  
= 0 − 0 − 𝜎𝜖̃2 − 0  
= 𝜎𝜖̃2  
Though, the fixed effect estimators can generally provide unbiased and consistent 
estimators, it has other drawbacks. In this thesis, we aim to investigate the impact of 
overconfidence bias onto financial market performance. As stated before, the 
timeinvariant variables will be eliminated by the data transformation of fixed effect 
mode. Therefore, random effect model can be carried out but with more strict 
assumptions to hold.    
  
4.3.2 Random effect model(RE)  
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝑐𝑖 + 𝑥𝑖𝑡𝛽 + 𝜖̃𝑖𝑡  
where 𝛼𝑖 is the unobserved effect and 𝑐𝑜𝑣̃(𝑐𝑖, 𝑥𝑖) = 0. Random effect models belong to 
the method of GLS estimation. The key issue is whether the random effect model should 
be used in the panel data given the assumption that 𝐸(𝑢̃𝑖𝑡|𝑥𝑖𝑡, 𝑐𝑖) (Wooldrige, 2002).   
Between estimator:  
𝑦 𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝑥 𝑖𝛽 + (𝛾𝑖 − 𝛼 + 𝜖̃ 𝑖)  
where 𝑦 𝑖 = 𝑇  ∑𝑇𝑡=11 𝑦𝑖𝑡 , 𝑥 𝑖 = 𝑇  ∑𝑇𝑡=11 𝑥𝑖𝑡 , 𝜖̃ 𝑖 = 𝑇  ∑𝑇𝑡=11 𝜖̃𝑖𝑡   
  
GLS estimator:  
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛾𝑖 + 𝑋𝑖𝑡′ 𝛽 + 𝜖̃𝑖𝑡  
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝑋𝑖𝑡′ 𝛽 + (𝛾𝑖 + 𝜖̃𝑖𝑡)  
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1 
2 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝑋𝑖𝑡′ 𝛽 + 𝑢̃𝑖𝑡  
Since 𝑢̃𝑖𝑡 = 𝛾𝑖 + 𝜖̃𝑖𝑡 is serial correlated over times and OLS estimator is not efficient,  
GLS is consistent and efficient for RE models.  
𝜎𝛾2,          , 𝑡 ≠ 𝑠̃ 
𝐶𝑜𝑣̃[(𝛾𝑖 + 𝜖̃𝑖𝑡), (𝛾𝑖 + 𝜖̃𝑖𝑠̃)] = {𝜎𝛾2 + 𝜎𝜖̃2, 𝑡 = 𝑠̃  
 1 1 1 
𝛺−2𝑦𝑖 = 𝛺−2𝑊𝑖𝛿 + 𝛺−2(𝛾𝑖 + 𝜖̃𝑖)  
𝑦𝑖𝑡 − 𝜆 𝑦 𝑖 = (1 − 𝜆 )𝜇 + (𝑥𝑖𝑡 − 𝜆 𝑥 𝑖)′𝛽 + 𝑣̃𝑖𝑡   
where 𝑣̃𝑖𝑡 = (1 − 𝜆 )𝛾𝑖 + (𝜖̃𝑖𝑡 − 𝜆 𝜖̃𝑖 ) and 𝜆 is consistent estimator for 𝜆 = 1 − 
 𝜎𝜖̃   
(𝑇𝜎𝛾2+𝜎𝜖̃2) 
The feasible GLS(FGLS) estimator is the OLS estimator of 𝛽 in the above model. FGLS 
is consistent and full efficient for RE models but is inconsistent for FE model.  Still use 
OLS even when heteroscedasticity is suspect, but to adjust standard errors and test 
statistics so that they are valid in the presence of arbitrary heteroscedasticity16.   
  
  
  
4.3.3 Hauman and Taylor model  
  
It is possible that some random individual unobservable effect are correlated with 
repressors, 𝑐𝑜𝑣̃(𝑐𝑖, 𝑥𝑖) ≠ 0. If the strict exogenous assumption of 𝑐𝑜𝑣̃(𝑐𝑖, 𝑥𝑖)=0 is not 
hold, the random effect estimator is biased and inconsistent.  For the purpose of 
investigate the change of time-invariant variable (Overconfidence bias, eg.), with 
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√ ∑ 𝑁 𝑖 = 1 
possible 𝑐𝑜𝑣̃(𝑐𝑖, 𝑥𝑖) ≠ 0, Hausman and Taylor  (1981) suggest a panel data model to 
address this issue.   
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝑥1′𝑖𝑡𝛽1 + 𝑥2′𝑖𝑡𝛽2 + 𝑧1′𝑖𝛼1 + 𝑧2′𝑖𝛼2 + 𝑐𝑖 + 𝑢̃𝑖𝑡.  
                                                      
16 Asymptotic Normality of OLS estimator:  
𝑦𝑖 = 𝑥𝑖𝛽 + 𝑢̃𝑖  
 𝑁 −1 𝑁 
 𝛽 𝑂𝐿𝑆 = 𝛽 + (𝑁−1 ∑ 𝑥𝑖′𝑥𝑖 ) (𝑁−1 ∑ 𝑥𝑖′𝑢̃𝑖 )  
 𝑖=1 𝑖=1 
  The asymptotic distribution of OLS estimator:  
𝑁 
 𝑥𝑖′𝑥𝑖 ) 𝑥𝑖′𝑢̃𝑖 )  
 𝑖=1 𝑖=1 
 therefore asymptotic variance of OLS estimator:  
𝑁 
𝐴 𝑣̃𝑎 𝑟(𝛽 ) = (𝑋′𝑋)−1 (∑ 𝑢̃ 𝑖2𝑥𝑖′𝑥𝑖  ) (𝑋′𝑋)−1  
𝑖=1 
                  𝑢̃ 𝑖2𝑥𝑖′𝑥𝑖  is the White standard errors or Huber standard errors, or Heteroskedasticityrobust 
standard errors used for the estimations of the following chapters.  
In this model, 𝑥1𝑖𝑡 is time varying and uncorrelated with 𝑐𝑖; 𝑧𝑖𝑡 is time-invariant variable 
and uncorrelated with 𝑐𝑖. 𝑥2𝑖𝑡 and 𝑧2𝑖 are allowed to correlate with 𝑐𝑖.  
  
Hausman and Taylor (1981) assume that:  
𝐸[𝑐𝑖|𝑥1𝑖𝑡, 𝑧1𝑖] = 0  𝐸[𝑐𝑖|𝑥2𝑖𝑡, 𝑧2𝑖] ≠ 0  
𝑉𝑎𝑟[𝑐𝑖|𝑥1𝑖𝑡, 𝑧1𝑖, 𝑥2𝑖𝑡, 𝑧2𝑖] = 𝜎𝑐2  
𝐶𝑜𝑣̃[𝑢̃𝑖𝑡, 𝑐𝑖|𝑥1𝑖𝑡, 𝑧1𝑖, 𝑥2𝑖𝑡, 𝑧2𝑖] = 0 𝑉𝑎𝑟[𝑢̃𝑖𝑡 
+ 𝑐𝑖|𝑥1𝑖𝑡, 𝑧1𝑖, 𝑥2𝑖𝑡, 𝑧2𝑖] = 𝜎2 = 𝜎𝑢̃2 + 𝜎𝑐2  
𝜎𝑐2 
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𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟[𝑢̃𝑖𝑡 + 𝑐𝑖, 𝑢̃𝑖𝑠̃ + 𝑐𝑖|𝑥1𝑖𝑡, 𝑧1𝑖, 𝑥2𝑖𝑡, 𝑧2𝑖] = 𝜌 = 𝜎 2  
The model assumes that some of the regressors are correlated with random effect 𝑐𝑖, 
therefore leads to convergence problem of either OLS or GLS estimators. Hausman and 
Taylor (1981) then propose that, to get consistent estimators, the mean-LSDV method 
is applied to get valid instruments:   
(𝑦𝑖𝑡 − 𝑦 𝑖) = (𝑥1𝑖𝑡 − 𝑥 1𝑖 )′𝛽1 + (𝑥2𝑖𝑡 − 𝑥 2𝑖)′𝛽2 + (𝜖̃𝑖𝑡 − 𝜖̃𝑖 )  
𝑥1𝑖𝑡 − 𝑥 1𝑖 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑥2𝑖𝑡 − 𝑥 2𝑖 act as instruments that produce unbiased estimates (Christopher 
and Ruper, 1988).12  
  
4.4 Regression models   
  
In viewed of the above methods, the following single equation regression models are 
built up and run as described to test the different hypotheses of each empirical chapters 
from Chapter 5 to Chapter 7.   
  
Model    1:  Cross sectional regression  
  𝑦𝑖 = 𝛼1 + 𝛽1𝑂𝑣̃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖 + 𝛣𝑋 + 𝜖̃𝑖  
Model 2: Pool OLS regression of Panel data  
  𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼1 + 𝛽1𝑂𝑣̃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖 + 𝛣𝑋 + 𝜖̃𝑖𝑡  
Model 3: Random effect model of Panel data  
  𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼1 + 𝛽1𝑂𝑣̃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖 + 𝛣𝑋 + 𝑐𝑖 + 𝜖̃𝑖𝑡  
Model 4: Hausman Taylor mode of Panel data  
  𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼1 + 𝛽1𝑂𝑣̃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖 + 𝛣𝑋 + 𝑀𝑖𝑡 + 𝑐𝑖 + 𝜖̃𝑖𝑡  
                                                 
12 Hausman and Taylor model steps are shown in Appendix C.  
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Where:  
𝑦𝑖= Average relative final wealth or volume across 6 sessions of student 𝑖   
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = Relative final wealth or volume of student 𝑖 for 6 sessions. 𝑖 = 1,2, … , 𝑛; 𝑡 = 
1,2,3,4,5,6  
𝑂𝑣̃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖 =difference overconfidence measurement variables defined in the 
previous chapter. They are Miscalibartion, overconfidence and ability as a pair of 
measurements, better-than-average effect, the illusion of control, prediction errors.   
𝑀𝑖𝑡 :Ordre book measurements,  𝑚1𝑖𝑡, 𝑚2𝑖𝑡, 𝑚3𝑖𝑡, 𝑚4𝑖𝑡 , which refers to order 
aggressiveness, total order size, shares per order, VWP-price difference  
𝑋 = (𝑏𝑐𝑖, 𝑠̃1𝑖, 𝑠̃2𝑖, 𝑒𝑚𝑝̃𝑖, 𝑠̃𝑡𝑖, 𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑖, 𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖, 𝑛𝑖, 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠̃𝑐𝑜𝑠̃𝑡𝑖)′: are the control variables  
defined in the previous chapter.   
𝛣 = (𝛽2, 𝛽3, 𝛽4, 𝛽5, 𝛽6, 𝛽7, 𝛽8, 𝛽9, 𝛽10): are the coefficients of control variables.  
𝑠̃𝑡= unobservable time fixed effect.   
𝑐𝑖= unobservable individual effect.   
  
4.5 Data and Descriptive Statistics.   
  
According to the section of “Defining Variables” in Chapter 3, the data sets have been 
collected from trading game experiments and survey experiment.   
  
Table 1 summarizes descriptive statistics for relative final wealth and absolute volume. 
Column 1 reports mean, median, minimum, maximum, skewness, kurtosis and the 
numbers of observations for average relative final wealth across six sessions used in 
cross-sectional regressions. Further, column 3 presents the same statistics for relative 
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final wealth used in Panel Data analysis with both cross-sectional and time dimensions. 
The sample shows that the mean for relative final wealth is negative and close to zero, 
which highlights that the average for deviations from individual’s final wealth to the 
group mean is close to zero.   
Table 1. Summary statistics of Relative Final Wealth and Absolute Volume  
  
  Cross-Sectional  Panel Data  
      
  Relative  Absolute  
 Final Wealth  Volume  
    
 Relative  Absolute  
Final Wealth  Volume  
  𝑊 𝑖  𝑉 𝑖  
 𝑊𝑖𝑗  𝑉𝑖𝑗  
Mean  -0.01  59.21  -0.02  59.44  
Median  -0.13  50.20  -0.05  49.00  
Standard Deviation  1.16  40.47  2.19  52.56  
Min  -3.10  6.33  -9.34  0.00  
Max  4.70  243.67  8.35  425.00  
Skewness  0.82  1.77  0.06  2.33  
Kurtosis  4.78  7.21  5.12  11.04  
 
  
Figure 1A and Figure 1B plots histograms for relative final wealth under both 
crosssectional level and panel data level to characterise skewness and kurtosis.  
Skewness measures symmetry while, kurtosis measures the shape of tails relative to a 
normal distribution. As can be seen that the distributions are nearly symmetric and bell-
shaped with slightly more weight in the tails.    
  
  
Observations  281  281  1686  1686  
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Figure 1a Histogram of Average Relative Final Wealth (𝑊 𝑖)  
  
  
Figure 1b.  Histogram of Relative Final Wealth (𝑊𝑖𝑗)  
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By way of preliminary analysis of psychological variables, Table 2 presents the 
descriptive statistics for the survey measurements. Miscal’s mean is 0.74 which is 
slightly higher than previous studies of 0.50 ( Biais, et al. 2005). A possible explanation 
for the average higher miscalibration found in our study is that the subjects are Chinese 
students. According to Yates, et al (1989) pointed out, region, age and background affect 
the probability judgement of the subjects. Menkhoff et al. 2013 argue that students tend 
to be more overconfident than professionals according to miscalibration test.  Table 3 
presents the statistics of dummy variables that control the characteristics of subjects.  
Table 4 presents the correlation analysis results for overconfidence variables and gender.  
It is observed that, in general, the independent variables are not highly correlated.   
  
  
Table 2. Summary Statistics of Survey Measurements  
                
  ocRankgood  ocRankbad  avgsvpred  MisCal  avgpder  bta  ioc  
Mean  25.90  44.33  0.08  0.74  0.60  0.15  3.08  
Median  25.90  44.33  0.08  0.74  0.50  0.15  3.08  
Standard  
Deviation  
5.64  8.52  1.37  0.12  0.68  0.17  0.38  
Min  2.20  2.00  -1.00  0.23  0.17  -0.99  1.40  
Max  42.60  71.33  10.00  0.95  5.96  0.99  4.60  
Skewness  -0.40  -0.28  3.01  -0.72  6.91  -0.20  -0.03  
Kurtosis  4.32  5.39  18.64  4.28  53.31  14.29  5.32  
Observations  281               
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Table 3. Summary Statistics of Demographic Variables   
    
  n  bc  s1  s2  emp  st  gender  
Mean  0.01  0.45  0.73  0.18  0.07  0.36  0.66  
Median  0.00  0.00  1.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  1.00  
Standard  
Deviation  
0.11  0.50  0.45  0.39  0.25  0.48  0.47  
Min  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  
Max  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  
Skewness  8.68  0.21  -1.02  1.63  3.42  0.57  -0.67  
Kurtosis  76.35  1.04  2.03  3.67  12.70  1.32  1.45  
 Observations  281              
 
  
Table 4.  Correlation Coefficients  
  
  ocRankgood  ocRankbad  avgMisCal  avgsvpred1  avgpder  ioc  bta  gender  
ocRankgood  1.00                
ocRankbad  0.38  1.00              
avgMisCal  0.16  0.44  1.00            
avgsvpred1  0.08  0.07  0.19  1.00          
avgpder  -0.02  -0.07  0.00  0.03  1.00        
ioc  -0.02  -0.01  -0.04  -0.13  0.08  1.00      
bta  -0.04  0.01  0.04  -0.04  -0.01  0.13  1.00    
gender  -0.08  0.03  0.12  0.00  0.01  -0.04  0.04  1.00  
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Chapter 5. Investigating Overconfidence Measures Effects on 
Final Wealth (network experimental market)  
5.1. Introduction  
  
To date, a strong relationship between overconfidence bias and financial market trading 
performance has been established. (Statman et al. 2006; Barber and Odean 2000; Barber 
and Odean 2001). Previous studies suggest that this cognitive biases may have a 
significant role in affecting an individual’s decision-making behaviours in different  
markets (Scheinkman and Xiong 2003). Some different manifestations of  
overconfidence biases have been documented in the literature, and the associated impact 
on financial market behaviours have been investigated (Cesarini 1999; Menkhoff 2006;  
Daniel, et al. 1998; Biais, et al. 2005).   
It has been found that investors are prone to overconfidence in terms of miscalibration 
(Daiel et al. 1998). Many people tend to think that their knowledge and abilities are 
better than average (Menkhoff 2006).  People sometimes believe that they have more 
power to control event outcomes than they actually have. The illusion of control causes 
them to place too high a probability on their success (Langer 1975; Scott et al. 2003).  
The literature generally supports the hypothesis that overconfidence, in terms of 
miscalibration, reduces the trading profits, final wealth, and market performance, and 
that a gender effect is also observed, with male traders having a larger trading volume 
than female traders (Barber and Odean 2001). The gender effect is also explored in more 
details in the next chapter.   
Glaser and Weber (2007) argue that it is not only important to investigate into the linkage 
between overconfidence bias and trading, but it is also crucial to identify whether and 
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which psychological biases affect trading behaviour. More precisely, it is interesting to 
establish which kind of overconfident, i.e, miscalibration, BTA,  with respect to one’s 
knowledge, ability in judgement, or the misperception of the accuracy of information, 
is able to forecast market outcomes, which, in turn, might inspire future research on how 
to attenuate such biases.   
  
This chapter aims to contribute to the academia in this field by assessing the relationship 
between trading performance and overconfidence bias measures, looking at the effects 
of various overconfidence bias measures, gender and other demographic variables in an 
experimental financial market (see the design in chapter 3). This experiment builds on 
the stand alone experiment by expanding the experimental design into a network trading 
market.  
However, the studies of cognitive bias have often failed to evaluate the ability effect on 
trading performance because it was a variable that was left-out. While the effect of 
miscalibration and gender on trading performance have been found in the previous 
literature, too few studies have taken a detailed look at how overconfidence and ability 
can simultaneously affect trading performance. This chapter will also attempt to 
investigate the impact of a pair of overconfidence and ability measurements defined in 
this study (see the definitions in Chapter 3) on trading performance.   
It is noted across the existing literature that better-than-average effect and illusion 
control appear to affect trading performance and decision-making (Menkhoff 2006;  
Langer 1975).  This chapter will also investigate the extent of the relationship between 
other measurements mentioned in previous literature of overconfidence bias and trading 
performance.   
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5.2. Hypothesis   
The hypotheses are:    
1. Mis-calibration reduces relative final wealth in an experimental financial market.  
The result makes contributions to the literature on experimental analysis of 
overconfidence effect. We can see significant and consistent miscaibration effect on 
relative final wealth.  
2. Overconfidence and ability measurements defined in this chapter affect relative final 
wealth.   
This chapter is the first quantitative study of the relationship of calibrated ability and 
overconfidence and experimental financial market performance. We found that ability 
rank enhance relative final wealth, while overconfidence reduce relative final wealth.   
3. Better-than-average, the illusion of control, prediction error as other forms of 
overconfidence are found to reduce relative final wealth.   
This chapter also attempts to contribute to the literature looking at various measures of 
overconfidence experimentally and empirically. However, there is no significant effect 
of other measures onto relative final wealth in this study.   
4. There is a significant gender difference in relative final wealth.   
We can not see any gender difference among the subjects in their relative final wealth.   
  
5.3. Regression Results and Discussions  
This section presents and discusses the findings of cross-sectional and panel data 
regression results using network experiments data. The principle aims of this chapter are 
investigating the impacts of different time-invariant overconfidence measures on 
relative final wealth, with OLS and Random effect models being run as described in 
chapter 4. Though the fixed effect estimator is efficient and consistent, we focus on the 
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change on the time-invariant variables, which are eliminated by fixed effect models.  As 
can been seen from Table 5  Panel1,    Miscalibration score(Miscal), dividend prediction 
error (pderro)  are negative correlated with relative final wealth(lnw) after fitting 
different regression models (Pool OLS, Random Effect-GLS and Random Effect 
Maximum Likelihood), while better-than-average effect(bta) and ability 
measurement(ocRankgood) are positively correlated with relative final wealth. In 
addition, they are statistically significant at 1% , 5% or 10%  significant levels. In 
another word, the negative and significant coefficients of Miscalibration and Dividend 
prediction error predict a loss of relative final wealth in our data. According to Daniel 
et al 1998, Scheikam and Xiong 2003, overconfidence in one’s judgement, which is 
measured by Miscalibration, is negatively correlated with people’s wealth. The findings 
of negative correlations are consistent with the existing literatures. In column 1 shown 
in the table, the relative final wealth is predicted to decrease 1.7 when overconfidence 
measured by Miscalibration score goes up by one, and decrease by 0.41 when 
overconfidence level measured by dividend prediction error increase by one.  
 As introduced in Chapter 2, “better-than-average” effect (bta) is defined as when people 
believe themselves to be better than others, which is also known as the overplacement 
(Moore and Healy 2008). “better-than-average” effect (bta) is commonly referred to the 
fact that investors classify themselves of “above average level” comparing to their 
counterparts. (Moore and Healy 2008; Scott et al. 1999; Menkhoff et al. 2006). 
Following Greico and Hogarth (2009),Menkhoff (2006), BTA and the illusion of control 
can be used as proxy variables of overconfidence, which have been found significantly 
reduce trading performance in terms of both profit and wealth. BTA here is positively 
correlated with relative final wealth, which is in contrast to the findings of previous 
studies. The BTA score in this study is calculated based on post-experimental 
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questionnaire. The ex-post positive BTA effect may suggest that the subjects updated 
their beliefs correctly about their past performance comparing to their peers. Therefore, 
this ex-post BTA effect in my study may capture the ability effect in terms of predicting 
trading performance.  If their expectations are correct, with higher BTA score, their 
relative performance are higher. Similarly, another ability measure (ocRankgood) is 
positively correlated with relative wealth, which suggests that participants with higher 
ability level of answering survey questions, have higher trading performance(relative 
final wealth).   
So far, we have found that some aspects of overconfidence decrease relative final wealth, 
while some aspects of ability increase relative final wealth. The findings of negative 
correlations between different aspects of overconfidence level with trading performance 
are consistent with the existing studies. Furthermore, the findings of positive 
correlations between ability and trading performance contribute to the emerging 
literature of explaining psychological bias.  
A lagged dependent variable in a regression is often used to capture some of the dynamic 
effects in learning process. After including lagged relative final wealth in the  
regressions, as can be seen from column 2-4, the statistics of 𝑅2 and 𝐹 𝑠̃𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑠̃𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠̃ are 
both improved. Additionally, the significance of coefficients of  lagged relative final 
wealth, fitting in the different models, suggest that current session’s trading performance 
measured by relative final wealth is significantly correlated with previous session’s 
trading wealth. The better the previous trading performance the better the current 
performance. One possible explanation is that, during the 6 sequence of sessions in the 
experiment, participants were learning through trading. This learning process may refer 
to the learning of the market, being familiar with the software, or their own impact on 
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the market. Unfortunately, we are not able to precisely measure which aspects of 
learning process has driven up the trading performance. However, we can still conclude 
that the positive and significant relationship between previous trading performance and 
current session’s trading performance suggests that the learning effect has been found 
in our data.  
Table  5: Regress Relative Final Wealth on   all 
overconfidence related measures and all other controls 
(Including lagged relative final wealth)  
  
  Relative Wealth  Relative Wealth  Relative Wealth  Relative Wealth  
  Pool OLS  Pool OLS  RE-GLS  RE-MLE  
          
Lagged lnw    0.12**  0.10**  0.12**  
    (2.03)  (2..08)  (2.11)  
 
Panel 1: 
Overconfidence 
Measures:  
            
Miscal   -1.74*   -1.37   -1.37   -1.37  
   (-1.75)   (-1.25)   (-1.25)   (-1.30)  
pderro   -0.41**   -0.45**   -0.48***   -0.45**  
   (-2.19)   (-2.17)   (-2.94)   (-2.25)  
ioc   0.04   0.04   0.02   0.04  
   (0.12)   (0.10)   (0.05)   (0.10)  
bta   1.98**   1.39*   1.39*   1.39*  
   (2.52)   (1.74)   (1.69)   (1.70)  
svpred   -0.26   -0.18   -0.20   -0.18  
   (-1.48)   (-0.94)   (-0.90)   (-0.98)  
ocRankbad   -0.02   -0.03   -0.03   -0.03  
   (-1.30)   (-1.56)   (-1.44)   (-1.62)  
ocRankgood   0.09***   0.08***   0.08***   0.08***  
   (3.84)   (3.20)   (3.09)   (3.32)  
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Panel 2: Other 
Controls:  
            
bc   0.21   0.29   0.29   0.29  
   (0.90)   (1.11)   (1.04)   (1.16)  
s1   -0.16   -0.40   -0.41   -0.40  
   (-0.35)   (-0.78)   (-0.69)   (-0.80)  
s2   -0.32   -0.37   -0.36   -0.37  
   (-0.58)   (-0.62)   (-0.54)   (-0.64)  
emp   -1.03*   -1.50**   -1.48**   -1.50**  
   (-1.68)   (-2.15)   (-1.96)   (-2.23)  
st   0.52*   0.43   0.43   0.43  
   (1.95)   (1.44)   (1.29)   (1.50)  
gender   0.50**   0.42   0.44   0.42  
   (1.99)   (1.47)   (1.41)   (1.53)  
age   0.05   0.07   0.06   0.07  
   (0.62)   (0.73)   (0.73)   (0.76)  
n   0.14   0.25   0.21   0.25  
   (0.13)   (0.20)   (0.30)   (0.21)  
 transcost   -0.18   -0.24   -0.21   -0.24  
   (-0.43)   (-0.50)   (-0.47)   (-0.52)  
 session=2   0.41   0.00   0.00   0.00  
  (1.06)  (.)  (.)  (.)  
 session=3  -0.15  -0.56  -0.54  -0.56  
  (-0.38)  (-1.43)  (-1.32)  (-1.49)  
 session=4  0.03  -0.37  -0.36  -0.37  
  (0.08)  (-0.91)  (-0.76)  (-0.94)  
 session=5  -0.46  -0.84**  -0.83**  -0.84**  
  (-1.14)  (-2.14)  (-2.36)  (-2.22)  
 session=6  0.11  -0.21  -0.21  -0.21  
  (0.28)  (-0.53)  (-0.61)  (-0.55)  
Constant  -1.47  -0.85  -0.74  -0.85  
  (-0.58)  (-0.31)  (-0.32)  (-0.32)  
 
 R2  0.104  0.137      
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F 1.99 2.18   t statistics in parentheses  
 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01  
As shown in Chapter 6, we haven’t found any significant impact of overconfidence 
measures on trading volume. However we have discovered that there is a significant 
gender difference in our data sample. For example, as in the table above, the coefficients 
of gender dummy variable indicate that female participants significantly traded less than 
their male counterparts. Barber and Odean (2001) have found that males are more 
aggressive and tend to trade excessively comparing to females by using a large 
brokerage data sample. In column 2-4, the coefficients of lagged volume are positively 
correlated with current volume in different regression models. The finding suggests if  
‘learning’ takes places in trading, as discussed above, participants will enhance their 
understandings about the market, the software, or their own impact on the market. 
Consequently they will perform better as suggested by table , while they will trade more 
aggressively. According to Benos (1998) point out that trading activity is associated 
with some aspects of overconfidence. Hence, the ‘learning’ process encourages 
participant to trade more by increasing their overconfidence level. This empirical 
finding is consistent with the theoretical work about learning and overconfidence.  
Before discussing about learning process in this chapter, we have assumed that 
overconfidence level is fixed and not changing over time. The finding of learning 
increases trading volume may contribute to the existing studies about overconfidence 
impact on trading behavior by releasing the assumption of constant overconfidence  
level.  
Table 6 : Regress Absolute Volume on  
all overconfidence related measures and all other controls  
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(Including lagged volume)  
Note: The regressions models here have the same dependent variable sets as the previous table, but this 
table has omitted the regression results of the variables that are not significant.      
  Volume  Volume  Volume  Volume  
  Pool OLS  Pool OLS  RE-GLS  RE-MLE  
Lagged volume    0.09***  0.09*  0.09***  
    (3.20)  (1.83)  (3.31)  
Gender  -4.53**  -4.61*  -4.61  -4.61*  
(=1 if female)  (-2.13)  (-1.82)  (-1.44)  (-1.89)  
Constant  -3.56  1.00  1.00  1.00  
  (-0.17)  (0.04)  (0.07)  (0.04)  
R2  0.861        0.841       
F  109.21  76.87      
          
t statistics in parentheses  
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01  
  
Relationship 1: Miscalibration and Relative Final Wealth  
The first objective of this chapter is to ascertain the extent of the miscalibration effect 
on relative final wealth. Initially, cross sectional multivariate models were run to show 
the crude relationship between different overconfidence measurements and relative final 
wealth, in which other demographic variables are also included.   
The regression results reported in Table 5 suggest a robust relationship between 
miscalibration and relative final wealth with different model specifications. As expected, 
the coefficients for miscalibration in different models are very similar. All the 
coefficients of miscalibration are significantly negative.   
The first column in Table 5 presents the estimates for cross-sectional OLS regression.  
The dependent variable is average relative final wealth for the 6 sessions of each student. 
Miscalibration significantly lowers average relative final wealth (the estimated 
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coefficient is -1.1822, with a t-statistic of -1.79), whilst the impact of other demographic 
variables on relative final wealth is not significant. The point estimate of age is -0.0772, 
with t-statistic of -1.29; the t-statistics for the other variables are all smaller. This Table 
also presents Pool OLS regression for the panel data estimates for Mis-calibration and 
other controls in column 2. The point estimated coefficients indicate a robust impact by 
miscalibration on relative final wealth.   
In the next two columns, it is assumed that there is an unobserved individual effect and 
that all the independent variables in the model are strictly exogenous. The point 
estimates for the Random effect GLS and Random effect Maximum Likelihood are 1.29 
respectively, with t-statistics of -1.76 and -1.84. Unsurprisingly, GLS and  
Maximum Likelihood provide similar estimates.   
  
  
Table 5. Regressions Of Relative Final Wealth Onto Miscalibration And Other Controls. T Statistics In 
Parentheses, * P < 0.10, ** P < 0.05, *** P < 0.01.  
  
  Cross Sectional OLS  Pool OLS  Random Effect 
GLS  
Random effect  
ML  
Dep. Var.:  𝑊 𝑖  𝑊𝑖𝑗  𝑊𝑖𝑗  𝑊𝑖𝑗  
         
 Miscal  -1.1822*  -1.32**  -1.29*  -1.29*  
   (-1.79)  (-2.43)  (-1.76)  (-1.84)  
         
bc  -0.0334  0.01  0.02  0.02   (-0.18)  (0.08)  (0.08)  (0.08)  
         
s1  -0.2032  -0.12  -0.11  -0.11  
  
    
(-0.70)  
  
(-0.47)  
  
(-0.31)  
  
(-0.33)  
s2  -0.0995  -0.04  -0.02  -0.02  
  
    
(-0.29)  
  
(-0.13)  
  
(-0.05)  
  
(-0.06)  
emp  0.0348  0.17  0.21  0.21  
  
    
(0.06)  
  
(0.41)  
  
(0.38)  
  
(0.39)  
st  0.0927  0.03  0.04  0.04  
  (0.41)  (0.20)  (0.19)  (0.20)  
    
gender  
  
-0.0729  
  
0.03  
  
0.02  0.02  
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(-0.32)  
  
(0.17)  
  
(0.09)  
  
(0.09)  
age  -0.0772  -0.07  -0.08  -0.08  
  
    
(-1.29)  
  
(-1.44)  
  
(-1.23)  
  
(-1.25)  
n  0.5390  0.58  0.60  0.60  
  
    
(1.09)  
  
(1.04)  
  
(0.81)  
  
(0.84)  
 transcost  -0.0572  -0.08  -0.01  -0.02  
  (-0.15)  (-0.32)  (-0.02)  (-0.07)  
    
 session=1  
  
  
  
0.00  
  
  0.00  
  
    
  
  
(.)  
  
  
  
(.)  
 session=2    -0.09    -0.11  
  
    
  
  
(-0.38)  
  
  
  
(-0.50)  
 session=3    0.04    0.02  
  
    
  
  
(0.16)  
  
  
  
(0.07)  
 session=4    -0.08    -0.10  
  
    
  
  
(-0.31)  
  
  
  
(-0.44)  
 session=5    -0.22    -0.23  
  
    
  
  
(-0.90)  
  
  
  
(-1.03)  
 session=6    0.13    0.10  
    (0.51)    (0.44)  
    
Constant  
  
2.8600*  
  
2.73**  
  
2.85  
2.88*  
  (1.88)  (2.06)  (1.64)  (1.71)  
R2  0.040  0.013      
F  0.9564  0.81      
Observations  172  927  927  927  
  
  
  
  
 As column 1 in Table 8 shows, the standard errors for the coefficients are generally 
lower than in the Pool OLS regressions. According to the discussions in Chapter 4, if 
the assumptions of OLS are hold, the OLS estimator is the best linear unbiased estimator. 
Table 8a column 1 present Breush-Pagen LM test results. The null hypothesis in the 
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BPLM test is that variance across individuals is zero. In other words, there is no 
significant difference across individuals and no unobserved random effect.   
  
Table 8 Standard Errors Of Coefficients From Regressing Relative Final Wealth Onto Different 
Psychological Variables.  
 Mical  ocRankbad  
Pool OLS 0.541 0.013 0.009 RE GLS 0.730 0.017 
0.011  
 RE MLE  0.701  0.016  0.011  
 
  
As column 1 in table 8a shows, 𝜒2 = 44 (p-value<0), so we can reject the null hypothesis 
of no systematic difference and conclude that random effect model is appropriate. This 
evidence that the significant unobserved effect across individuals.   
Table 8a Breush-Pagan LM Test  
  
 
      𝜒2  p-value  
Mical      44  0  
goodbad      36.56  0  
bta      47.59  0  
pderro      30.93  0  
svpred      21.41  0  
  
  
  
  
Relationship 2: Ability Rank and Overconfidence Rank as new measurements of 
Psychological Bias  
Suantak et al. (1996) point out that the hard-easy effect of overconfidence occurs when 
the degree of overconfidence increases as the difficulty of the questions increases.  
  
   ocRankgood   
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According to the literature mentioned in section 1, the difficulty of the general 
knowledge questions involved in such experiments affects the level of overconfidence.  
We calculated the average overconfidence measurement of the five most accurate 
questions and the five least accurate questions and named them ocRankgood and 
ocRankbad. We expected the five least accurate questions to provide a better 
measurement of overconfidence based on the confidence intervals of these questions. 
However, for those high accuracy questions, we expect the intervals of the questions to 
be narrow. Narrow intervals with high accuracy cannot imply overconfidence but may 
indicate an effect from ability on trading performance. The higher the ability to get a 
correct interval with a narrow width, the better performance a subject should be able to 
obtain.   
  
The second objective is to further check the impact of the newly defined psychological 
bias measures on relative final wealth. As Table 6 shows, ocRankgood and ocRankbad 
are negatively and positively correlated with relative final wealth, with p-value<0.01. 
Also the results of BG-LM test shown in Table 8a suggests random effect is appropriate, 
indicating that there is unobserved random effect. The consistent and robust regression 
results from varying model specification suggest that ability (calibrated by ocRankgood) 
increases relative final wealth, while overconfidence (calibratied by ocRankbad) 
reduces relative final wealth. This finding contributes to the emerging literature about 
psychological bias.   
  
  
Table 6 Regressions Of Relative Final Wealth Onto Ability Rank/Overconfidence Rank And Other Controls. 
T Statistics In Parentheses, * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.  
  
  Cross Sectional 
OLS  
Pool OLS  Random Effect 
GLS  
Random effect  
ML  
Dep. Var. :  𝑊 𝑖  𝑊𝑖𝑗  𝑊𝑖𝑗  𝑊𝑖𝑗  
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ocRankbad   -0.0319
**   -0.03
***   -0.03
***   -0.03
***  
   (-2.59)   (-3.66)   (-2.85)   (-2.90)  
              
ocRankgood   0.0531
***   0.05
***   0.05
***   0.05
***  
   (2.79)   (4.12)   (3.21)   (3.26)  
              
bc   0.0124   0.00   0.01   0.01  
  (0.07)  (0.01)  (0.04)  (0.04)  
   s1    
-0.2679  
  
-0.29  
  
-0.28  -0.28  
  
    
(-1.01)  
  
(-1.26)  
  
(-0.95)  
  
(-0.97)  
s2  -0.2481  -0.28  -0.27  -0.27  
  (-0.77)  (-1.09)  (-0.81)  (-0.82)  
    
emp  
  
-0.0075  
  
-0.06  
  
-0.04  -0.04  
  
    
(-0.01)  
  
(-0.19)  
  
(-0.09)  
  
(-0.09)  
st  0.1789  0.17  0.17  0.17  
  
    
(0.82)  
  
(1.09)  
  
(0.89)  
  
(0.90)  
gender  -0.0722  -0.05  -0.06  -0.06  
  
    
(-0.34)  
  
(-0.36)  
  
(-0.31)  
  
(-0.31)  
age  -0.0862  -0.07  -0.08  -0.08  
  (-1.39)  (-1.44)  (-1.24)  (-1.26)  
   n    
0.6269  
  
0.62  
  
0.63  0.63  
  
    
(1.22)  
  
(1.15)  
  
(0.91)  
  
(0.93)  
 transcost  0.0287  -0.01  0.02  0.02  
  (0.08)  (-0.05)  (0.06)  (0.06)  
    
 session=1  
  
  
  
0.00  
  
0.00  0.00  
  
    
  
  
(.)  
  
(.)  
  
(.)  
 session=2    -0.05  -0.07  -0.07  
    (-0.23)  (-0.33)  (-0.33)  
    
 session=3  
  
  
  
0.03  
  
0.01  0.01  
    (0.14)  (0.05)  (0.06)  
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 session=4  
  
  
  
-0.04  
  
-0.06  -0.06  
  
    
  
  
(-0.17)  
  
(-0.29)  
  
(-0.29)  
 session=5    -0.11  -0.12  -0.12  
    (-0.49)  (-0.57)  (-0.57)  
    
 session=6  
  
  
  
0.19  
  
0.17  0.17  
  
    
  
  
(0.82)  
  
(0.77)  
  
(0.78)  
Constant  2.2540  1.88  2.02  2.01  
  (1.30)  (1.40)  (1.19)  (1.21)  
R2  0.091  0.028      
F  1.4261  1.80      
Observations  173  1016  1016  1016  
  
  
Relationship 3: Other Measurements of Overconfidence Effects on Relative Final 
Wealth  
The aim of this section is to investigate the extent to which the impacts of other 
overconfidence measures.   
Following Greico and Hogarth (2009),Menkhoff (2006), BTA and the illusion of control 
can be used as proxy variables of overconfidence, which have been found significantly 
reduce trading performance in terms of both profit and wealth. Table 7 presents 
estimated results for the different models about these measures, with BTA being 
significant in the cross sectional OLS and Pool OLS specifications. BTA here is 
positively correlated with relative final wealth, which is in contrast to the findings of 
previous studies. The BTA score in this study is calculated based on post-experimental 
questionnaire. The ex-post positive BTA effect may suggest that the subjects updated 
their beliefs correctly about their past performance comparing to their peers. If their 
expectations are correct, with higher BTA score, their relative performance are higher.   
  
79  
  
Table 7. Regressions Of Relative Final Wealth Onto Other Overconfidence Measures And Other Controls. 
T Statistics In Parentheses, * P < 0.10, ** P < 0.05, *** P < 0.01.  
  
  
  Cross Sectional 
OLS  
Pool OLS  Random Effect 
GLS  
Random Effect 
MLE  
Dep. Var. :  𝑊 𝑖  𝑊𝑖𝑗  𝑊𝑖𝑗  𝑊𝑖𝑗  
  
ioc  
  
0.0895  
  
0.08  
  
0.08  
  
0.08  
  
    
(0.37)  
  
(0.46)  
  
(0.37)  
  
(0.38)  
    
svpred  
  
0.0269  
  
0.06  
  
0.07  0.07  
  (0.40)  (0.41)  (0.45)  (0.46)  
    
pderro  
  
-0.0147  
  
-0.04  
  
-0.05  -0.05  
  (-0.09)  (-0.41)  (-0.59)  (-0.59)  
    
bta  
  
1.0955*  
  
0.75*  
  
0.80  0.79  
  (1.69)  (1.70)  (1.38)  (1.41)  
          
  
  
  
Relationship 4 Gender effect  
  
So far, we have not found any significant gender effect on relative final wealth through 
testing overconfidence measures. A simple t-test is presented to test the equality between 
female and male participants’ relative final wealth. As Table 9 shows, the null 
hypothesis of equality, at least, can not be rejected at any significant level below 10.62%. 
It concludes that there is not a significant difference between female and male for 
relative final wealth.   
  
Table 9. Two-Sample T Test With Equal Variances Of Relative Final Wealth (By Gender)  
                            
diff = mean(0) - mean(1) ;   Ho: diff=0  
  
 Ha: diff != 0      Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.1062    
    
 Ha: diff < 0                   Pr(T < t) = 0.9469           
    
 Ha: diff > 0                    Pr(T > t) = 0.0831    
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Relationship 5 Prediction Error  
Miscalibration of overconfidence and accuracy in subjective probability of judgment 
were first mentioned by Admas and Admas (1961). The overconfidence effect was 
defined as systematic overestimation of the precision of one’s ability and overestimation 
of the accuracy of one’s predictions in decision making (Yate 1990). To study the effect 
of overconfidence on the accuracy of prediction, we performed statistical analysis of 
prediction errors and overconfidence measurements. We argue that the process 
underlying the formation of overconfident beliefs in the trading game (dividend 
prediction error) is similar to that underlying the formation of overconfident judgements 
when answering the calibration questionnaire (miscalibration score). Both reflect 
overestimation of the private information or accuracy of one’s own knowledge, and 
underestimation of conditional risk. For example, overconfident subjects response to the 
miscalibration questions by overestimating their knowledge and provide excessively 
narrowed confidence intervals. Similarly, it is expected that overconfident trader in the 
financial experimental market also overestimate the precision of their information or 
public cues. They also correspondingly underestimate the variance of true dividend in 
the experiment.   
As Table 10 presents, no significant relationship has been found for miscalibration and 
prediction error. However, ocRankgood lower prediction error suggests that people with 
higher ability rank tend to make smaller prediction errors. Also, employment positively 
correlates with prediction error under Pool OLS and Random effect Maximum 
Likelihood methods. This also has been found in Menkhoff (2013) ’s study, with  
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professionals who has more working experience tend to be more overconfident and 
overestimate their ability and knowledge.   
  
Table 10 Regressions Of Dividend Prediction Error Onto Miscalibration And Other Controls. T Statistics 
In Parentheses, * P < 0.10, ** P < 0.05, *** P < 0.01.  
  
   Pool OLS  Random  Random  Pool OLS  Random  Random  
 Effect GLS  effect ML  Effect GLS  effect ML  
                   
Miscal           -0.28   -0.32   -0.32  
           (-1.26)   (-0.76)   (-0.91)  
                   
ocRankbad  0.00   0.00   0.00           
  (1.13)   (0.57)   (0.60)           
                   
ocRankgood  -0.02***   -0.02   -0.02**           
   (-3.78)   (-1.51)   (-2.48)           
                    
bc   -0.05   -0.05   -0.05   -0.05   -0.06   -0.06  
   (-0.80)   (-0.68)   (-0.62)   (-0.81)   (-0.64)   (-0.62)  
                    
s1   -0.01   -0.00   -0.00   -0.00   -0.00   -0.00  
   (-0.10)   (-0.06)   (-0.03)   (-0.03)   (-0.06)   (-0.03)  
                    
s2   0.13   0.14   0.14   0.11   0.11   0.11  
   (1.13)   (0.74)   (0.81)   (0.89)   (0.61)   (0.58)  
                    
emp   0.55***   0.53   0.53**   0.69***   0.71   0.71***  
   (3.64)   (1.13)   (2.40)   (3.95)   (1.11)   (2.62)  
                    
st   -0.06   -0.05   -0.05   -0.05   -0.04   -0.04  
   (-0.95)   (-0.78)   (-0.55)   (-0.74)   (-0.55)   (-0.38)  
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gender   0.05   0.04   0.03   0.09   0.08   0.07  
   (0.71)   (0.45)   (0.36)   (1.28)   (1.14)   (0.70)  
                    
age   0.03*   0.04   0.04   0.03   0.04   0.04  
  (1.68)  (0.78)  (1.32)  (1.55)  (0.67)  (1.21)  
    
n  
  
0.23  
  
0.26  
  
0.26  
  
0.24  
  
0.27  0.26  
  
    
(1.06)  
  
(0.66)  
  
(0.76)  
  
(1.07)  
  
(0.63)  
  
(0.75)  
 transcost  0.10  0.11  0.11  0.13  0.11  0.11  
  
    
(1.10)  
  
(1.27)  
  
(1.13)  
  
(1.27)  
  
(1.17)  
  
(1.08)  
 session=1  0.00  0.00    0.00  0.00    
  
    
(.)  
  
(.)  
  
  
  
(.)  
  
(.)  
  
  
 session=2  -0.03  0.00    -0.05  -0.01    
  
    
(-0.34)  
  
(0.03)  
  
  
  
(-0.44)  
  
(-0.14)  
  
  
 session=3  -0.02  -0.01    0.00  0.01    
  
    
(-0.24)  
  
(-0.14)  
  
  
  
(0.00)  
  
(0.13)  
  
  
 session=4  0.02  0.04    0.03  0.05    
  (0.21)  (0.57)    (0.33)  (0.71)    
    
 session=5  
  
-0.00  
  
0.01  
     
0.02  
  
0.03    
  
    
(-0.04)  
  
(0.10)  
  
  
  
(0.20)  
  
(0.33)  
  
  
 session=6  0.07  0.08    0.09  0.10    
  (0.68)  (1.09)    (0.89)  (1.34)    
    
Constant  
  
0.09  
  
-0.04  
  
-0.02  
  
-0.05  
  
-0.18  -0.15  
  (0.17)  (-0.04)  (-0.03)  (-0.10)  (-0.15)  (-0.19)  
R2  0.048      0.044      
F  2.80      2.50      
Observations  904  904  904  829  829  829  
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5.4. Robustness check with Stand-alone experiment  
A robustness check is a common exercise in applied econometric studies. It refers to 
investigating how certain regression coefficient estimates behave when the specification 
is modified by adding or removing regressors (White and Lu 2014). For an experimental 
data set, robustness is a sort of generality.   
Before the network experiment was continued in 2017, a stand-alone experiment was 
designed to generate a rough idea of what we expect. The following section discusses 
the regression results in details.   
Firstly, we set the stage by focusing on the bivariate linear regression results. In the first 
group of bivariate regression models, the dependent variable is average wealth (𝑊 𝑖) of 
individual’ 𝑖  and the explanatory variables are overconfidence variables and prediction 
error. As Table 11 shows, the coefficients of miscalibration and survey prediction error 
are negative. For example, the average wealth decrease is accompanied by a large 
increase in overconfidence variable (miscalibration and prediction error (svpred). The 
estimated coefficient for miscalibration is more significant, and the model having more 
explanatory power. These estimates are negative, which is consistent with the existing 
literature and our hypothesis of ‘higher overconfidence lowering final wealth’.  
  
Table 11. Regression Average Wealth Onto Miscalibration Or Prediction Error  
 
   coeff  t-stat  R-squared  
  
miscalibration  -5.163  -2.116  0.038 svpred  -0.142  -
0.454  0.003  
 
  
  
  
Gender characteristics  
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According to the basic equality test of the groups partitioned by gender characteristics, 
we cannot reject the null hypothesis of the same mean of average wealth for men and 
women, which is consistent with our network experimental results. However, Barber 
and Odean (2001) assume that men are more overconfident than women and found that 
men have a lower average return.   
Prediction error  
  
According to the theoretical literature, the prediction error caused by overconfidence 
lowers final wealth and trading performance. We regress the average wealth on 
miscalibration together by adding prediction error. As can be seen from Table 12 and 
Table 13, there is no strong effect of miscalibration onto prediction error. But the sign 
of miscalibration in Table 12 suggest that there is a weakly negative correlation was 
found.   
  
Table 12. Regressing Average Wealth Onto Both Miscaibration And Prediction Error  
  
   Coefficient   t-Statistic   
C 0.911 0.386182 miscalibration  -3.929 -
1.576737 svpred -0.212 -0.921087  
 
 R-squared  0.050     
  
  
  
Table 13. Regressing Prediction Error Onto Miscalibration  
   Coefficient   t-Statistic   
C 2.104 1.292 miscalibration  0.641 0.531  
 
 R-squared  0.041     
     
  
  
Overconfidence and ability  
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As can be seen from Table 14, all of the coefficients of ocRankbad are negative. 
ocRankbad is defined as a measurement of overconfidence according to the width of the 
five least accurate questions’ confidence intervals. Therefore, the higher the value of 
ocRankbad, the higher the overconfidence level. The coefficients and corresponding 
tstatistics indicate that ocRankbad is significantly and negatively correlated with final 
wealth. The estimates of ocRankgood are positively correlated with final wealth. The 
results conclude that final wealth decreases as the degree of overconfidence increases, 
where overconfidence is measured using the width of the least accurate questions’ 
confidence intervals. Final wealth increases as ability increases, where ability is 
measured by the average confidence intervals of the most accurate questions. The 
finding is consistent with the findings from the network experimental result.   
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
Table 14: Sensitivity check of Regressing Average Wealth onto Ability Rank and Overconfidence 
Rank.   
  
   Regression 1  Regression 2  Regression 3  
  Coeffi.  T-Stat.  Coeffi.  T-Stat.  Coeffi.  T-Stat.  
C  -0.903  -0.805  -4.804  -3.640  -0.560  -0.461  
ocRankgood  -0.068  -2.575      -0.067  -2.500  
ocRankbad      0.021  0.741      
D1          -0.622  -0.828  
R2  
  
0.067    
    
0.006    
    
0.074  
  
  
  
  Regression 4  Regression 5  Regression 6  
  Coeffi.  T-Stat.  Coeffi.  T-Stat.  Coeffi.  T-Stat.  
C  -4.333  -2.685  -2.485  -1.769  -2.194  -1.343  
ocRankgood      -0.092  -3.148  -0.091  -3.012  
ocRankbad  0.019  0.612  0.060  1.904  0.057  1.713  
D1  -0.607  -0.749      -0.417  -0.528  
R2  0.013    0.108    0.112    
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As can be seen in Table 15, the first column presents the estimates of coefficients. The 
estimated coefficient of ocRankbad is statistically significant with the absolute t-statistic 
values well above 2.   
Table 15. Sensitivity Check of Regressing Prediction Error onto Ability Rank and Overconfidence 
Rank.   
  
  Regression 1  Regression 2  Regression 3  
  Coeffi.  T-Stat.  Coeffi.  T-Stat.  Coeffi.  T-Stat.  
C  1.967  3.440  2.256  4.505  1.306  2.609  
ocRankgood  0.013  1.046      0.000  0.036  
ocRankbad  -0.027  -2.218  -0.021  -1.955      
R2  0.062    0.048    0.000    
  
  
  
  
Table 16. Sensitivity Check of Regressing Average Wealth onto Ability Rank and Overconfidence 
Rank, with Dropping each session sequentially.    
  
  
 Dep.V  ADEW-1  ADEW-2  ADEW-3  
 
Ind.V  Coeffi.  T-Stat.  Coeffi.  T-Stat.  Coeffi.  T-Stat.  
C  -3.259  -1.914  -2.000  -1.357  -2.308  -1.250  
ocRankgood  -0.090  -2.803  -0.053  -1.857  -0.100  -2.928  
ocRankbad  0.055  1.477  0.046  1.553  0.057  1.522  
D1  -0.609  -0.692  -0.570  -0.741  -0.557  -0.616  
R2  0.097    0.052    0.105    
   ADEW-4    ADEW-5    ADEW-6    
Ind.V  Coeffi.  T-Stat.  Coeffi.  T-Stat.  Coeffi.  T-Stat.  
C  -2.597  -1.398  -1.357  -0.759  -1.640  -1.057  
ocRankgood  -0.103  -3.235  -0.112  -2.906  -0.085  -3.336  
ocRankbad  0.057  1.492  0.071  1.903  0.059  2.008  
 D1  0.028  0.032  -0.234  -0.279  -0.563  -0.781  
 R2  0.116    0.136    0.124    
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5.5. Summary  
Our experimental data replicates the findings suggested in the empirical and theoretical 
literature that overconfidence, in terms of miscalibration score, affects trading behaviour 
and reduces relative final wealth in the financial market. However, we can not find any 
support for the conjecture by which there is a gender difference of trading performance. 
We also test the role of ability rank and overconfidence rank, finding that they are 
significantly affecting relative final wealth as we expected. This finding suggests that 
ability enhance trading outcomes and overconfidence worse trading performance, which 
contributes to the emerging literature of explaining psychological bias and market 
bahaviours.   
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Chapter 6. Investigating Gender and Overconfidence bias effects 
on Trading Activity  
  
6.1. Introduction  
  
It was shown in the previous chapter that overconfidence bias significantly worse 
relative final wealth in the experimental financial market. The strong association 
between overconfidence bias and final wealth has been observed in the previous chapter 
to withstand adjustments in different hypothesised models.  
High trading volume is a well-established phenomenon appears in a financial market, 
thereby leads to lower returns (Barber et al 2009; Barber and Odean 2000). Many studies 
show that trading activity measured by trading volume will decrease individuals’ 
earnings and performance (Gervais and Odean 2001). Benos (1998) found that investors 
overestimated the accuracy of their information, leading to increased trading volumes 
in different markets. Daniel et al. (1998) also conclude that average overconfident 
behaviour caused by overconfidence in financial markets can cause harmful effects.  
Thus, this chapter builds on the previous one by expanding the study to empirically 
analyse the experimental data and attempt to conclude the direct association between 
overconfidence measures and trading activity measures.  
In contrast to the findings of previous chapter, gender effect is significant in explaining 
active trading behaviours in this section, while direct causality between overconfidence 
measures and trading volume not being found.   
  
  
6.2. Regression results 1: overconfidence and trading activity  
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The most common explanation of active trading behaviours is that people are 
overconfidence (Odena 1998, DeBondt Thaler 1995), which means that people believe 
that the accuracy of their estimation about asset values is greater than that of their 
opponents (odean 1998).  
However, there is only a small number of literature analyses the direct relationship 
between trading volume and overconfidence bias. According to Biais et al (2005) 
pointed out, there is no significant association between miscalibration based 
overconfidence bias and trading activity. Furthermore, Glaser and Weber (2007) analyse 
the relationships between different measurements of overconfidence with measures of 
trading activity, finding the better-than-average effect to significantly increase trading 
volume and  miscalibration to be not significant. However, Deaves et al 2009 found that 
misclibration score, as well as better-than-average effect, increases trading volume in an 
experimental financial market.   
Therefore, we next go on investigate the extent to which overconfidence engenders 
excessive trade.   
As Table 17 and Table 18 show, no significant relationship has been found between any 
overconfidence measures and relative absolute volumes. However, Table 20 does show 
that ocRankbad is significantly negatively correlated with 𝑚3𝑖𝑗, which is expressed as 
share size per order. This indicates that subjects with higher overconfident rank tend to 
place smaller size orders. While 𝑚2𝑖𝑗 being negatively correlated with ability, it 
indicates that a subject with higher ability tend to trade less in terms of total order size.   
  
  
  
Table 17. Regressions Of Absolute Volume Onto Miscalibration And Other Controls. T Statistics In  
Parentheses, * P < 0.10, ** P < 0.05, *** P < 0.01  
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  Cross  
Sectional  
OLS  
Cross- 
Sec. OLS  
Pool  
OLS  
Random  
Effect  
GLS  
Cross  
Sectional  
OLS  
Cross- 
Sec. OLS  
Pool  
OLS  
Random  
Effect  
GLS  
  
Miscal  
  
  
  
-8.15  
  
-8.15  
  
-8.15  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
    (-0.69)  (-0.36)  (-0.37)          
  
ocRankgood  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
0.02  
  
-0.52*  
  
-0.52  
  
-0.52  
          (0.06)  (-1.80)  (-0.95)  (-0.98)  
  
ocRankbad  
  
  
  
  
  
  
    
  
-0.51  
    
0.03  
  
0.03  
0.03  
          (-0.93)  (0.15)  (0.08)  (0.08)  
    
bc  
      
-0.11  
  
-0.11  
  
-0.11  
-0.35  
    
-1.02  
  
-1.02  
-1.02  
    (-0.03)  (-0.02)  (-0.02)  (-0.06)  (-0.33)  (-0.18)  (-0.18)  
    
s1  
      
9.94*  
  
9.94  
  
9.94  
9.46  
    
9.75*  
  
9.75  
9.75  
    (1.75)  (0.92)  (0.95)  (0.96)  (1.89)  (1.00)  (1.03)  
    
s2  
      
8.24  
  
8.24  
  
8.24  
10.15  
    
10.50*  
  
10.50  
10.50  
    (1.28)  (0.67)  (0.70)  (0.91)  (1.80)  (0.95)  (0.98)  
    
emp  
      
-20.57**  
  
-20.57  
  
-20.57  
-19.50  
    
-18.54**  
  
-18.54  
-18.54  
    (-2.28)  (-1.20)  (-1.24)  (-1.34)  (-2.45)  (-1.29)  (-1.33)  
    
st  
      
-6.70*  
  
-6.70  
  
-6.70  
-6.18  
    
-5.94*  
  
-5.94  
-5.94  
    (-1.87)  (-0.98)  (-1.02)  (-0.96)  (-1.76)  (-0.93)  (-0.96)  
    
gender  
      
-11.73***  
  
-11.73*  
  
-11.73*  
-10.93*  
    
-10.71***  
  
-10.71*  
-10.71*  
    (-3.34)  (-1.75)  (-1.81)  (-1.72)  (-3.23)  (-1.70)  (-1.76)  
    
age  
      
0.89  
  
0.89  
  
0.89  
0.34  
    
0.65  
  
0.65  
0.65  
    (0.85)  (0.45)  (0.46)  (0.17)  (0.63)  (0.33)  (0.34)  
    
n  
      
-41.60***  
  
-41.60*  
  
-41.60*  
-42.48*  
    
-41.04***  
  
-41.04*  
-41.04*  
    (-3.50)  (-1.84)  (-1.90)  (-1.88)  (-3.48)  (-1.84)  (-1.90)  
    
 session=1  
      
0.00  
  
  
  
0.00  
      
0.00  
  
  
0.00  
    (.)    (.)    (.)    (.)  
    
 session=2  
      
0.08  
  
  
  
0.08  
      
-1.48  
  
  
-1.48  
  
    
  (0.01)  
    
  
  
(0.02)  
  
  (-0.29)  
    
  
  
(-0.40)  
 session=3  
  4.29    4.29    2.27    2.27  
  
    
  (0.79)  
    
  
  
(1.12)  
  
  (0.44)  
    
  
  
(0.62)  
 session=4  
  3.80    3.80    2.16    2.16  
  
    
  (0.70)  
    
  
  
(0.99)  
  
  (0.42)  
    
  
  
(0.59)  
 session=5  
  0.43    0.43    -0.87    -0.87  
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  (0.08)  
    
  
  
(0.11)  
  
  (-0.17)  
    
  
  
(-0.24)  
 session=6  
  2.45    2.45    0.60    0.60  
    (0.45)    (0.64)    (0.12)    (0.16)  
    
Constant  
      
44.48  
  
46.32  
  
44.48  
63.96  
    
56.12*  
  
56.56  
56.12  
    (1.59)  (0.88)  (0.87)  (1.16)  (1.94)  (1.04)  (1.07)  
R2  
  0.035      0.061  0.035      
F  
  2.44      1.05  2.50      
Observations  
  948  948  948  173  1038  1038  1038  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
Table 18. Regressions Of Absolute Volume Onto Other Psychological Variables And Other Controls. T  
Statistics In Parentheses, * P < 0.10, ** P < 0.05, *** P < 0.01  
  
  
  
Dep. Var.:  
Cross Sectional OLS  
𝑉 𝑖  
Pool OLS  Random Effect GLS  Random Effect MLE  
𝑉𝑖𝑗  𝑉𝑖𝑗  𝑉𝑖𝑗  
  
ioc  
  
-0.28  
  
-0.83  
  
-0.83  
  
-0.83  
  (-0.04)  (-0.22)  (-0.12)  (-0.12)  
  
gender  
    
-10.58*  
  
-10.38***  
-10.38*  
  
-10.38*  
  (-1.67)  (-3.13)  (-1.65)  (-1.70)  
  
emp  
  
-20.43  
  
-19.45**  
  
-19.45  
  
-19.45  
  
  
(-1.41)  
  
(-2.57)  
  
(-1.36)  
  
(-1.40)  
  
  
svpred  
  
1.10  
  
4.02  
  
3.03  
  
3.02  
  (0.51)  (1.32)  (1.05)  (1.06)  
  
gender  
  
-10.40  
  
-4.87  
  
-9.88  
  
-9.75  
  (-1.64)  (-1.06)  (-1.34)  (-1.38)  
  
emp  
  
-20.19  
  
-22.59**  
  
-27.36*  
  
-27.25*  
  
  
(-1.40)  
  
(-2.29)  
  
(-1.67)  
  
(-1.74)  
  
  
pderro  
    
1.09  
  
2.21  1.76  
  
1.77  
  (0.28)  (1.17)  (1.03)  (1.04)  
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gender  
  
-10.52*  
  
-11.05***  
  
-10.01  
  
-10.03  
  (-1.66)  (-3.07)  (-1.55)  (-1.59)  
emp  -20.34  -21.79**  -21.72  -21.71  
  
  
(-1.41)  
  
(-2.53)  
  
(-1.48)  
  
(-1.51)  
  
  
bta  
    
12.21  
  
10.76  10.76  
  
10.76  
  (0.67)  (1.12)  (0.59)  (0.61)  
  
gender  
  
-10.60*  
  
-10.37***  
  
-10.37*  
  
-10.37*  
  (-1.68)  (-3.13)  (-1.66)  (-1.71)  
  
emp  
  
-21.92  
  
-20.78***  
  
-20.78  
  
-20.78  
   (-1.50)  (-2.72)  (-1.44)  (-1.48)  
          
  
  
  
Table 20 Regressions of 𝑚3𝑖𝑗-shares per order, 𝑚2𝑖𝑗-total order size onto different psychological variables 
and other controls. t statistics in parentheses, * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01  
  
Pool  
OLS  
RE- 
GLS  
RE- 
MLE  
Pool  
OLS  
RE- 
GLS  
RE- 
MLE  
Pool 
OLS  
RE- 
GLS  
RE- 
MLE  
Pool 
OLS  
RE- 
GLS  
RE- 
MLE  
Dep. Var. :  𝑚3𝑖𝑗  𝑚3𝑖𝑗  𝑚3𝑖𝑗  𝑚3𝑖𝑗  𝑚3𝑖𝑗  𝑚3𝑖𝑗  𝑚2𝑖𝑗  𝑚2𝑖𝑗  𝑚2𝑖𝑗  𝑚2𝑖𝑗  𝑚2𝑖𝑗  𝑚2𝑖𝑗  
                          
Miscal  -0.25  -0.27  -0.27  
            
-0.42  -0.47  -0.47  
  
(-0.43)  (-0.25)  (-0.25)  
            
(-0.85)  (-0.56)  (-0.58)  
                          
ocRankgood  
      
0.00  -0.00  -0.00  -0.03**  -0.03  -0.03*  
      
        
(0.03)  (-0.01)  (-0.01)  (-2.49)  (-1.45)  (-1.65)  
      
                          
ocRankbad  
      
-0.04***  -0.03**  -0.03**  -0.01  -0.01  -0.01  
      
        
(-3.90)  (-2.04)  (-2.03)  (-1.20)  (-0.69)  (-0.70)  
      
                          
                          
bc  0.39**  0.39  0.39  0.36***  0.36  0.36  0.00  0.01  0.01  -0.04  -0.04  -0.04  
  
(2.56)  (1.31)  (1.36)  (2.58)  (1.33)  (1.35)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (-0.33)  (-0.16)  (-0.16)  
  
s1  
  
0.33  
  
0.35  
  
0.35  
  
0.05  
  
0.08  
 
  
0.08  
  
0.39**  
  
0.43  
  
0.44  
  
0.14  
  
0.19  
0.19  
  
(1.14)  (0.62)  (0.69)  (0.19)  (0.15)  (0.17)  (2.04)  (1.29)  (1.25)  (0.71)  (0.56)  (0.49)  
  
s2  
  
0.11  
  
0.13  
  
0.12  
  
-0.03  
  
-0.00  
 
  
-0.00  
  
0.44*  
  
0.48  
  
0.48  
  
0.08  
  
0.11  
0.12  
  
(0.33)  (0.20)  (0.22)  (-0.10)  (-0.01)  (-0.01)  (1.93)  (1.23)  (1.23)  (0.33)  (0.28)  (0.26)  
  
emp  
  
0.80**  
  
0.76  
  
0.77  
  
0.35  
  
0.31  
 
  
0.31  
  
0.39  
  
0.33  
  
0.33  
  
0.51  
  
0.45  
0.45  
  
(2.28)  (1.60)  (0.94)  (1.16)  (0.66)  (0.46)  (1.20)  (0.76)  (0.64)  (1.26)  (0.87)  (0.73)  
 
st    
0.34*  
  
0.33  
  
0.33  
  
0.39**  
  
0.37  
 
  
0.37  
  
0.06  
  
0.03  
  
0.03  
  
0.12  
  
0.09  
0.09  
  
(1.90)  (0.89)  (1.02)  (2.35)  (1.13)  (1.26)  (0.43)  (0.12)  (0.12)  (0.87)  (0.35)  (0.37)  
  
gender  
  
-0.91***  
  
-0.93***  
  
-0.93***  
  
-0.83***  
  
-0.86***  
 
  
-0.86***  
  
0.09  
  
0.04  
  
0.04  
  
0.14  
  
0.09  
0.09  
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(-5.49)  
  
(-2.96)  
  
(-2.95)  
  
(-5.36)  
  
(-2.94)  
  
(-2.93)  
 
  
(0.70)  
  
(0.19)  
  
(0.18)  
  
(1.04)  
  
(0.39)  
  
(0.36)  
age  0.07  0.07  0.07  0.06  0.06  0.06  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  
  
(1.40)  (0.80)  (0.73)  (1.14)  (0.65)  (0.62)  (0.16)  (0.12)  (0.11)  (0.32)  (0.21)  (0.20)  
  
n  
  
2.01***  
  
1.91***  
  
1.91*  
  
2.11***  
  
2.00***  
 
  
2.00*  
  
-0.27  
  
-0.46  
  
-0.46  
  
-0.34  
  
-0.53  
-0.53  
  
(4.88)  (5.19)  (1.80)  (5.18)  (5.85)  (1.92)  (-0.61)  (-0.74)  (-0.58)  (-0.75)  (-0.82)  (-0.65)  
  
 transcost  
  
1.32***  
  
0.94***  
  
0.94***  
  
0.00  
  
1.03***  
 
  
1.03***  
  
4.48***  
  
3.70***  
  
3.69***  
  
4.41***  
  
3.63***  
3.63***  
  
  
(5.06)  
  
(2.81)  
  
(4.12)  
  
(.)   (3.19)  
  
(4.73)  
 
  
(13.73)  
  
(7.96)  
  
(18.06)  
  
(12.84)  
  
(7.44)  
  
(17.03)  
  
 session=2  
  
0.15  
  
0.15  
  
0.15  
  
0.15  
  
0.14  
 
  
0.14  
  
0.00  
  
0.00  
  
0.00  
  
0.00  
  
0.00  
0.00  
  
(0.60)  (0.87)  (0.86)  (0.62)  (0.87)  (0.86)  (.)  (.)  (.)  (.)  (.)  (.)  
  
 session=3  
  
0.11  
  
0.13  
  
0.13  
  
0.13  
  
0.15  
 
  
0.15  
  
0.02  
  
0.01  
  
0.01  
  
0.09  
  
0.09  
0.09  
  
  
(0.45)  
  
(0.67)  
  
(0.75)  
  
(0.55)  
  
(0.79)  
  
(0.89)  
 
  
(0.12)  
  
(0.09)  
  
(0.08)  
  
(0.44)  
  
(0.59)  
  
(0.54)  
 session=4  0.13  0.13  0.13  0.09  0.09  0.09  0.01  0.04  0.04  0.03  0.06  0.06  
  
(0.50)  (0.72)  (0.77)  (0.37)  (0.52)  (0.55)  (0.06)  (0.22)  (0.23)  (0.12)  (0.34)  (0.36)  
  
 session=5  
  
0.24  
  
0.24  
  
0.24  
  
0.21  
  
0.21  
 
  
0.21  
  
-0.07  
  
-0.06  
  
-0.06  
  
0.00  
  
0.02  
0.02  
  
  
(0.98)  
  
(1.30)  
  
(1.41)  
  
(0.89)  
  
(1.16)  
  
(1.27)  
 
  
(-0.35)  
  
(-0.39)  
  
(-0.41)  
  
(0.01)  
  
(0.09)  
  
(0.10)  
 session=6  0.06  0.07  0.07  0.10  0.10  0.10  0.09  0.08  0.08  0.12  0.12  0.12  
  
(0.26)  (0.34)  (0.40)  (0.44)  (0.54)  (0.62)  (0.44)  (0.50)  (0.53)  (0.56)  (0.66)  (0.72)  
  
Constant  
  
2.49*  
  
2.62  
  
2.62  
  
4.25***  
  
4.40*  
 
  
4.40*  
  
3.41***  
  
3.67**  
  
3.67*  
  
2.62**  
  
2.89  
2.89  
  
(1.84)  (1.08)  (1.05)  (3.05)  (1.71)  (1.73)  (3.32)  (1.96)  (1.88)  (2.54)  (1.60)  (1.53)  
R2  0.108  
    
0.121  
    
0.359  
    
0.342  
    
F  8.95  
    
10.94  
    
16.23  
    
13.32  
    
Observations  948  948  948  1038  1038  1038  1038  1038  1038  948  948  948  
  
6.3. Regression results 2: Gender and Trading Activity  
  
Though a significant gender difference in relation to relative final wealth was not found 
in the previous chapter, there is a widely held perception, built upon theoretical and 
empirical studies, that gender does impact on trading behaviours. (Agnew et al 2003, 
Barber and odean 2001; Grinblatt and Keloharju 2009).  While there is a lack of 
empirically or experimentally studies investigating the direct relationship between 
overconfidence bias measures and trading activity, there is growing number of studies 
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suggesting that males trade more than women, which has been attributed to male are 
more prone to overconfidence.  
In an influential study by Barber and Odean (2001) that used gender as a proxy for 
overconfidence, they found men to trade more than women, presenting that females 
trade 55% less than males. Male traders reduce much more returns by making additional 
trades, when compared to females. One of the explanations for this is that males have 
been frequently found in different contexts to be more overconfident than female, 
although this effect does to be task dependent (Lunderberg et al 1994).  
Some of the empirical literature studying household trading data suggests that men and 
women trade differently. Men, for example, are found to be more aggressive and trade 
excessively, which lowers returns (Barber and Odean 2001). We argue that gender could 
be one of the proxy variables of overconfidence and that men trade more, leading to 
lower final wealth. This establishes another accepted explanation of excessive trading 
puzzle in final market. This chapter also studies the extent to which the role of gender 
in an experimental market can explain excessive trading, which aims to contribute to the 
emerging pantheon of literature on this topic.   
As can be seen from table 17 to table 20, gender consistently negatively correlates with 
trading activity measured by either absolute trading volume or average order size. Recall 
the definition of gender in the regression, it equals to 1 if the subject is female. Therefore 
a negative coefficient indicates that female subjects trade significantly less than males.  
As table 22 shows, there is significant gender difference, based on t-test for equality 
variance, on trading volume, males trade more than female with significant level of  
1.26%.   
Table 21. Two-sample t test with equal variances of Miscalibration (By Gender)  
                            
diff = mean(0) - mean(1) ;   Ho: diff=0  
  
 Ha: diff != 0      Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0592             
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 Ha: diff < 0                   Pr(T < t) = 0.0696           
    
 Ha: diff > 0                    Pr(T > t) = 0.9704    
  
  
  
  
Table 22 . Two-sample t test with equal variances of Absolute Volume (By Gender)  
                            
diff = mean(0) - mean(1) ;   Ho: diff=0  
  
 Ha: diff != 0      Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0253            
    
 Ha: diff < 0                   Pr(T < t) = 0.9874           
    
 Ha: diff > 0                    Pr(T > t) = 0.0126    
  
  
  
This gender difference in trading has been attributed to men being more overconfident. 
Barber and Odean 2001. However, not many studies have systematically tested this 
interpretation. The purpose of this paper is to experimentally investigate to the extent 
that gender differences in trading activity are explained by differences in confidence. In 
particular, a significant gender difference in the relationship between trading activity 
and psychological bias measurements is expected. However, as can be seen from table 
21, the t –test for equality suggests that the underlying gender difference in misclibration 
is not zero (with a significant level of 5.92%).  We can not find systematic difference in 
overconfidence between men women.   
  
6.4. Summary  
  
This chapter aim to investigate the direct relationship between overconfidence measures 
and trading volume using the underlying experimental data sets, and in so doing, 
examine the other evidence for causality and the processes underlying the relationship. 
However, we have not found any support for the conjecture by which confidence 
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explains active trades. We believe other mechanisms suggested in the literature to 
promote trading activity might explain the gender differences in relation to trading 
volume, such as sensation-seeking preferences(Grinblatt and Keloharju 2009), or 
attitudes towards entertainment or gambling(Dorn and Sengmueller, 2009) Dorn et al 
2014)  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
Chapter 7. Investigating Order Aggressiveness and Trading 
Performance  
  
  
7.1 Introduction  
  
My primary goal is to investigate the relationship between psychological bias measures 
and trading performance in a controlled experimental market. Existing evidence 
suggests that the linkage between performance and overconfidence bias is likely to be 
causal, but that many more complicated processes are at play. For the purpose of 
uncovering the mechanisms how psychological bias affects trading performance, I relate 
aggressiveness behaviour consequences to the psychological bias measures.   
There is no consensus in the emerging literature on what drives the observed behaviour 
bias and subsequent risk-taking behaviour. This thesis complements previous literature 
by investigating how behaviour bias affects trading outcome.   
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7.2. Order aggressiveness  
  
Biais et al (2009a) present the intraday order flows and classify orders in terms of 
aggressiveness. Investors may suffer from trading loss on their aggressive orders. 
Apparently, investors demand liquidity and trade aggressively to their detriment. As a 
results, trading losses was traced to their aggressive trading behaviours. (Barber, et al. 
2009b). In a striking constrast, Benos (1998) suggests that aggressive trading may make 
higher outcomes than rational behaviours.   
We next go on to investigate, not only the actual transacted shares, but all the orders 
being submitted to the market. Thus, we are able to look into the reason that affects 
order aggressiveness. Our results therefore shed light on the causality relationship of 
behavioural biases and order submission strategies in limit order markets, which has not 
been exclusively examined yet, but important in the studies of market behaviours.    
  
7.3. Order aggressiveness determinants:  
  
A number of studies have suggested different explanations of the reasons why investors 
place aggressive orders, in which assuming investors have rational behaviours. ( Parlour 
1998 ; Foucault 1999; Handa and Schwartz 1996; Biais et al. 1995). However, we have 
seen that the psychological bias does affect market outcomes and trader’s performance.  
Thus, we suggest that the underlying psychological bias affects order aggressiveness. 
To fully analyse the determinants of placing aggressive orders, I consider regression 
models described as follows:  
𝑚1𝑖𝑗 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑜𝑣̃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖 + 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠̃𝑖 + 𝑠̃𝑒𝑠̃𝑠̃𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑑𝑢̃𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠̃ + 𝜖̃𝑖𝑡,  
where 𝑚1𝑖𝑗 is the average order aggressiveness of individual 𝑖  in session 𝑗, 
𝑜𝑣̃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖 refer to miscalibration score or overconfidence/ability ranks defined 
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in chapter 3; other controls including individual’s characteristics are collected in survey 
experiment; session dummies is a group of 5 dummy variables, in which session 𝑖 
dummy equal to one if session is 𝑖 is included and session 1dummy is excluded to avoid 
dummy variable trap.   
To assess this association and get robust results, I test the above relationship with 
different empirical methods.   
Table 23 presents multivariate results of order aggressiveness ranks and different 
overconfident measures with control variables. The table presents coefficients 
estimators and t-statistics in the parentheses based on the standard errors robust to 
heteroscedasticity.  
The positive relation between Ability rank (ocRankgood) and order aggressiveness is 
particularly strong and robust under different estimation methods. While miscalibration 
score(Miscal) and overconfidence rank(ocrRankbad) have no statistically significant 
relationship with order aggressiveness in this study. The academic background variables 
(s1 and s2) are weakly positively correlated with order aggressivenss. Surprisingly 
session dummies for session 5 and 6 are generally significant negatively correlated with 
order aggressiveness.   
Table 23. Regressions of order aggressiveness onto different psychological variables and other controls  t 
statistics in parentheses, * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01  
Panel A  Pool  
OLS  
 RE- 
GLS  
RE- 
MLE  
Pool  
OLS  
RE-GLS  RE- 
MLE  
Pool  
OLS  
RE-GLS  RE- 
MLE  
Dep. Var.:  𝑚1𝑖𝑗  𝑚1𝑖𝑗  𝑚1𝑖𝑗  𝑚1𝑖𝑗  𝑚1𝑖𝑗  𝑚1𝑖𝑗  𝑚1𝑖𝑗  𝑚1𝑖𝑗  𝑚1𝑖𝑗  
                    
ocRankgood  0.03***  0.03**  0.03**  
            
  (4.71)  (2.34)  (2.36)              
                    
ocRankbad  0.01  0.01  0.01  
            
  (1.34)  (0.66)  (0.62)              
                    
Miscal  
      -0.05  -0.07  -0.07        
        (-0.20)  (-0.13)  (-0.13)        
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bc  -0.13*  -0.13  -0.13  -0.12  -0.12  -0.12  -0.13*  -0.13  -0.13  
  (-1.90)  (-0.93)  (-0.94)  (-1.58)  (-0.75)  (-0.75)  (-1.87)  (-0.90)  (-0.92)  
                    
s1  0.42***  0.44**  0.44*  0.41***  0.42*  0.42  0.38***  0.39  0.39  
  (4.32)  (2.31)  (1.81)  (3.70)  (1.94)  (1.51)  (3.10)  (1.55)  (1.59)  
                    
s2  0.43***  0.44**  0.44  0.52***  0.53**  0.53*  0.44***  0.45  0.45  
  (3.67)  (1.98)  (1.61)  (3.81)  (1.98)  (1.68)  (3.17)  (1.58)  (1.61)  
                    
emp  -0.19  -0.21  -0.21  0.03  0.01  0.01  -0.11  -0.13  -0.13  
  (-1.21)  (-0.77)  (-0.58)  (0.15)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (-0.60)  (-0.34)  (-0.35)  
                    
st  -0.05  -0.05  -0.05  -0.11  -0.13  -0.13  -0.09  -0.09  -0.09  
  (-0.56)  (-0.34)  (-0.34)  (-1.28)  (-0.71)  (-0.72)  (-1.07)  (-0.56)  (-0.58)  
                    
gender  0.01  -0.00  -0.00  0.02  -0.00  -0.00  -0.01  -0.03  -0.02  
  (0.12)  (-0.03)  (-0.03)  (0.18)  (-0.02)  (-0.02)  (-0.15)  (-0.15)  (-0.16)  
                    
age  0.06***  0.06  0.06  0.03  0.03  0.03  0.03  0.04  0.04  
  (2.65)  (1.55)  (1.29)  (1.29)  (0.73)  (0.63)  (1.44)  (0.71)  (0.73)  
                    
n  0.02  -0.04  -0.04  0.06  -0.02  -0.01  0.04  -0.01  -0.01  
  (0.06)  (-0.17)  (-0.07)  (0.19)  (-0.06)  (-0.02)  (0.15)  (-0.02)  (-0.02)  
                    
 transcost  1.17***  0.93***  0.93***  1.19***  0.89***  0.89***  1.15***  0.92***  0.92***  
  (8.47)  (6.65)  (9.14)  (7.99)  (6.03)  (8.38)  (9.61)  (9.00)  (9.06)  
                    
 session=2  -0.00  -0.01  -0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  -0.00  -0.01  -0.01  
  
    
(-0.02)  
  
(-0.09)  
  
(-0.09)  
  
(0.09)  
  
(0.11)  
  
(0.11)  
  
(-0.03)  
  
(-0.09)  
  
(-0.09)  
 session=3  -0.02  -0.01  -0.01  0.02  0.04  0.04  -0.02  -0.01  -0.01  
  
    
(-0.14)  
  
(-0.11)  
  
(-0.13)  
  
(0.17)  
  
(0.38)  
  
(0.45)  
  
(-0.13)  
  
(-0.13)  
  
(-0.13)  
 session=4  -0.08  -0.08  -0.08  -0.05  -0.05  -0.05  -0.08  -0.08  -0.08  
  (-0.70)  (-1.06)  (-1.10)  (-0.42)  (-0.60)  (-0.64)  (-0.69)  (-1.10)  (-1.10)  
    
 session=5  
  
-0.19  
  
-0.19**  
  
-0.19**  
  
-0.16  
  
-0.16*  
  
-0.16**  
  
-0.19  
  
-0.19**  
-0.19**  
  (-1.62)  (-2.18)  (-2.54)  (-1.25)  (-1.71)  (-2.00)  (-1.54)  (-2.54)  (-2.55)  
    
 session=6  
  
-0.25**  
  
-0.25***  
  
-0.25***  
  
-0.21*  
  
-0.21**  
  
-0.21***  
  
-0.25**  
  
-0.25***  
-0.25***  
  (-2.22)  (-3.07)  (-3.34)  (-1.73)  (-2.41)  (-2.66)  (-2.04)  (-3.33)  (-3.34)  
    
Constant  
  
-0.74  
  
-0.66  
  
-0.66  
  
1.06  
  
1.16  
  
1.16  
  
1.05*  
  
1.12  
1.12  
  (-1.19)  (-0.62)  (-0.49)  (1.63)  (0.97)  (0.85)  (1.78)  (0.92)  (0.94)  
R2  0.142  
    0.114      0.111      
F  10.94  
    7.97      9.10      
Observations  
  
1038  
  
1038  
  
1038  
  
948  
  
948  
  
948  
  
1038  
  
1038  
  
1038  
  
Panel B  
                  
BGLM test  
𝜒2  
  
  
  
  
  
656.5  
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p-value   
    0.00              
  
The panel B of Breush-Pagan LM test results suggests that the variance is systematic 
different from zero and random effect model is appropriate.   
It is clear that ability rank increase order aggressiveness with coefficient of 0.03 in 
random effect GLS model,  while weaker academic background in financial economics  
(s1=1, IEBF students) also engender higher aggressive orders with coefficient of 0.44. 
The reported standard deviations of ability, s1 are 0.121 and 0.0068. Though they all 
have positive associations with the order aggressiveness and coefficient of s1 is even 
higher, the standardized coefficients indicate a different story. The standardized 
coefficients suggest that a change of one standard deviation in ability rank leads in a  
 = 4.41 standard deviations increase in the order aggressiveness, which is higher 
than that in s1. The significance of session dummies equal to session 5 or session 6 
suggests that the last two sessions’ order aggressiveness are significantly less than 
previous sessions.   
The results show that ocRankgood as a measure of ability increases order aggressiveness, 
while IEBF students do behave more aggressive comparing to FE and Finance students.   
  
7.4 Order book information and final wealth:  
  
Table 24 reports results for regressing relative final wealth onto miscalibration and 
overconfident/ability ranks, in which controlling for individuals’ characteristics. As can 
be seen from the first row of coefficients across different regression specifications, order 
aggressive is statistically and significantly correlated with relative final wealth. Subjects 
who place higher aggressive orders have higher relative final wealth. This finding is in 
contrast to the literature of aggressiveness is harmful to one’s wealth (Barber, et al. 
2009b). However, there is emerging literature that suggests aggressive trader can survive 
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in the market by generating higher performance comparing to more rational trader 
(Benos, 1998).  
Table 24. Regressions of total order size onto different psychological variables and other controls  t 
statistics in parentheses, * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01  
  
  Pool  
OLS  
RE- 
GLS  
REMLE  
𝑚2𝑖𝑗  
Pool  
OLS  
 
𝑚2𝑖𝑗  
REGLS  
 
𝑚2𝑖𝑗  
REMLE  
𝑚2𝑖𝑗  
Pool  
OLS  
RE- 
GLS  
RE- 
MLE  
Dep. Var. :  𝑚2𝑖𝑗  𝑚2𝑖𝑗  𝑚2𝑖𝑗  𝑚2𝑖𝑗  𝑚2𝑖𝑗  
                    
Miscal        -0.42  -0.47  -0.47        
        (-0.85)  (-0.56)  (-0.58)        
                    
ocRankgood  -0.03**  -0.03  -0.03*              
  (-2.49)  (-1.45)  (-1.65)              
                    
ocRankbad  -0.01  -0.01  -0.01              
  (-1.20)  (-0.69)  (-0.70)              
                    
bc  0.00  0.01  0.01  -0.04  -0.04  -0.04  -0.00  0.00  0.00  
  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (-0.33)  (-0.16)  (-0.16)  (-0.00)  (0.01)  (0.01)  
                    
s1  0.39**  0.43  0.44  0.14  0.19  0.19  0.44**  0.49  0.49  
  (2.04)  (1.29)  (1.25)  (0.71)  (0.56)  (0.49)  (2.21)  (1.41)  (1.40)  
                    
s2  0.44*  0.48  0.48  0.08  0.11  0.12  0.44*  0.49  0.49  
  (1.93)  (1.23)  (1.23)  (0.33)  (0.28)  (0.26)  (1.95)  (1.23)  (1.22)  
                    
emp  0.39  0.33  0.33  0.51  0.45  0.45  0.31  0.24  0.24  
  (1.20)  (0.76)  (0.64)  (1.26)  (0.87)  (0.73)  (1.04)  (0.46)  (0.45)  
                    
st  0.06  0.03  0.03  0.12  0.09  0.09  0.10  0.07  0.07  
  (0.43)  (0.12)  (0.12)  (0.87)  (0.35)  (0.37)  (0.73)  (0.31)  (0.30)  
                    
gender  0.09  0.04  0.04  0.14  0.09  0.09  0.11  0.06  0.06  
  (0.70)  (0.19)  (0.18)  (1.04)  (0.39)  (0.36)  (0.82)  (0.26)  (0.26)  
                    
age  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.04  0.04  0.04  
  (0.16)  (0.12)  (0.11)  (0.32)  (0.21)  (0.20)  (0.97)  (0.60)  (0.59)  
                    
n  -0.27  -0.46  -0.46  -0.34  -0.53  -0.53  -0.31  -0.51  -0.51  
  (-0.61)  (-0.74)  (-0.58)  (-0.75)  (-0.82)  (-0.65)  (-0.67)  (-0.63)  (-0.63)  
                    
 transcost  4.48***  3.70***  3.69***  4.41***  3.63***  3.63***  4.51***  3.70***  3.68***  
  (13.73)  (7.96)  (18.06)  (12.84)  (7.44)  (17.03)  (22.93)  (18.33)  (18.00)  
                    
 session=2  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.02  0.01  0.01  
  (.)  (.)  (.)  (.)  (.)  (.)  (0.12)  (0.08)  (0.08)  
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(2.54)   
0.342   
                    
 session=3  0.02  0.01  0.01  0.09  0.09  0.09  0.01  0.04  0.04  
  (0.12)  (0.09)  (0.08)  (0.44)  (0.59)  (0.54)  (0.06)  (0.23)  (0.23)  
                    
 session=4  0.01  0.04  0.04  0.03  0.06  0.06  -0.07  -0.06  -0.06  
  (0.06)  (0.22)  (0.23)  (0.12)  (0.34)  (0.36)  (-0.35)  (-0.41)  (-0.41)  
                    
 session=5  -0.07  -0.06  -0.06  0.00  0.02  0.02  0.09  0.08  0.08  
  (-0.35)  (-0.39)  (-0.41)  (0.01)  (0.09)  (0.10)  (0.43)  (0.53)  (0.53)  
                    
 session=6  0.09  0.08  0.08  0.12  0.12  0.12  0.01  0.01  0.01  
  (0.44)  (0.50)  (0.53)  (0.56)  (0.66)  (0.72)  (0.04)  (0.06)  (0.06)  
                    
Constant  3.41***  3.67**  3.67*  2.62**  2.89  2.89  1.38  1.59  1.60  
  (1.96) 
 (1.88)  (1.60)  (1.53) (0.95) 
 (0.95)  
 R2            
 F  16.23      13.32      39.33      
 Observations  1038  1038  1038  948  948  948  1038  1038  1038  
 
  
  
  
Trading activity (total order size):  
Table 25 and 26 , ability rank is weakly significant, negatively correlated with 𝑚2𝑖𝑗  
Table 27 and 28, overconfidence rank is significantly negatively correlated with 𝑚3𝑖𝑗 
However, no obvious associations have been found between 𝑚2𝑖𝑗, 𝑚3𝑖𝑗 and relative final 
wealth.  
VWAP and price:  
According to the definition of 𝑚4𝑖𝑗 , the higher the value the lower the strategy 
performance.   
Table 25. Regressions of shares per order onto different psychological variables and other controls  t 
statistics in parentheses, * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01  
  
   Pool  RE- RE- Pool  RE- RE- Pool  RE- RE- 
 OLS  GLS  MLE  OLS  GLS  MLE  OLS  GLS  MLE  
 Dep. Var. :  𝑚3𝑖𝑗  𝑚3𝑖𝑗  𝑚3𝑖𝑗  𝑚3𝑖𝑗  𝑚3𝑖𝑗  𝑚3𝑖𝑗  𝑚3𝑖𝑗  𝑚3𝑖𝑗  𝑚3𝑖𝑗  
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ocRankgood           0.00  -0.00  -0.00        
           (0.03)  (-0.01)  (-0.01)        
                       
ocRankbad           -0.04
***  -0.03**  -0.03**        
           (-3.90)  (-2.04)  (-2.03)        
                       
Miscal  -0.25  -0.27  -0.27              
  (-0.43)  (-0.25)  (-0.25)              
                    
bc  0.39**  0.39  0.39  0.36***  0.36  0.36  0.32**  0.32  0.32  
  (2.56)  (1.31)  (1.36)  (2.58)  (1.33)  (1.35)  (2.24)  (1.15)  (1.18)  
                    
s1  0.33  0.35  0.35  0.05  0.08  0.08  0.16  0.18  0.18  
  (1.14)  (0.62)  (0.69)  (0.19)  (0.15)  (0.17)  (0.65)  (0.39)  (0.40)  
                    
s2  0.11  0.13  0.12  -0.03  -0.00  -0.00  0.08  0.10  0.10  
  (0.33)  (0.20)  (0.22)  (-0.10)  (-0.01)  (-0.01)  (0.29)  (0.20)  (0.20)  
                    
emp  0.80**  0.76  0.77  0.35  0.31  0.31  0.24  0.20  0.20  
  (2.28)  (1.60)  (0.94)  (1.16)  (0.66)  (0.46)  (0.69)  (0.29)  (0.30)  
                    
st  0.34*  0.33  0.33  0.39**  0.37  0.37  0.41***  0.40  0.40  
  (1.90)  (0.89)  (1.02)  (2.35)  (1.13)  (1.26)  (2.60)  (1.28)  (1.31)  
                    
gender  -0.91***  -0.93***  -0.93***  -0.83***  -0.86***  -0.86***  -0.84***  -0.87***  -0.87***  
  (-5.49)  (-2.96)  (-2.95)  (-5.36)  (-2.94)  (-2.93)  (-5.42)  (-2.87)  (-2.94)  
                    
age  0.07  0.07  0.07  0.06  0.06  0.06  0.11**  0.11  0.11  
  (1.40)  (0.80)  (0.73)  (1.14)  (0.65)  (0.62)  (2.30)  (1.20)  (1.22)  
                    
n  2.01***  1.91***  1.91*  2.11***  2.00***  2.00*  1.99***  1.88*  1.88*  
  (4.88)  (5.19)  (1.80)  (5.18)  (5.85)  (1.92)  (3.59)  (1.74)  (1.78)  
                    
 transcost  1.32***  0.94***  0.94***  0.00  1.03***  1.03***  1.49***  1.03***  1.03***  
  (5.06)  (2.81)  (4.12)  (.)  (3.19)  (4.73)  (6.34)  (4.68)  (4.72)  
                    
 session=2  0.15  0.15  0.15  0.15  0.14  0.14  0.15  0.14  0.14  
  (0.60)  (0.87)  (0.86)  (0.62)  (0.87)  (0.86)  (0.61)  (0.86)  (0.86)  
                    
 session=3  0.11  0.13  0.13  0.13  0.15  0.15  0.13  0.15  0.15  
  (0.45)  (0.67)  (0.75)  (0.55)  (0.79)  (0.89)  (0.55)  (0.89)  (0.89)  
                    
 session=4  0.13  0.13  0.13  0.09  0.09  0.09  0.09  0.09  0.09  
  (0.50)  (0.72)  (0.77)  (0.37)  (0.52)  (0.55)  (0.36)  (0.54)  (0.55)  
                    
 session=5  0.24  0.24  0.24  0.21  0.21  0.21  0.21  0.21  0.21  
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(3.05)   
0.121   
  (0.98)  (1.30)  (1.41)  (0.89)  (1.16)  (1.27)  (0.87)  (1.26)  (1.27)  
                    
 session=6  0.06  0.07  0.07  0.10  0.10  0.10  0.10  0.10  0.10  
  (0.26)  (0.34)  (0.40)  (0.44)  (0.54)  (0.62)  (0.42)  (0.62)  (0.62)  
                    
Constant  2.49*  2.62  2.62  4.25***  4.40*  4.40*  1.41  1.54  1.53  
  (1.08) 
 (1.05)  (1.71)  (1.73) (0.68) 
 (0.70)  
 R2            
F  8.95      10.94      8.59      
Observations  948  948  948  1038  1038  1038  1038  1038  1038  
  
Table 26. Regressions of the performance of VWAP strategy onto different 
psycholo other controls. t statistics in parentheses, * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 
0.01.   
  
gical variab les and  
  Pool  
OLS  
RE-GLS  RE- 
MLE  
Pool  
OLS  
RE-GLS  RE- 
MLE  
Pool  
OLS  
RE-GLS  RE- 
MLE  
Dep. Var.:  𝑚4𝑖𝑗  𝑚4𝑖𝑗  𝑚4𝑖𝑗  𝑚4𝑖𝑗  𝑚4𝑖𝑗  𝑚4𝑖𝑗  𝑚4𝑖𝑗  𝑚4𝑖𝑗  𝑚4𝑖𝑗  
                   
 Miscal  -0.03  -0.02  -0.02              
   (-1.27)  (-0.86)  (-1.18)              
                   ocRankgood   
     -0.00***  -0.00***  -0.00***        
         (-3.36)  (-2.60)  (-3.04)        
          ocRankbad    -0.00 -0.00 -0.00        (-0.40) (-0.27) (-0.37)     
                   
                   
bc  -0.01*  -0.01  -0.01  -0.01*  -0.01  -0.01  -0.01*  -0.01  -0.01  
  (-1.76)  (-1.22)  (-1.16)  (-1.95)  (-1.52)  (-1.50)  (-1.87)  (-1.38)  (-1.41)  
                    
s1  0.01**  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  
  (2.28)  (1.61)  (0.70)  (1.42)  (0.90)  (0.70)  (1.16)  (0.84)  (0.86)  
                    
s2  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01***  0.01**  0.01  0.01*  0.01  0.01  
  (1.62)  (1.16)  (0.78)  (2.62)  (2.02)  (1.36)  (1.65)  (1.20)  (1.24)  
                    
emp  -0.01  -0.01  -0.01  -0.01  -0.01  -0.01  -0.01  -0.01  -0.01  
  (-0.41)  (-0.25)  (-0.84)  (-0.27)  (-0.17)  (-0.44)  (-0.90)  (-0.64)  (-0.66)  
                    
st  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  
  (0.17)  (0.17)  (0.13)  (0.19)  (0.17)  (0.13)  (0.54)  (0.41)  (0.42)  
                    
gender  -0.00  -0.00  -0.00  -0.00  -0.00  -0.00  -0.00  -0.00  -0.00  
  (-0.17)  (-0.06)  (-0.08)  (-0.62)  (-0.42)  (-0.51)  (-0.45)  (-0.31)  (-0.32)  
                    
age  0.00  0.00  0.00  -0.00  -0.00  -0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  
  (0.69)  (0.48)  (0.63)  (-0.00)  (-0.00)  (-0.00)  (0.79)  (0.58)  (0.60)  
                    
n  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  
  (0.68)  (0.59)  (0.62)  (0.71)  (0.57)  (0.60)  (0.68)  (0.53)  (0.55)  
                    
 transcost  -0.03***  -0.03***  -0.03***  -0.03***  -0.03***  -0.03***  -0.03***  -0.03***  -0.03***  
  (-5.80)  (-2.62)  (-3.78)  (-5.50)  (-3.30)  (-3.64)  (-4.10)  (-3.41)  (-3.47)  
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 session=2  -0.01  -0.01  -0.01  -0.00  -0.00  -0.00  -0.00  -0.00  -0.00  
  (-0.91)  (-1.07)  (-1.10)  (-0.16)  (-0.17)  (-0.22)  (-0.20)  (-0.21)  (-0.21)  
                    
 session=3  -0.01**  -0.01**  -0.01**  -0.01  -0.01  -0.01  -0.01  -0.01  -0.01  
  (-2.04)  (-2.27)  (-2.39)  (-0.76)  (-0.80)  (-1.00)  (-0.91)  (-1.01)  (-1.01)  
                    
 session=4  -0.01  -0.01  -0.01  -0.00  -0.00  -0.00  -0.00  -0.00  -0.00  
  (-0.86)  (-0.99)  (-1.19)  (-0.33)  (-0.36)  (-0.48)  (-0.43)  (-0.48)  (-0.48)  
                    
 session=5  -0.01**  -0.01**  -0.01**  -0.01  -0.01  -0.01  -0.01  -0.01  -0.01  
  (-2.02)  (-2.07)  (-2.17)  (-1.08)  (-1.08)  (-1.39)  (-1.27)  (-1.38)  (-1.39)  
                    
 session=6  -0.01  -0.01*  -0.01**  -0.01  -0.01  -0.01  -0.01  -0.01  -0.01  
  (-1.59)  (-1.84)  (-2.19)  (-0.66)  (-0.73)  (-0.96)  (-0.87)  (-0.95)  (-0.96)  
                    
  
 (0.49)  (0.51)  (1.81)  (1.47)  (0.02) 
 (0.02)  
  
  
  
Table 27. Regressions of the relative final wealth onto 𝑚1𝑖𝑗  and different psychological variables and other 
controls.  t statistics in parentheses, * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.   
  
  
  
Pool 
OLS  
Random  
Effect  
GLS  
Random 
effect  
ML  
Pool 
OLS  
Rando 
m  
Effect  
GLS  
Random 
effect  
ML  
HT              
(m1 is   
endogenous)  
Pool 
OLS  
Random  
Effect  
GLS  
Random 
effect  
ML  
HT          (m1 
is    
endogenous)  
Dep. Var.:  𝑊𝑖𝑗  𝑊𝑖𝑗  𝑊𝑖𝑗  𝑊𝑖𝑗  𝑊𝑖𝑗  𝑊𝑖𝑗  𝑊𝑖𝑗  𝑊𝑖𝑗  𝑊𝑖𝑗  𝑊𝑖𝑗  𝑊𝑖𝑗  
                          
m1  0.16***  0.18***  0.18***  0.16**  0.17*  0.17**   0.19
*  0.15**  0.16*  0.16**   0.19
*  
  
(2.80)  (2.62)  (2.65)  (2.11)  (1.79)  (2.44)   (1.83)  (2.05)  (1.85)  (2.44)   (1.94)  
                          
Miscal  
      
-1.31**  -1.28**  -1.28*   -1.37
*  
         
        
(-2.49)  (-2.09)  (-1.84)   (-1.93)           
                          
ocRankgood  
               
0.05***  0.05***  0.05***   0.05
***  
                 
(3.60)  (2.74)  (2.92)   (2.75)  
                          
ocRankbad  
               
- 
0.03***  
-0.03***  -0.03***   -0.03
***  
                 
(-3.60)  (-2.80)  (-2.99)   (-3.08)  
Constant   0.03   0.03   0.03   0.08 
** 
  0.08 
* 
  0.08   0.00   0.00   0.00   
(0.75)   (2.45)   (0.05)   
R 2   0.045       0.048       0.028       
F   2.95       3.41       2.12       
Observations   948   948   948   1038   1038   1038   1038   1038   1038   
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bc  -0.03  -0.02  -0.02  0.03  0.03  0.03   0.03  0.02  0.03  0.03   0.03  
  
(-0.18)  (-0.11)  (-0.11)  (0.21)  (0.18)  (0.18)   (0.16)  (0.14)  (0.16)  (0.16)   (0.15)  
                          
s1  -0.31  -0.30  -0.30  -0.19  -0.19  -0.19   -0.23  -0.36
*  -0.35  -0.35   -0.40  
  
(-1.33)  (-0.99)  (-1.01)  (-0.79)  (-0.58)  (-0.56)   (-0.67)  (-1.66)  (-1.39)  (-1.22)   (-1.34)  
                          
s2  -0.22  -0.21  -0.21  -0.13  -0.12  -0.12   -0.16  -0.35  -0.35  -0.35   -0.39  
 
  
  
(-0.85)  
 
  
(-0.61)  
  
(-0.63)  
  
(-0.45)  (-0.31)  
 
   
(-0.32)  
  
(-0.42)  (-1.38)  
 
  
(-1.13)  
  
(-1.05)  
  
(-1.16)  
emp  -0.05  -0.02  -0.02  0.16  0.20  0.20  0.23  -0.04  -0.01  -0.02  0.01  
  
(-0.13)  (-0.03)  (-0.04)  (0.31)  (0.28)  (0.37)  (0.42)  (-0.11)  (-0.03)  (-0.04)  (0.02)  
 
st  
 
  
0.14  
  
0.15  
  
0.15  
0.05   
   
0.06  
  
0.06  
0.05   
  
0.17  
  
0.18  
  
0.18  
0.17  
  
  
(0.91)  
 
  
(0.73)  
  
(0.75)  
  
(0.30)  (0.27)  
 
   
(0.29)  
  
(0.24)  (1.11)  
 
  
(0.86)  
  
(0.94)  
  
(0.88)  
gender  -0.10  -0.10  -0.10  0.03  0.02  0.02  0.02  -0.05  -0.06  -0.06  -0.07  
  
(-0.64)  (-0.52)  (-0.53)  (0.15)  (0.08)  (0.09)  (0.08)  (-0.34)  (-0.28)  (-0.31)  (-0.35)  
  
age  
 
  
-0.06  
  
-0.07  
  
-0.07  
-0.08   
   
-0.09  
  
-0.09  
-0.10   
  
-0.08*  
  
-0.09  
  
-0.09  
-0.10*  
  
  
(-1.20)  
 
  
(-1.07)  
  
(-1.09)  
  
(-1.53)  (-1.28)  
 
   
(-1.35)  
  
(-1.51)  (-1.67)  
 
  
(-1.38)  
  
(-1.44)  
  
(-1.66)  
n  0.50  0.52  0.52  0.56  0.59  0.59  0.58  0.61  0.62  0.62  0.62  
  
(0.92)  (0.73)  (0.75)  (0.99)  (1.19)  (0.83)  (0.81)  (1.08)  (1.24)  (0.93)  (0.92)  
  
 transcost  
 
  
-0.24  
  
-0.20  
  
-0.20  
-0.28   
   
-0.21  
  
-0.22  
-0.24   
  
-0.19  
  
-0.17  
  
-0.17  
-0.20  
  
  
(-0.96)  
 
  
(-0.74)  
  
(-0.76)  
  
(-1.08)  (-0.83)  
 
   
(-0.76)  
  
(-0.78)  (-0.78)  
 
  
(-0.73)  
  
(-0.65)  
  
(-0.73)  
 session=2  -0.06  -0.07  -0.07  -0.09  -0.11  -0.11  
  
-0.05  -0.07  -0.07  
  
  
(-0.24)  (-0.34)  (-0.34)  (-0.41)  (-0.56)  (-0.50)  
  
(-0.24)  (-0.36)  (-0.32)  
  
  
 session=3  
 
  
0.04  
  
0.01  
  
0.02  
0.04   
   
0.01  
  
0.02  
  
 
  
0.04  
  
0.02  
  
0.02  
  
  
  
(0.16)  
 
  
(0.07)  
  
(0.07)  
  
(0.17)  (0.06)  
 
   
(0.07)  
  
  
(0.17)  
 
  
(0.08)  
  
(0.08)  
  
  
 session=4  -0.03  -0.05  -0.05  -0.07  -0.09  -0.09  
  
-0.03  -0.05  -0.05  
  
  
(-0.13)  (-0.24)  (-0.23)  (-0.27)  (-0.37)  (-0.39)  
  
(-0.12)  (-0.21)  (-0.22)  
  
  
 session=5  
 
  
-0.08  
  
-0.09  
  
-0.09  
-0.20   
   
-0.21  
  
-0.21  
  
 
  
-0.08  
  
-0.09  
  
-0.09  
  
  
  
(-0.34)  
 
  
(-0.41)  
  
(-0.41)  
  
(-0.86)  (-1.00)  
 
   
(-0.91)  
  
  
(-0.38)  
 
  
(-0.45)  
  
(-0.42)  
  
  
 session=6  0.23  0.21  0.21  0.16  0.14  0.14  
  
0.23  0.21  0.21  
  
  
(0.99)  (0.97)  (0.98)  (0.72)  (0.63)  (0.61)  
  
(1.08)  (1.01)  (0.98)  
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Constant  
 
  
1.24  
  
1.42  
  
1.41  
2.59**   
   
2.72  
  
2.71  
3.07*   
  
2.01  
  
2.16  
  
2.15  
2.67  
  
(1.07)  (0.94)  (0.96)  (1.99)  (1.61)  (1.63)  (1.74)  (1.52)  (1.25)  (1.30)  (1.54)  
R2  0.015  
    
0.020  
      
0.034  
      
F  1.03  
    
1.07  
      
1.74  
    
1.79  
Observations  1016  1016  1016  927  927  927  927  1016  1016  1016  1016  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
Tabe 28. Regressions of the relative final wealth onto 𝑚2𝑖𝑗 − total order side,  and different 
psychological variables and other controls.  t statistics in parentheses, * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p 
0.01.   
   <  
   Pool  Random  Random  
 OLS  Effect  effect  
 GLS  ML  
Pool  
OLS  
Random  Random  HT(m2 is  Pool  
Effect  effect  endogenous)  OLS  
GLS  ML  
Random  Random  HT(m2 is  
Effect  effect  endogenous)  
GLS  ML  
 Dep. Var. :  𝑊𝑖𝑗  𝑊𝑖𝑗  𝑊𝑖𝑗  𝑊𝑖𝑗  𝑊𝑖𝑗  𝑊𝑖𝑗  𝑊𝑖𝑗  𝑊𝑖𝑗   𝑊𝑖𝑗  𝑊𝑖𝑗  𝑊𝑖𝑗  
                          
m2  0.01  0.03  0.03  0.00  0.03  0.02   0.06  0.02  0.03  0.03   0.06  
  
(0.25)  (0.67)  (0.66)  (0.07)  (0.69)  (0.60)   (1.27)  (0.44)  (0.85)  (0.75)   (1.19)  
                          
Miscal  
      
-1.31**  -1.27**  -1.28*   -1.37
*  
         
        
(-2.48)  (-2.05)  (-1.82)   (-1.91)           
                          
ocRankgood  
               
0.05***  0.05***  0.05***   0.05
***  
                 
(3.95)  (2.95)  (3.30)   (3.24)  
                          
ocRankbad  
               
- 
0.03***  
-0.03***  -0.03***   -0.03
***  
                 
(-3.49)  (-2.66)  (-2.87)   (-2.95)  
                          
bc  -0.05  -0.04  -0.04  0.01  0.02  0.02   0.01  0.00  0.01  0.01   0.00  
108  
  
  
(- 
0.34)  
(-0.24)  (-0.24)  (0.08)  (0.09)  (0.09)   (0.05)  (0.01)  (0.04)  (0.03)   (0.00)  
                          
s1  -0.24  -0.24  -0.24  -0.12  -0.11  -0.11   -0.16  -0.30  -0.29  -0.29   -0.34  
  
(- 
1.04)  
(-0.78)  (-0.80)  (-0.50)  (-0.36)  (-0.34)   (-0.45)  (-1.37)  (-1.13)  (-1.00)   (-1.14)  
                          
s2  -0.15  -0.14  -0.14  -0.04  -0.02  -0.02   -0.07  -0.29  -0.28  -0.28   -0.33  
  
(- 
0.56)  
(-0.39)  (-0.40)  (-0.13)  (-0.06)  (-0.06)   (-0.17)  (-1.14)  (-0.91)  (-0.85)   (-0.98)  
                          
emp  -0.06  -0.04  -0.04  0.17  0.20  0.19   0.21  -0.07  -0.05  -0.05   -0.04  
  
(- (-0.09)  (-0.09)  (0.32)  (0.26)  (0.36)   (0.38)  (-0.19)  (-0.09)  (-0.13)   (-0.09)  
 0.18)              
                          
st  0.12  0.13  0.13  0.03  0.04  0.04   0.02  0.16  0.17  0.17   0.16  
  
(0.82)  (0.64)  (0.66)  (0.20)  (0.17)  (0.19)   (0.10)  (1.07)  (0.80)  (0.89)   (0.81)  
                          
gender  -0.10  -0.11  -0.11  0.03  0.02  0.02   0.01  -0.06  -0.06  -0.06   -0.07  
  
(- 
0.66)  
(-0.54)  (-0.55)  (0.16)  (0.07)  (0.08)   (0.04)  (-0.35)  (-0.29)  (-0.32)   (-0.39)  
                          
age  -0.05  -0.06  -0.06  -0.07  -0.08  -0.08   -0.10  -0.07  -0.08  -0.08   -0.10  
  
(- 
1.08)  
(-0.97)  (-0.98)  (-1.45)  (-1.21)  (-1.25)   (-1.48)  (-1.49)  (-1.23)  (-1.26)   (-1.54)  
                          
n  0.51  0.53  0.53  0.58  0.61  0.60   0.61  0.62  0.63  0.63   0.64  
  
(0.94)  (0.75)  (0.76)  (1.03)  (1.18)  (0.85)   (0.84)  (1.11)  (1.20)  (0.94)   (0.94)  
                          
 transcost  -0.08  -0.12  -0.12  -0.09  -0.13  -0.13     
-0.09  -0.12  -0.12     
  
(- 
0.28)  
(-0.38)  (-0.38)  (-0.29)  (-0.43)  (-0.39)     
(-0.29)  (-0.41)  (-0.38)     
                          
 session=2  -0.06  -0.07  -0.07  -0.09  -0.12  -0.11     
-0.05  -0.07  -0.07     
  
(- 
0.24)  
(-0.35)  (-0.35)  (-0.40)  (-0.57)  (-0.51)     
(-0.24)  (-0.37)  (-0.33)     
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 session=3  0.03  0.01  0.01  0.04  0.01  0.01     
0.03  0.01  0.01     
  
(0.13)  (0.02)  (0.03)  (0.17)  (0.05)  (0.05)     
(0.14)  (0.04)  (0.04)     
                          
 session=4  -0.04  -0.07  -0.06  -0.08  -0.10  -0.10     
-0.04  -0.06  -0.06     
  
(- 
0.19)  
(-0.30)  (-0.30)  (-0.30)  (-0.42)  (-0.44)     
(-0.16)  (-0.26)  (-0.28)     
                          
 session=5  -0.11  -0.12  -0.12  -0.22  -0.24  -0.24     
-0.11  -0.12  -0.12     
  
(- 
0.48)  
(-0.58)  (-0.58)  (-0.97)  (-1.16)  (-1.04)     
(-0.52)  (-0.62)  (-0.58)     
                          
 session=6  0.19  0.16  0.16  0.13  0.10  0.10     
0.19  0.17  0.17     
  
(0.81)  (0.76)  (0.77)  (0.57)  (0.47)  (0.44)     
(0.91)  (0.82)  (0.78)     
                          
 Constant  1.24  1.42  1.41  ** 2.81*  2.81*  3.23*  1.83  1.92  1.92  2.47  
   (0.94)  (0.96)  (1.67)  (1.66)  (1.80)  (1.40)  (1.11)  (1.15)  (1.40)  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
As can be seen from Table 29 and Table 30, ocRankgood is significantly negatively 
correlated with 𝑚4𝑖𝑗 ; 𝑚4𝑖𝑗 is negatively significantly correlated with relative final 
wealth.  
  
Table 29. Regressions of the relative final wealth onto 𝑚3𝑖𝑗  and different psychological variables and other 
controls.  t statistics in parentheses, * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.   
  
Pool 
OLS  
Random  
Effect GLS  
Random 
effect ML  
Pool 
OLS  
Random  
Effect GLS  
Random 
effect ML  
HT(m3)  Pool  
OLS  
Random  
Effect GLS  
Random 
effect ML  
HT(m3)  
Dep. Var. :  𝑊𝑖𝑗  𝑊𝑖𝑗  𝑊𝑖𝑗  𝑊𝑖𝑗  𝑊𝑖𝑗  𝑊𝑖𝑗  𝑊𝑖𝑗  𝑊𝑖𝑗  𝑊𝑖𝑗  𝑊𝑖𝑗  𝑊𝑖𝑗  
                             
m3  0.05*   0.05   0.05  0.04   0.05   0.04  0.05  0.04   0.05  0.05  0.05  
  
(1.68)   (1.58)   (1.60)  (1.26)   (1.19)   (1.29)  (1.02)  (1.40)   (1.33)  (1.43)  (1.18)  
2.73 
  (1.07) 
  
(2.11) 
  R 2 
  
0.015 
      
0.013 
                F 
  
1.03 
      
0.85 
      
0.75 
      
0.75 *** 
  
1.57 
  Observations 
  
1016 
  
1016 
  
1016 
  
927 
  
927 
  
927 
  
927 
      
(8.20) 
  
1016 
  
110  
  
                             
Miscal  
        
-1.31**   -1.27
**   -1.27
*  -1.39*  
         
          
(-2.45)   (-2.04)   (-1.82)  (-1.96)           
                             
ocRankgood  
                  
0.05***   0.05
***  0.05***  0.05***  
                    
(3.93)   (2.91)  (3.27)  (3.16)  
                             
ocRankbad  
                  
- 
0.03***   
-0.03**  -0.03***  -0.03***  
                    
(-3.28)   (-2.50)  (-2.73)  (-2.83)  
                             
bc  -0.06   -0.06   -0.06  -0.00   -0.00   -0.00  -0.01  -0.01   -0.01  -0.01  -0.02  
  
(-0.46)   (-0.33)   (-0.34)  (-0.03)   (-0.01)   (-0.01)  (-0.06)  (-0.11)   (-0.06)  (-0.06)  (-0.11)  
                             
s1  -0.24   -0.23   -0.24  -0.13   -0.12   -0.12  -0.16  -0.29   -0.28  -0.28  -0.32  
  
(-1.06)   (-0.77)   (-0.79)  (-0.55)   (-0.39)   (-0.37)  (-0.48)  (-1.34)   (-1.10)  (-0.97)  (-1.09)  
                             
s2  -0.15   -0.13   -0.13  -0.04   -0.03   -0.03  -0.07  -0.28   -0.27  -0.27  -0.30  
  
(-0.56)   (-0.38)   (-0.39)  (-0.15)   (-0.07)   (-0.07)  (-0.18)  (-1.10)   (-0.86)  (-0.82)  (-0.92)  
                             
emp  -0.07   -0.04   -0.05  0.13   0.17   0.17  0.22  -0.08   -0.06   -0.06  -0.03  
  
(-0.22)   (-0.10)   (-0.10)  (0.25)   (0.23)   (0.32)  (0.39)  (-0.21)   (-0.10)   (-0.13)  (-0.06)  
                              
st  0.10   0.11   0.11  0.02   0.03   0.03  0.01  0.15   0.15   0.15  0.14  
  
(0.69)   (0.55)   (0.56)  (0.11)   (0.12)   (0.13)  (0.05)  (0.96)   (0.71)   (0.81)  (0.72)  
                              
gender  -0.06   -0.06   -0.06  0.06   0.06   0.06  0.06  -0.02   -0.02   -0.02  -0.03  
  
(-0.36)   (-0.30)   (-0.31)  (0.38)   (0.26)   (0.29)  (0.28)  (-0.11)   (-0.09)   (-0.10)  (-0.14)  
                              
age  -0.06   -0.06   -0.06  -0.07   -0.08   -0.08  -0.10  -0.07   -0.08   -0.08  -0.10  
  
(-1.20)   (-1.05)   (-1.07)  (-1.50)   (-1.26)   (-1.30)  (-1.55)  (-1.54)   (-1.26)   (-1.31)  (-1.61)  
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n  0.40   0.41   0.41  0.49   0.50   0.50  0.48  0.52   0.52   0.52  0.50  
  
(0.73)   (0.57)   (0.59)  (0.87)   (0.98)   (0.70)  (0.67)  (0.93)   (1.00)   (0.77)  (0.73)  
                              
 transcost  -0.12   -0.08   -0.08  -0.14   -0.08   -0.08  -0.08  -0.08   -0.05   -0.05  -0.06  
  
(-0.50)   (-0.30)   (-0.31)  (-0.56)   (-0.30)   (-0.29)  (-0.29)  (-0.33)   (-0.23)   (-0.21)  (-0.24)  
                              
 session=2  -0.06   -0.08   -0.08  -0.10   -0.12   -0.12    
-0.06   -0.08   -0.08    
  
(-0.27)   (-0.38)   (-0.38)  (-0.43)   (-0.59)   (-0.52)    
(-0.27)   (-0.40)   (-0.36)    
                              
 session=3  0.02   -0.00   0.00  0.03   0.01   0.01    
0.03   0.00   0.01    
  
(0.10)   (-0.00)   (0.00)  (0.14)   (0.04)   (0.04)    
(0.12)   (0.02)   (0.03)    
                              
 session=4  -0.05   -0.07   -0.07  -0.08   -0.11   -0.10    
-0.04   -0.07   -0.06    
  
(-0.21)   (-0.33)   (-0.33)  (-0.31)   (-0.44)   (-0.46)    
(-0.17)   (-0.29)   (-0.30)    
                              
 session=5  -0.12   -0.13   -0.13  -0.23   -0.25   -0.24    
-0.12   -0.13   -0.13    
  
(-0.52)   (-0.62)   (-0.62)  (-1.01)   (-1.20)   (-1.08)    
(-0.55)   (-0.66)   (-0.61)    
                              
 session=6  0.18   0.16   0.16  0.12   0.10   0.10    
0.19   0.16   0.16    
  
(0.78)   (0.73)   (0.74)  (0.56)   (0.45)   (0.43)    
(0.89)   (0.80)   (0.76)    
                              
 Constant  1.35  1.52  1.51  2.64**  2.77  2.76  3.31*  1.82  1.81  2.45  
   (1.01)  (1.02)  (1.63)  (1.64)  (1.87)  (1.03)  (1.09)  (1.40)  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
1.71 
  (1.16) 
  
(2.02) 
  
(1.28) 
  R 2 
  
0.010 
      
0.015 
        
0.030 
        F 
  
0.69 
      
1.06 
      
0.71 
  
1.70 
      
1.59 
  Observations 
  
1016 
  
1016 
  
1016 
  
927 
  
927 
  
927 
  
927 
  
1016 
  
1016 
  
1016 
  
1016 
  
112  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
Table 30. Regressions of the relative final wealth onto 𝑚4𝑖𝑗  and different psychological variables and other 
controls.  t statistics in parentheses, * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.   
   Pool OLS  RE-GLS  RE-MLE  Pool OLS  RE-GLS  RE-MLE  HT(m4)  Pool OLS  RE-GLS  RE-MLE  HT(m4)  
 Dep. Var. :  𝑊𝑖𝑗  𝑊𝑖𝑗  𝑊𝑖𝑗  𝑊𝑖𝑗  𝑊𝑖𝑗  𝑊𝑖𝑗  𝑊𝑖𝑗  𝑊𝑖𝑗  𝑊𝑖𝑗  𝑊𝑖𝑗  𝑊𝑖𝑗  
                        
m4  -3.01***  -2.47**  -2.47**  -3.77***  -2.96*  -2.97**  -1.35  -2.74**  -2.35*  -2.35**  -1.50  
  
(-3.09)  (-2.51)  (-2.52)  (-2.85)  (-1.80)  (-2.48)  (-0.99)  (-2.35)  (-1.74)  (-2.40)  (-1.36)  
                        
Miscal  
      
-1.42***  -1.38**  -1.38**  -1.43**  
        
        
(-2.74)  (-2.37)  (-2.00)  (-2.03)  
        
                        
                        
ocRankgood  
              
0.05***  0.05***  0.05***  0.05***  
                
(3.60)  (2.77)  (3.05)  (3.03)  
                        
ocRankbad  
              
-0.03***  -0.03***  -0.03***  -0.03***  
                
(-3.62)  (-2.85)  (-2.97)  (-3.05)  
                        
                        
bc  -0.07  -0.06  -0.06  -0.01  -0.01  -0.01  -0.00  -0.02  -0.01  -0.01  -0.01  
  
(-0.53)  (-0.36)  (-0.37)  (-0.10)  (-0.03)  (-0.03)  (-0.01)  (-0.17)  (-0.08)  (-0.09)  (-0.07)  
                        
s1  -0.21  -0.21  -0.21  -0.09  -0.09  -0.09  -0.13  -0.27  -0.27  -0.27  -0.30  
  
(-0.92)  (-0.70)  (-0.70)  (-0.39)  (-0.28)  (-0.27)  (-0.40)  (-1.26)  (-1.04)  (-0.93)  (-1.04)  
                        
s2  -0.10  -0.09  -0.09  -0.00  0.01  0.01  -0.05  -0.24  -0.24  -0.24  -0.28  
  
(-0.39)  (-0.27)  (-0.28)  (-0.01)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (-0.12)  (-0.95)  (-0.77)  (-0.72)  (-0.85)  
                        
emp  -0.09  -0.07  -0.07  0.10  0.14  0.14  0.22  -0.09  -0.07  -0.07  -0.03  
  
(-0.27)  (-0.16)  (-0.16)  (0.22)  (0.24)  (0.27)  (0.41)  (-0.24)  (-0.14)  (-0.16)  (-0.06)  
                        
st  0.13  0.14  0.14  0.03  0.04  0.04  0.03  0.17  0.17  0.17  0.16  
  
(0.88)  (0.70)  (0.71)  (0.21)  (0.19)  (0.20)  (0.13)  (1.09)  (0.82)  (0.91)  (0.84)  
    
gender  
  
-0.10  
  
-0.11  
  
-0.11  
  
0.03  
  
0.02  
  
0.02  
  
0.02  
  
-0.06  
  
-0.06  
  
-0.06  
-0.07  
  
    
(-0.69)  
  
(-0.57)  
  
(-0.57)  
  
(0.15)  
  
(0.09)  
  
(0.10)  
  
(0.08)  
  
(-0.39)  
  
(-0.32)  
  
(-0.35)  
  
(-0.39)  
age  -0.05  -0.06  -0.06  -0.07  -0.07  -0.07  -0.09  -0.07  -0.08  -0.08  -0.10  
  
(-0.99)  (-0.92)  (-0.92)  (-1.34)  (-1.16)  (-1.20)  (-1.44)  (-1.47)  (-1.21)  (-1.27)  (-1.53)  
    
n  
  
0.54  
  
0.55  
  
0.55  
  
0.62  
  
0.63  
  
0.63  
  
0.60  
  
0.65  
  
0.65  
  
0.65  
0.64  
  
(1.00)  (0.79)  (0.80)  (1.08)  (1.16)  (0.90)  (0.85)  (1.14)  (1.18)  (0.98)  (0.95)  
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 transcost  -0.14  -0.09  -0.09  -0.22  -0.13  -0.13  -0.07  -0.11  -0.07  -0.07  -0.04  
  
(-0.59)  (-0.35)  (-0.35)  (-0.89)  (-0.55)  (-0.49)  (-0.25)  (-0.45)  (-0.31)  (-0.27)  (-0.15)  
    
 session=2  
  
-0.06  
  
-0.08  
  
-0.08  
  
-0.12  
  
-0.13  
  
-0.13  
     
-0.06  
  
-0.07  
  
-0.07  
  
  
    
(-0.26)  
  
(-0.36)  
  
(-0.36)  
  
(-0.51)  
  
(-0.64)  
  
(-0.58)  
  
  
  
(-0.26)  
  
(-0.38)  
  
(-0.34)  
  
  
 session=3  0.01  -0.01  -0.01  -0.02  -0.03  -0.03  
  
0.01  -0.01  -0.01  
  
  
(0.04)  (-0.05)  (-0.05)  (-0.07)  (-0.13)  (-0.13)  
  
(0.06)  (-0.03)  (-0.03)  
  
    
 session=4  
  
-0.05  
  
-0.07  
  
-0.07  
  
-0.10  
  
-0.12  
  
-0.12  
     
-0.05  
  
-0.07  
  
-0.07  
  
  
    
(-0.23)  
  
(-0.34)  
  
(-0.35)  
  
(-0.40)  
  
(-0.50)  
  
(-0.53)  
  
  
  
(-0.20)  
  
(-0.31)  
  
(-0.32)  
  
  
 session=5  -0.14  -0.15  -0.15  -0.27  -0.27  -0.27  
  
-0.14  -0.14  -0.14  
  
  
(-0.60)  (-0.67)  (-0.68)  (-1.20)  (-1.33)  (-1.20)  
  
(-0.63)  (-0.72)  (-0.67)  
  
    
 session=6  
  
0.17  
  
0.15  
  
0.15  
  
0.08  
  
0.06  
  
0.06  
     
0.17  
  
0.15  
  
0.15  
  
  
(0.73)  (0.69)  (0.70)  (0.36)  (0.29)  (0.27)  
  
(0.84)  (0.74)  (0.72)  
  
    
Constant  
  
1.40  
  
1.58  
  
1.58  
  
2.83**  
  
2.95*  
  
2.95*  
  
3.37*  
  
2.09  
  
2.21  
  
2.21  
2.71  
  
(1.20)  (1.07)  (1.08)  (2.19)  (1.77)  (1.79)  (1.93)  (1.60)  (1.29)  (1.34)  (1.57)  
R2  0.017  
    
0.024  
      
0.036  
      
F  1.14  
    
1.61  
    
0.71  1.97  
    
1.65  
Observations  1016  1016  1016  927  927  927  927  1016  1016  1016  1016  
  
  
  
  
7.4.1 Robustness check with Hausman and Taylor Model  
  
As can been seen from the results presented in this chapter, each regression models were 
revisited with different estimation methods. The pool OLS regression assumes there is 
no unobserved effect, the systematic variance is zero. However, according to Table 31 
BGLM suggests that the null hypothesis of OLS regression is rejected in all the 
regressions with alternative overconfidence or aggressiveness measures. Though the 
OLS results shows statistical significance, it may not be efficient and unbiased. We are 
suggested that order book information were collected to reflect psychological bias, so if 
we adding order book information into the basic relation of overconfidence measures 
and relative final wealth, we expect that order book information as additional regressors 
may be correlated with overconfidence measures or unobserved individual effect.  
Endogenous variables are a common problem in OLS regression, and can lead to 
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violation of the assumptions of OLS regression and random effect GLS models.  
Hausman and Taylor regression model introduced in chapter 4 could present efficient 
and consistent estimators when the model is suffering endogeneity problem. Recall the 
conclusion section in chapter 6 suggests that there are some other psychological bias not 
observed and potentially correlated with trading behaviour, which indicating that the 
individual effects may be correlated with the regressors of order book information. In 
this case, the OLS or Random effect GLS are biased upward.   
As mentioned in chapter 4, the fixed effect estimator can provide generally consistent 
estimator. However, in this thesis, the coefficients of psychological measures can not be 
estimated by a fixed effect model. In addition, the fixed effect estimates may not be fully 
efficient.   
Hausman and Taylor regression model is presented to address the issues. As can be seen 
from Table 24, consider the Hausman and Taylor estimator given in the seventh column.  
The coefficient on 𝑚1𝑖𝑗 is estimated to be 0.19, which is higher than OLS, GLS  and 
MLE estimate results. In addition, a Hausman test results of the difference between fixed 
effect estimators and Hausman and Taylor estimaors is shown in Table 31. The test 
statistics is χ2 =0.87, with p-value of 0.6476. Therefore, the null hypothesis of there is 
not systematic different in efficiency between fixed effect estimator and HT estimator 
can not be rejected, which indicate that the instruments used in HT model are valid.  In 
general, the HT estimators resemble the Pool OLS and random effect estimators across 
estimation results in this chapter.   
Table 31. Hausman Test Fixed And HT Estimator ( 𝑚1𝑖𝑗 Is Endogenous)  
          
      𝜒2  p-value  
 Mical      0.87  0.6476  
goodbad      1.26  0.5323  
 bta      1.28  0.5276  
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 pderro      1.26  0.5336  
 svpred      2.41  0.491  
  
  
  
  
  
7.6. Discussion  
  
To sum up, I examine the relationships between order aggressiveness, overconfidence 
or ability measures and relative final wealth. I found that subjects with higher ability 
rank tend to place higher aggressive orders and end up by higher relative wealth. This 
may be one of the channel that explains the mechanism how psychological bias affect 
final wealth in the financial market. Another finding is that ability improve order 
performance ( 𝑚4𝑖𝑗), through which improves relative final wealth. The results 
presented in this chapter elucidate the mechanisms and causal pathways operating in the 
complex relationship and allow conclusions to be made separately by different possible 
psychological bias measurements.   
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
Chapter 8. Discussions and Conclusions  
  
8.1. Findings  
  
  
116  
  
This thesis studies the overconfidence effect on heterogeneous behaviours in an 
experimental financial market. In order to document miscalibration score and other 
relevant psychological bias measures, we used the miscalibration test suggested by 
psychological literature. We collected a survey data set that encompassing the 
participants of this experimental research that contains both psychological measures and 
their demographic variables for the purposes of this study. We also gathered two panel 
data sets about experimental financial market trading details from both stand-alone and 
network trading games. The data sets span six-session trading periods and contain 
various trading information, which support the empirical analysis of experimental 
trading market.   
The results reported across this thesis consistently show that overconfidence rank and 
ability rank, which are newly defined by this study, significantly and simultaneously 
affect relative final wealth. More precisely, ability rank significantly increases relative 
final wealth, while overconfidence rank reduces relative final wealth. Unsurprisingly, 
misclibration score has been found to negatively correlate with trading performance in 
this study, which is consistent with the existing literature. Gender effect has been found 
to help explain excessive trading volume but not relative final wealth. For the process 
of discovering the channel through which psychological bias affects financial market 
performance, we have found that ability rank significantly enhances order 
aggressiveness and improves trading performance. This indicates that people placing 
more aggressive orders were willing to take more risk with price volatility. Such 
risktaking behaviour, alongside higher ability rank, can enhance trading performance. 
This also explains why sometimes aggressive traders can survive in the current financial 
market.   
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8.2. Criticisms   
  
Criticisms have emerged despite the volume of findings investigating and improving 
overconfidence measurements having proliferated in recent years. Criticisms that have 
been raised against all types of overconfidence are usually directed either at research 
methodology and experimental design or the underlying concept itself. For example, the 
overuse of the term “overconfidence” may generate statistical and economic bias 
(Olsson, 2014). Fellner and Krugel (2012) indicate that overconfidence and 
miscalibration are unrelated, even though miscalibration has frequently been measured 
as the overprecision of knowledge. The list of psychological researchers who have 
questioned the reality of overconfidence or the research design includes Juslin (1994);  
Gigerenzer (1991); Marsh and Merton (1986); Gigerenzer, Hoffrage and Kleinbolting 
(1991); Erev, Wallsten & Budescu (1999); Kleidon 1986). Researchers should  be able 
to document the validity and reliability of the measures adopted in their research to 
reconcile these doubts and concerns about overconfidence itself and its measurement.   
  
8.3. Limitations and Further Research  
  
The thesis adopts an experimental approach in testing overconfidence and its 
interaction with gender and ability. Several measures of overconfidence are 
proposed and used in regression analysis to test for potential relationship between 
overconfidence of trading performance and activity. Although the use of different 
measures of overconfidence and ability provide a wealth of information of 
measuring the different aspects of psychological bias, most of the measures are ad 
hoc and can be problematic. We have not, for example, systematically distinct the 
differences between all these measures. Furthermore, one of the limitation of this 
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thesis is that the loss of generality. We were not able to get a sample of participants 
with different age, occupations, trading experiences and levels of educations.  
However, the restricted sample still tells us some stories about overconfidence. With 
the similar age, education and trading experiences, students still behaved very 
differently, not only in the overconfidence measurement tests(misclibration 
questionnaire surveys), but also trading performance. With controlling age, 
education and trading experience, we can discover the direct relationships between 
proxies of overconfidence and trading behaviours. Another limitation is that the 
noncash incentive may not be the proper incentive and encourages participant to 
trade seriously. Higher incentive dose improve performance often, typically 
judgment tasks that are responseive to better effort. Incentives also 
reduce”presentation” effects(eg generosity and risk -seeking). However, table 5 and 
6 with lagged dependent variable as regressors suggest that there is significant 
improvement in terms of relative final wealth or trading activity between two 
consecutive sessions. This finding somehow implies that participant were trading 
seriously and were learning to behave better as well.   
In view of the criticisms and limitations, further research is needed to address the 
relevant issues. The financial market experiments in this research were designed based 
on assuming no feedback effect. In other words, each participant is assumed to have  a 
constant overconfidence level and that there are no dynamics in the analytical model. 
However, Gervais and Odean (2001) proposed a theoretical overconfidence model 
incorporating learning process, suggesting that overconfidence changes over the time if 
there is learning through feedback. Empirically, Griffin et al (2007) suggest that past 
earning success as a proxy variable of psychological bias can significantly affect 
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investor’s belief and trading activity. If the assumption of giving feedback to participants 
after each session is released, dividend prediction may be a more appropriate proxy of 
overconfidence, which is not found to be significant in this study.   
If we allow feedback effect in an experimental study, we could expect a time fixed effect 
on the data. A heterogeneous panel model with time-specific factors can be estimated. 
However, this assumption may also cause an endogeneity problem, with some of the 
regressors on the righthand side of the regression potentially correlating with the error 
term. Precisely, feedback effect induces the impact of last period’s outcome on this 
period dividend prediction and possible onto this period performance. Therefore, a 
dynamic panel model may be considered and GMM estimation method could be applied 
with valid instruments.    
A risk averse investor tend to sell stock promptly or by placing a limit order at a more 
favourable price. We use order book information to measure order aggressiveness to 
interpret the attitude towards risk. However, a more formal theoretical model should be 
investigated to contribute the volume of literature of studying risk attitude and behaviour 
bias.   
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Appendix A.  
OLS Solution of Kyle (1985) model:  
  
2 
min 𝐸[(𝑣̃ − 𝑃(𝑦)) ] = 
𝐸[𝑣̃ − 𝜇 − 𝜆(𝛼 + 𝛽𝑣̃ + 
𝑢̃ )]2  
= 𝐸[𝑣̃ (1 − 𝜆𝛽) − 𝜆𝑢̃ − 𝜇 − 𝜆𝛼]2  
 Recall  the  assumptions:  𝐸[𝑣̃ ] = 𝑝̃0; 𝐸[(𝑣̃ − 𝑝̃0)2] = 𝛴0, 𝐸[𝑢̃] = 0; 𝐸[𝑢̃2] = 
𝜎𝑢̃2, 𝐸[𝑢̃𝑣̃] = 0  
Objective function becomes:  
min[(1 − 𝜆𝛽)2(𝛴0 + 𝑝̃02) + (𝜇 + 𝜆𝛼)2 + 𝜆2𝜎𝑢̃2 − 2(𝜇 + 𝜆𝛼)(1 − 𝜆𝛽)𝑝̃0]  
First order condition with respect to 𝜇, 𝜆:  
𝜇 = −𝜆𝛼 + 𝑝̃0(1 − 𝜆𝛽)  
−2𝛽(1 − 𝜆𝛽)(𝛴0 + 𝑝̃02) + 2𝛼(𝜇 + 𝜆𝛼) + 2𝜆𝜎𝑢̃2 − 2𝑝̃0[−𝛽(𝜇 + 𝜆𝛼) + 𝛼(1 − 𝜆𝛽)] 
= 0  
Hence:   
𝛽𝛴0 
 
𝜆 = 𝛽2𝛴0 + 𝜎𝑢̃2  
Appendix B.   
  
Trading Game Instructions  
1. General instructions  
Please read these simple instructions carefully.   
This is an assessed exercise (part 1 of Coursework 1) of using TRETS. For more details 
of TRETS, please study Lecture handout of E-Trading. This trading exercise tutorial 
will last for approximately 1 hour, including instructions, practice, and post-exercise 
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questionnaires. There will be a sequence of 6 assessed trading sessions each of which 
lasts 5 minutes in the tutorial. The session will be closed after 5 minutes. YOU CAN  
NOT TRADE any shares after the session closed.   
2. Using the software  
To find the software, go to ‘Learning Central---Tutorial Question Sheets/Answers--- 
T04-E trading’, Download TRETS_1.3 Client.bat (Right Click—Click ‘Save target as ’, 
to save the software to the desktop)  
  
You may practice by clicking ‘Run’ of ‘PRCTICE: AGGREGATE BOOK, NORMAL’  
OR ‘PRACTICE: DETAIL BOOK, SLOW’. Then you can click START button on the 
bottom left corner to start practice.      
3. The Market:  
At the beginning of each session, you will be endowed with 300 cash and 50 shares. In 
a nextwork exercise, 8 traders will participant in each market. After the session starts, 
you may buy and sell any numbers of shares subject to your available fund and positions.  
Each session lasts for 5 minutes and will be repeated for 6 times. Your inventories of 
cash and share will not carry over from one session to the next one.   
Before each session starts, you will receive a private signal about true dividend value 
shown in the “NEWS” panel on your screen. You have to predict the true dividend value 
before the session ends and write it down in the paper provided by the experimenter.  
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Your performance in the market will be equal to the total dividend value you receive on 
the shares you are holding plus the end of session cash you have.   
  
4. Assessed trading exercise procedure  
Before assessed trading exercise starts, you will be instructed to click ‘run’ of 
NETWORK: Continuous Trading, then click ‘Connect’ on the bottom left corner.   
  
The market as described above will be repeated for 6 times. Before session starts, you 
will receive a dividend signal shown in the NEWS panel. After the beginning of each 
session, subject to sufficient amount of cash and number of shares, you may sell part of 
your shares or purchase more shares using your cash. Pay attention with the transaction 
cost of each trade. It will be deducted from your profits.   
At the end of each market, the shares of ‘position’( In Account Balance panel)  will pay 
a dividend. The dividend value is unknown. You can speculate the true dividend value 
according to the dividend signal, limit order book and price path. After dividends are 
paid, the stock is worth nothing. Then your portfolio wealth will be calculated based on : 
Cash + true dividend* Position  
For more details of calculating portfolio wealth and marking scheme of your coursework 
1, please read lecture handout L04-E Trading.ppt  
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5. After each trading sessions, you need to provide a prediction (guess) of the true 
dividend and write down the number on the paper provided.   
6. After all the trading sessions, you need to fill a post experimental questionnaire.   
7 Marking scheme   
Subject to successful completion of 6 trading sessions, your marks will be rewarded as 
follows (account for 10% of module mark):  
1. 6% for participating each of 6 trading sessions in week 5 and 6.  
2. Maximum 4% extra bonus based on your portfolio wealth in your trading group at the 
end of each game.   
  
Software For Trading Experiments  
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Documents for Experimental Research  
  
Letter to students  
Dear Students,  
Please be informed that we would like to make use of the outcomes of your two tutorial 
session activities in BST277 (Investment and Electronic Trading) for experimental 
research. The participation in the above experiment will not be linked in any way with 
the performance in any module, including BST277. Your tutorial exercise results will 
be treated with strict anonymity and confidentiality.   
You will be asked to fill in a questionnaire if you choose to participate in the experiment. 
All information provided in the questionnaire will be held anonymously so that it will 
not be possible to trace information or comments back to individual contributors.   
Information will be stored in accordance with the current Data Protection Act. 
Participants may opt to omit any questions of the questionnaire that they do not want to 
answer.   
You may withdraw from the participation of the experiment without providing a reason 
at any stage of the exercise. Your withdrawal will neither affect your performance in the 
module nor your right as a student of Cardiff Business School. In the event that you 
withdraw from the experiment, your trading outcomes will be deleted.   
If you would like the outcomes of your tutorial sessions to be used for research, please 
kindly sign the accompanied Informed Consent Declaration form.    
  
             Yours sincerely  
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            Dr Woon Wong & Ms Xinran Zhao   Informed 
Consent Declaration – For Research Participants  
  
This study is being conducted by Xinran Zhao, an Economics PhD student of the Cardiff Business  
School under the supervision of Dr Woon Wong (email: WongWK3@cardiff.ac.uk).  
  
Participation in the study is entirely voluntary and participants can withdraw from the study at any 
time without giving a reason. Participants may also ask questions at any time and discuss any 
concerns with either the researcher Xinran Zhao, ZhaoX8@cf.ac.uk or her supervisor as listed above.  
  
The findings of the study will form part of my research assignment.  
All information provided in the questionnaire will be held anonymously so that it will not be possible 
to trace information or comments back to individual contributors.  Information will be stored in 
accordance with the current Data Protection Act. Participants may opt to omit any questions of the 
questionnaire that they do not want to answer.   
  
Participation in the experiment will not be linked in any way with the performance in any modules. 
Participants can request information and feedback about the purpose and results of the study by 
applying directly to the researcher Xinran Zhao (ZhaoX8@cf.ac.uk)  
If you would like the outcomes of your trading exercise to be used for research, please select ‘Yes I 
consent’ and kindly fill in your student ID and your University Email address; If you do not consent, 
please select ‘No I do not consent’ and no other information is required.   
Yes, I consent  
Student ID: ___________________  
University Email: ________________________  
No, I do not Consent  
Researcher – Xinran Zhao 
Cardiff Business School 
Cardiff University  
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CF10 3EU  
01/01/2017  
Questionnaire 1: Individual’s characteristics  
Student Number:_____________      University Email Address:________________  
(Please circle the right answer, and provide details as required)  
1. Are you male or female?  
Male                                           Female  
  
2. What is your age?   __________  
  
3. What is your nationality? _________  
  
4. What is your BSc grade  
First-class honours            Upper second         Lower second         Others  
If others, please provide details: _____________  
  
5. What is your program of study ( IEBF, FE, or others)?   
________________  
    
  
6. Were you employed in trading or investment related area before?  
Yes                                              No  
  
If yes, Please provide details of your job. _______________________ 
________________________________________________________  
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7. Do you have any self-investment or Online-trading experience? (If no, please 
skip question 8,9)  
Yes                                              No  
8. How long is your investment experience?  
Up to 6 months                   6 months to 1 year                more than 1 year  
  
9. How would you rate your performance of investing in financial market?  
       Very poor           Poor              Average               Good             Very good  
  
For the following questions, please estimate your performance in the trading 
exercises.  
1—Totally agree to 5—completely disagree  
10. I will not earn positive profits in the trading games  
1 2                         3                             4                      5  
  
11. I may buy stocks that will underperform in the future  
1 2                           3                           4                      5  
12. I am not able to identify stocks with above average performance in the future.  
1 2                           3                           4                       5  
13. Buying stocks is like buying lottery tickets. Above-average performance seems 
to me to be more a matter of chance.  
1 2                          3                              4                     5  
14. My forecasts of future prices are always wrong.  
1 2                             3                          4                     5  
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Questionnaire 2: General Knowledge questions for Miscalibration Score  
  
Student Number_______________              Gender Female/Male  
For the following questions, please provide two estimates each, Lower Bound and Upper 
Bound. You believe that the true answers to the questions:  should not fall short of the 
Lower Bound with 95% probability; should not exceed the Upper Bound with 95% 
probability. In another word, you are 90% certain that the true answers are in between 
Lower and Upper Bounds.   
Example Question: What was the population of Great Britain in 1997 (in 
millions)?  
Answer: (If you are 90% certain that the population of Great Britain in 1997 
was between 47000000 and 80000000) you write:  
Lower Bound :47  
Upper Bound: 80  
Questions  
Lower  
Bound  
Upper  
Bound  
1.    Princess Diana (Princess of Wales) ’s age at death        
2.      Length of River Thames ( in km)         
3.      Number of countries that are members of United  
Nations  
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4.      Air distance from New York to London (in km)        
5.      Deepest point in the Ocean ( in meters)        
6.      What was the population in UK in year 2012( in 
millions)  
      
7.      Number of calories in a piece of white toast        
8.      Heights of the highest principal mountain of the world  
(in meters)  
      
9.      Largest continent in area of the world (in km2)        
10.   Year in which Newton discovered universal gravitation        
11.   Percentage of total area in world covered by water (%)        
12.   Number of joints in human body        
13.   GDP per capita in UK (in US$) in year 2008        
  
14.   Birth rate (birth/1000 population) in world in 2005  
  
   
  
   
   Please turnover  
15.   How many cities in UK        
16. What was the price of a US dollar in GBP yesterday      
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17.      How many companies are listed in London Stock  
Exchange   
      
18.      Suppose the expected return on stock ABC is 14%. 
Suppose risk-free interest rate =3%, E(Rm)=10% and  
ABC’s BETA =1.45. Then the alpha(excess return) on ABC 
is  
      
19.      There is a 7% semi-annual coupon bond with exactly 
2.5 years to maturity and  a yield to maturity of 8.75%, if 
face value(par)=100, what is the price(value) of the bond?  
      
20.      The price of a stock today is 100. Next year, the stock 
price will be either 120 or 90. The risk free rate is 3% per 
year . What is the price of put option with strike  
price(exercise price) 98.  
      
21.      A company has just paid a £2 dividend. If the 
company’s current growth rate of 4% is expected to continue 
indefinitely, and shareholders require a rate of return of 10% 
per annum, what ought to be the price of the company’s 
shares.(Price of a constant growth stock).   
      
22.   If the spot rate for one-year lending is 12 %, and the 
spot rate for two-year loans is 11% , the one- year implied 
forward rate is  
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Final question: Look back at your answers. Without changing any of the stated 
intervals, estimate how many of these intervals you believe contain the true value. 
In other words, how many correct answers do you think you had in those 
intervals?   
Answer: _______correct answers.  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
Questionnaire 3 Post- Experimental Questionnaire  
  
Participants were asked:  
“After the trading experiment, do you think what percentage of students doing this  
exercise  will  end  up  generating  higher  portfolio  wealth  than 
you?”______________________________________________  
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Events in the Financial Market Experiment  
  
Figure 2. Sequence of Events in Financial Market Experiment  
 
  
  
  
  
Appendix C.  
  
Hausman and Taylor step by step estimation  
1. Obtain consistent estimates of 𝛽1 and 𝛽2 using differences from “temporal mean-LSDV 
method  
(𝑦𝑖𝑡 − 𝑦 𝑖) = (𝑥1𝑖𝑡 − 𝑥 1𝑖 )′𝛽1 + (𝑥2𝑖𝑡 − 𝑥 2𝑖)′𝛽2 + (𝜖̃𝑖𝑡 − 𝜖̃𝑖 )  
2. (a) From step 1, use the residuals to compute the intra-group temporal mean of the 
residuals,   
𝑇 
 𝑇 𝑒 
𝑒𝑖 𝑡 𝑇 𝑖𝑡, and stack them into vector 𝑒 ′ = (⏞(𝑒 1 ,𝑒 1 ,…  , 𝑒 1 ),. . . ,  
  
Write down dividend prediction / Wealth is calculated but not realsed 
Session ends 
Trading Starts(Limit Order Book) 
Private information arrives 
Instructions &Trails 
Randomly assigned to groups 
Introduction & Questionnaires of Overconfidence Measurement 
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(b) Do a regression of 𝑧2𝑖, the invariant effects correlated with 𝑢̃𝑖, on 𝑧1𝑖 and 𝑥1𝑖𝑡 (c) Use 
the predicted values 𝑧 2𝑖 from (b) in the big matrix 𝑍 , where matrices 𝑍𝑘 are 
formed using the 𝑧𝑘𝑖 for each group i.  
Estimate of 𝜎  Use the estimate from LSDV regression in step 1 (d) Regress vector 𝑒 
on Z to get estimates of (𝛼 1,𝛼 2)  
(e) Note, we just did a 2SLS regression  
1. Estimate of 𝜎𝑢̃2: As in the RE model, use the estimate of 𝜎  from the 2SLS regression 
in Step2. Since:  
  𝜎  
𝜎   
𝑇 
Then an estimate of 𝜎𝑢̃ is   
𝜎  
𝜎   
𝑇 
to compute the FGLS. Let 𝜃 , then, for each group 2. We need weights 
I, let   
 𝑊 𝑖𝑡,𝑥2𝑖𝑡,𝑧1𝑖, 𝑧2𝑖] − 𝜃 [𝑥1𝑖𝑡,𝑥2𝑖𝑡, 𝑧1𝑖, 𝑧2𝑖 ]  
𝑦  𝜃 𝑦𝑖𝑡  
𝑣̃𝑖𝑡′ = [(𝑥1𝑖𝑡 − 𝑥1𝑖)′,(𝑥2𝑖𝑡 − 𝑥2𝑖)′, 𝑧1′𝑖, 𝑥 1′𝑖]  
Be the new weighted data and V the matrix of instruments, then do a 2SLS regression 
𝑦 on 𝑊 with instruments 𝑉:  of 
a) Regression 𝑊  on V, the generate the predicted values 𝑊   
b) Regress 𝑦  on the predicted values 𝑊  to get (𝛽 ′, 𝛼 ′)′  
3. To get the variance of (𝛽 ′, 𝛼 ′)′, one should not use the residuals of the 2SLS regression, 
because it is not convergent. See Greene Ch8 eq (8.8)  
  
  
= √ 
𝜎  𝜖̃ 2 
𝜎  𝜖̃ 2 + 𝑇 𝜎 𝑢̃ 2   
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